


The ANNALIST

A Magazine of Finance, Commerce and Economics

OCT. 23, 1922



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Vol. 20, No. 510

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
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Issued Monthly by

THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY
TIMES SQUARE, NEW YORK

25 cents a copy

\$3.00 a year

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THE ANNALIST

A Magazine of Finance, Commerce and Economics

Published Every Monday Morning by The New York Times Company, Times Square, New York

Subscription Rates

	One Year.	Three Years.	Six Years.
In United States, Mexico and United States tributaries.....	\$3.00	\$1.25	\$2.50
Canada (postpaid).....	5.50	1.40	2.75
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Single Copies, 10 Cents			
Binder for 28 Issues, \$1.50			

Entered as second-class matter March 21, 1914, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under Act of March 3, 1879

Vol. 20, No. 510

NEW YORK, MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1922

Ten Cents

Time to Abolish the Railroad Labor Board

By Benjamin Baker

IT must be evident to those who have followed closely the situation of the railroads that the winding up of the shopmen's strike marks the end of a definite cycle in railroad labor relations. The scheme of cast-iron, nation-wide labor regulation on the initiative of labor unions, which was forced upon the country by the Railroad Administration, has shown itself not only dangerous but practically unworkable, and it has, at length, broken down under the weight of its own excess. Pretty clearly indicated in the events of the last two months, the reality of this change was strikingly recognized on the part of a large section of organized railroad labor when W. G. Lee, President of the Brotherhood of Trainmen (brakemen) issued his recent public statement at Cleveland.

Mr. Lee, who has a well-deserved reputation for seeing things as they are, said in substance that the national handling of railroad labor controversies was *too big a job for any one man or for any small group of men*, and that, therefore, his organization (and by inference the other brotherhoods) would return to the former practice of dealing with labor issues where they arose, and with the individual railroads directly concerned—also in part through legislation. He declared that the situation, as it has recently existed, was “full of dynamite” for all parties involved—labor no less than the railroads and the public. On the subject of nation-wide strikes, he crystallized the lesson of the past Summer in these words:

“No sane government will permit any faction or class to paralyze the transportation business of the country and thereby punish the innocent, who are always in the majority.”

The establishing of this principle of public action in the minds of the whole people is the worthy and adequate accomplishment that emerges from the bitter struggle of last Summer. To twist a bit of ancient slang: “It came high, but we had to have it.” On the whole, national safety is probably worth what it costs to get it.

In the new situation brought about by the failure of the shopmen's strike, a readjustment of the Federal Government's method of dealing with railroad labor is more than ever desirable, and, what is more to the point, a saner and more reasonable method is now practicable.

President Harding's reputed purpose to ask Congress to put “teeth” in the Transportation act, so that railroad strikes might be prevented under statutory sanction was always unwise (as the writer sees the matter), and is now pretty clearly unnecessary. The truth expressed in the sentence quoted from Mr. Lee's statement ought to have been clear to the whole country last June. In a country of the great physical extent of the United States it is perfectly

evident that a suspension of the interstate traffic, over which the Federal Government has exclusive and unlimited power, must operate as a suspension of that Government itself, and that “no sane Government” can or will permit such an assault on its own existence.

National Government has effectually asserted its authority, and that authority is generally recognized. Let well enough alone.

Changes in the Labor Board, however, present a very different question. Labor leaders have always opposed it, and vari-

therefore, for some agency representing the public, through the Federal Government, to act as a court of appeal in wage disputes on the railroads which cannot be settled by direct negotiations.

In setting up the Railroad Labor Board Congress attempted to provide a final wage tribunal of this character. But the scheme selected had two radical vices, which experience has made abundantly clear.

The first of these is the tripartisan composition of the board. This was presumably dictated by the idea that there was something especially “fair” in giving equal representation on the board to the three parties concerned—the public, the railroads and labor. That idea has proved wholly illusory in practice, and that it would be so might well enough have been foreseen at the outset. The railroad members of the board have been, and were bound to be, partisan supporters of the railroad point of view. The labor members have been even more emphatically partisan supporters of the labor point of view. The actual decisions of the board have been made by the action of the public group of three, as was certain to be the case. The inclusion of the railroad and labor groups is worse than being the inclusion of two mutually neutralizing groups of votes—it has delayed and, in not a few instances, beclouded the action of the public group and its decisions. In the decisions and opinions relating to the wage orders which preceded the recent shop strike, the labor group unmistakably used its official position to embarrass and discredit the board as a whole and to encourage and foment strikes whose inevitable tendency was to destroy the authority of the board altogether.

The board or tribunal dealing with railroad wage issues should consist wholly of representatives of the public. The railroad side and the labor side of any issue brought before such a body can be adequately presented, with full justice to each side, without giving either side an opportunity to embarrass and discredit the final action by official participation in it in the necessarily fictitious character of “impartial” arbiters. One necessary change in the Labor Board is, therefore, cutting it down to members representing the public.

Another fundamental error in the establishment of the Labor Board lay in giving jurisdiction of railroad wages, outgo, to a body independent of that which controlled income, the Interstate Commerce Commission. It may be argued that the actual course of events has shown no serious ill results from this situation; that the Labor Board has had a certain unofficial contact with the commission, and that its wage orders have in reality been reasonably well related to the action of the commission on rates. But it is a weak defense of an unsound principle to say that it has done no serious harm—yet. The scheme of two independent boards dealing with opposing aspects of a single industry is wholly indefensible as a principle, and

This principle was asserted on the broadest grounds of national necessity in the Supreme Court's opinion in *In re Debs*; and to thinking men no new assertion of it was logically necessary. We have that assertion, however, in Judge Wilkerson's opinion accompanying his injunction against the shop strike. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court, if the Wilkerson injunction ever comes before it, should fail to sustain it in all essentials on the grounds presented in the *Debs* case. Dismissal of the injunction, as asked last week by the labor attorneys on the ground that the situation it applied to no longer exists, would leave the authority of the principles on which it rests wholly unimpaired. The paramount public right has been asserted and recognized on all sides—as a fact, if not as a theory, acceptable to labor leaders like Mr. Gompers.

To “rub it in” by adding anti-strike clauses and penalties to the Transportation act, besides being unnecessary, would arouse an opposition and launch a new propaganda against recognition of the public right that stands in no need of such gratuitous stimulation. The

ous bills of their inspiring are ready to propose its abolition.

The Labor Board should be abolished, but not in the manner advocated by the labor leaders, nor yet by transfer of its functions to the Department of Labor, as Secretary Davis has lately urged.

The function of the Labor Board should be preserved, while the board itself should be abolished, and the theory on which it was constituted discarded. The public is entitled to insist that there shall be no railroad strikes interrupting vital interstate traffic. Labor is entitled to ask that when the economic weapon of the strike is taken away from it the public shall compensate for that deprivation by providing some other adequate means of equalizing the bargaining power of the great corporation and of its employees, essentially that the public shall assume the obligation of seeing that substantial justice is done as between the two parties. This view of the public's relation to strikes is, of course, not acceptable to Mr. Gompers and his adherents, who assert that labor (leaders) must be at all times free to do as it pleases; but it will commend itself to most reasonable persons. There is need,

It ought now to be abandoned. Probably the framers of the Transportation act were quite conscious of this, and it is possible that they set up the Labor Board in its present form because they felt it politically necessary to give organized railroad labor an official voice in deciding wage issues, and to give labor representatives meant also the railroads, and, therefore, a tribunal that could not well be combined with the Interstate Commerce Commission. It is more than likely, also, that other political considerations now less obvious than that just mentioned came into play in shaping the Labor Board. The second necessary change in the Labor Board is, therefore, to abolish it altogether as an independent body dealing with the railroad industry.

THE obviously simple and effective way to co-ordinate public control of railroad finances, and to give the decision on such questions to the public representatives who will always decide such issues, whatever the scheme for partisan representation, is to turn the matter of railroad wages and working conditions over to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Some reorganization of the commission itself would be necessary to enable it to assume this function and discharge it adequately; and the

writer hazards the guess that a measure of such reorganization is desirable quite apart from the question of taking over the wage matter. There should be no need of increasing the present size of the commission. Better organization for its work would, in all probability, enable it to carry some additional cares quite as efficiently as it now bears its present burdens.

For the inclusion of wage issues among its duties the organization of the commission might well be changed by making the Chairman responsible for the conduct of all the administrative functions of the commission, and for the assigning of members of the commission to different branches of work. Under this plan the Chairman would designate three members of the commission to sit as a board of appeal on railroad wages and working conditions, acting on submissions or appeals as the Labor Board now does. The findings of this wage section should be reported to the full commission, to be considered by the whole membership mainly, if not wholly, in regard to the effect of the findings on the balance of income and outgo of the road or roads affected. The ultimate decision, revised if necessary in the light of railroad income conditions, should be promulgated as the decision of the commission as a whole.

The only objection that can be urged against this plan, as the writer sees the case, is the objection that it goes far to eliminate politics from the determination of railroad wages. It should go far to accomplish that result, and that is one of its merits in the writer's mind. The general public has little knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the selection and appointment of the public members of the Labor Board. There is no hidden scandal in the matter; but it is difficult for those who know something of the affair to feel that all the appointments, either in the public or the labor groups, have been as good as could have been made. It is fairly obvious that the appointments have not always been made with the chief aim of obtaining high ability and the capacity for sound judgment. It is for political reasons—or to evade them as much as possible—that it is proposed to have the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, rather than the President, designate the members of the suggested wage section. There is fair reason for expecting that any President will be more critical in selecting a new member of the commission than in naming members of the Labor Board, and any direct political bidding through such appointments would be made of uncertain effectiveness

by leaving the assignment to the wage section in the hands of the Chairman. No check is perfect, but this one seems reasonably promising.

UNDER the changed conditions of labor relations it seems reasonable to assume that the volume of work that would come before the proposed wage section of the Interstate Commerce Commission would be very much smaller than that the Labor Board has had to deal with in the last thirty months. It has been the consistent policy of all the railroad labor organizations in this period to take everything to the Labor Board. That was a piece of tactics—the piling up of disputes “likely to cause a serious interruption”—on which the shop crafts leaders depended for stampeding the board, and by which they nearly succeeded in persuading the public members to set up adjustment boards on the sole authority of the board. This phase has passed. The train service brotherhoods, by choice and election, and the other organization largely by necessity, will now deal with the railroads and agree with them if possible. It seems quite improbable that the volume of wage appeals and investigations would be too great for the wage section of an interstate commission adequately organized on the administrative side.

Stock Dividends—Are They Advisable?

By Frank E. Seidman, M. C. S., C. P. A.

IN the last few weeks the financial district has been aglow as a result of so-called “mellon” cuttings. Some of the large corporations, especially the Standard Oil Companies, have already declared large stock dividends. Others are admittedly contemplating them and Wall Street is seeking the reason for this sudden outpouring of paper dividends.

The United States Supreme Court decided that stock dividends were not taxable as income (*Eisner vs. Macomber*), on March 8, 1920, or nearly two and one-half years ago, and, at first thought, it appears strange that large corporations that intended to declare stock dividends did not do so a long time ago. Two important reasons seem to account for this delay: First, that the decision was rendered at about the time when bonus legislation was just beginning to be agitated and the taxing of stock dividends was feared as a revenue producing measure for this purpose; second, that large corporations, like other large bodies, move slowly.

There are a number of reasons why the present is an opportune time for the declaration of stock dividends. It is becoming apparent that the Government must seek new sources of revenue. Secretary Mellon announces a governmental deficit for the last fiscal year of more than one-half billion dollars. With the reduction of corporation income tax rates for the current year and a reduction of surtax rates on individual incomes, the probabilities are that the Government will fare no better in the next fiscal year under the present tax laws. It is imperative, therefore, that new sources of revenue be discovered and tapped in order to balance the governmental budget.

Prominent among the new taxation schemes proposed is that of taxing the undistributed profits of corporations. The proponents of this tax argue that, under the present tax laws, a corporation pays only a 12½ per cent. tax on its income, whereas profits made by individuals are taxed as high as 50 per cent. It is contended, therefore, that a tax on undistributed profits is justified in order to equalize the tax paid upon incomes by those corporations that do not distribute their incomes so that they would become taxable to the individuals. It is argued that

such a tax would result in considerable revenue to the Government from one of two angles. Either the corporation would pay the tax on account of the nondistribution of its earnings or, if the corporation did distribute its earnings, a tax would be collected from the individual stockholders.

While bankers and economists will probably raise considerable objection to this tax because of the possibility of overdraining the current capital of corporations, yet it is probable that, by the provision of proper exemptions, this scheme of taxing might be developed to produce the required results without hurting the financial structure of industry.

If such a tax is instituted it probably cannot be made to apply to surpluses accumulated prior to the passage of the new tax. However, it is possible that the new law, in the computation of exemptions, might take into consideration previously accumulated surpluses in such a way as to result in a detrimental effect upon corporations with large surpluses. It is as a protection against such a possibility that it appears advisable to declare stock dividends now.

Whether or not an undistributed profits tax is levied it is quite probable that an excise tax on the privilege of declaration of stock dividends will be considered in the next change in our revenue laws. In the hearings before the Senate Finance Committee during its consideration of the 1921 revenue law a stock dividend tax of 10 per cent. was proposed. Finally, however, it was eliminated from the bill, apparently for the reason that it was intended to be used as a source of revenue in connection with the prospective Soldiers' Bonus bill. If an undistributed profits tax is levied it will become imperative to provide for a stock dividend tax, as, otherwise, the proposed tax on surplus would be defeatable by the elimination of surplus through the declaration of stock dividends.

At the present time, therefore, when there is no tax whatsoever either upon surplus or upon the privilege of declaring stock dividends (other than stamp taxes) it would seem advisable to take advantage of this situation.

It is interesting to note that, under the revenue act of 1921, corporations are threatened with severe penalties if

they do not distribute their available earnings not used or usable in the business to their stockholders in the form of dividends. Section 220 of the revenue act of 1921 provides that if any corporation is formed or availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of surtaxes on its stockholders through the medium of permitting its profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed, a tax of 25 per cent. of the net income of such corporations shall be levied in addition to other taxes.

A similar provision was embodied in the 1918 Federal tax law. However, there are no cases on record of any action being taken by the Government to enforce this provision under the old law. The language in the 1921 law, however, is considerably stronger in this respect than in prior laws and it is quite probable that the Treasury Department will attempt to enforce this section of the law against corporations that have large surpluses or surplus funds which are not at present being used in the business.

By the declaration of stock dividends, surplus is automatically eliminated, notwithstanding the fact that the surplus funds remain in the business. A question then arises as to whether or not the department could still force dividend distributions or penalize the non-payment of

dividends when no surpluses are available. It is an established rule of law, confirmed by most State statutes, that dividends are payable only out of surplus. Once surplus has been capitalized it cannot, therefore, legally be absorbed through dividend appropriations. It is doubtful, therefore, if, under such circumstances, the Treasury Department could effectively enforce Section 220.

From the financial angle one of the principal benefits resulting from the issue of a stock dividend is the permanent retention of profits in the business. Once stock dividends are declared the result is a permanent capitalization of surplus that would otherwise be at all times available for distribution. Thus, such a dividend results in the permanent withholding from stockholders of the assets desired to be retained in the business. The stock dividend pacifies the stockholder when it is declared, in that it nominally gives him a dividend and, at the same time, benefits the corporation through the permanent capitalization of its surplus.

Another very important effect of the stock dividend is the obliteration of the surplus account so that it cannot be easily pointed to by the public as a sign of accumulation of unreasonable profits. Corporations that have accumulated large surpluses are always held out to the public as profit gougers. By the capitalization of the surplus account the

Continued on Page 427.



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The Austro-Hungarian Bank and Its Successor

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HE present currency used in Austria consists of several trainloads of notes printed on a good quality of paper and issued by the Austro-Hungarian Bank. Yet this bank was the instrument of a great financial reform, beginning in 1892, and brought order out of a disorder that had continued for years. Its charter gave it a monopoly of the issue of money and the reform law required that it keep a metal reserve equal at least to two-fifths of the notes in circulation. Those, of course, were legal tender and had to be accepted in payment of debts throughout Austria-Hungary. The notes outstanding on June 30, 1914, amounted to 2,325,145,670 crowns and served the needs of an empire of 53,000,000 people. The two-fifths reserve was sufficient, up to Aug. 4, 1914, to carry out the promise which is still being printed on the notes issued by the Bank, "The Austro-Hungarian Bank will pay against this bank-note at its central institutions in Vienna or Budapest, straightway on demand (from one to one hundred thousand) crowns in legal metal money." Before the war, gold and silver coins could practically always be obtained for notes.

But, under the stress of war, the metal reserve provision of the Bank was changed by law so that banknotes could be issued, not only on security of metal reserves but also on the basis of Treasury certificates held by the Bank. This was done so that the Government could meet its bills by discounting its own paper and receiving money in exchange. In redeeming these certificates, however, it fell further and further into arrears until it seriously impaired the credit of the Bank and reduced the value of its notes.

The assets of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, before the war, were gold and silver and foreign bills of exchange amounting to 1,609,071,835 crowns, an empire-wide network of buildings and business, and a remarkable fiscal organization of expert personnel. At the end of the war the Reparation Commission put all the Bank's assets into the hands of liquidators, who are still struggling with one of the most intricate problems the victors have had to solve. The price to be paid to the Bank's stockholders by States of Succession such as Czechoslovakia for buildings and other physical properties once belonging to the Bank is not yet settled, nor is the amount of banknotes to be redeemed by each State determined as yet. Some of the gold reserve was used to pay Dutch creditors, after reducing the bill more than half, for 7,000,000 gulden's worth of food sold to the Austro-Hungarian Government in 1917. The Austrian papers published acres of print discussing this question. It was usually referred to as the "Numschuld" after the initials of the Dutch organization "Nederlandsche Uitvoer Maatschappij."

At the end of 1919 arrangements were completed to set up a separate Austrian division of the Austro-Hungarian Bank with its own statement of assets and liabilities. Besides an indeterminate share of the assets held by the liquidators, the Austrian division has re-

sources as published on various dates. These are given in the Table I.

On the 23rd of August the weight of the gold at the disposal of the Bank with which to redeem its billion of promises was 13,6216 kilograms or 30.03 pounds. Silver and other metal assets had a negligible value.

By I. S. Pratt

Bank was obsolescent and ought to become obsolete as a bank of issue for Austria. It was at the mercy of the Government's necessities and was forced to inflate its currency from time to time in amounts not subject to a visible limit. There was apparently no means of controlling the depreciation. In lit-

of sugar, one bar of soap, &c., and then only if the shopkeeper was well disposed towards them. And as for the foreigners, they were calmly told by shopkeepers that the price of the overcoat or silk dress or rug had doubled, or else must be paid in foreign "valuta" at the preceding month's rate of exchange. Many stores closed on various pretexts. More than one antiquity dealer and fancy grocer clapped down his steel shutters and left town to spend

a few weeks at home in the country with his roses and vegetables.

Yet workers with small incomes must buy their little supplies every day and the shops must remain open to them. Obviously the Government had to do something. So the prominent bankers of the city were called into conference on the evening of the 13th of June and given all the brutal facts in the Government's possession. They received a full description of the bitter road Austria

TABLE I.
Assets of the Austrian Division of the Austro-Hungarian Bank

Date.	(In millions of crowns)						(In thousands of dollars)					
	Gold Coins and Other Metals Given In Gold.	Foreign Bills of Exchange Given	Private Banks and Other Commercial Discounts (paper)	Promissory Notes of the Austro- Hungarian Bank (paper)	Treasury Certificates Discounted at the Austro- Hungarian Bank (paper)	Gold Coins and Other Metals Exchange	Foreign Bills of Commercial Discounts (paper)	Promissory Notes of Private Banks and Other Metals Assets	Treasury Certificates Discounted at the Austro- Hungarian Bank	Gold Coins and Other Metals Given In Gold.	Foreign Bills of Commercial Discounts (paper)	Treasury Certificates Discounted at the Austro- Hungarian Bank
Jan. 7, 1920...	*278.7	7.7	92.4	14,771.3	Not stated	\$56,389.2	\$1,554.9	\$330.0	\$52,754.7	Not stated	74,304.6	Not stated
June 30, 1920...	0.05	8.9	10,251.1	10,774.1	separately	9.7	1,797.0	70,697.2	74,304.6	19,019.9	19,019.9	19,019.9
Dec. 31, 1920...	0.05	8.8	23,021.6	12,553.1		10.7	1,758.4	34,881.2	4,656.1	66,351.8	27,297.3	20,048.7
June 30, 1921...	0.07	6.6	1,305.8	13,064.2	47,773.3	13.9	1,326.3	1,813.6	18,144.7	1,671.0	13,130.4	1,783.5
Dec. 31, 1921...	0.09	9.9	29,373.7	25,888.2	151,773.1	17.3	2,007.3	5,283.0	4,516.3	11,580.9	1,869.2	11,029.6
June 30, 1922...	0.06	1.9	175,301.4	85,358.1	378,919.8	13.0	373.9	9,275.2	8,418.1	8,418.1		
July 31, 1922...	0.07	1.3	255,116.5	70,384.3	555,416.8	13.3	268.2	6,031.1				
Aug. 7, 1922...	0.07	1.3	276,595.4	92,026.7	597,576.8	13.3	260.7	5,360.4				
Aug. 15, 1922...	0.07	1.4	303,545.8	109,067.1	643,576.8	13.3	284.9	5,202.2				
Aug. 23, 1922...	0.07	0.9	404,421.0	†274,069.0	670,077.8	13.3	178.9	5,080.7				

*It should be noted that at this date the Austrian and other shares of metal reserves, foreign bills of exchange, and certain other assets were not yet separated in the statements of the Austro-Hungarian Bank.

†Including 116 billions of paper crowns as the equivalent of 20 millions French francs deposited with Austro-Hungarian Bank, but sequestered in favor of the new note bank.

TABLE II.

Liabilities of the Austrian Division of the Austro-Hungarian Bank

Date.	(In millions of paper crowns)				Current Rate of Exchange.	Value in Dollars.
	Notes in Circulation.	and Other Liabilities.	Total.	Current Rate of Exchange.		
Jan. 7, 1920...	12,101.2	2,762.5	14,863.7	280	\$53,084,779.62	
June 30, 1920...	16,971.3	4,062.9	21,034.2	145	145,063,422.02	
Dec. 31, 1920...	30,645.7	4,937.8	35,583.5	660	53,914,437.69	
June 30, 1921...	49,685.1	12,464.8	62,149.9	720	86,319,275.75	
Dec. 31, 1921...	174,114.7	32,830.2	206,944.9	5,560	37,220,314.06	
June 30, 1922...	549,915.7	89,665.5	639,581.2	18,900	33,840,274.66	
July 31, 1922...	786,225.6	94,683.4	880,909.0	42,300	20,825,271.99	
Aug. 7, 1922...	833,471.5	132,728.8	966,200.3	51,600	18,724,812.56	
Aug. 15, 1922...	913,932.4	142,228.8	1,056,191.2	58,350	18,100,963.35	
Aug. 23, 1922...	1,147,587.0	200,981.8	1,348,568.8	79,600	16,941,819.31	

While the assets have been dwindling, liabilities in crowns have increased by fantastic leaps, as may be seen from the summary of increases in the circulation of notes and checking accounts in Table II.

The reason the Bank's liabilities have grown to such enormous proportions may be gleaned from Table I. The Government has not been able to redeem its discounted treasury certificates at the Bank; its income has not been equal to its expenditure. Since the discounted certificates could not be taken up out of taxes and other revenues on hand it was necessary to issue new certificates in ever increasing amounts to retire the old ones when due. These in turn have served as the basis of ever increasing emissions of banknote currency, bearing the time-worn promise of redemption in gold or other metal money. But such heaps of paper promises have depressed the public's confidence in their ultimate value until the rate of exchange for dollars or pounds or gulden is now incredible. A remarkable and seldom appreciated anomaly is that the Bank's total liability, when converted into gold, is decreasing. The tendency I have remarked appears in Table II.

The point is coming into view when the entire circulation of the present Bank of Issue—which represents the floating debt of the country—could be bought up and retired at its current exchange value with the sum of one million dollars, or perhaps one dollar. I say perhaps, because there may first be a total collapse or upheaval.

By the middle of June, 1922, it had become clear that the Austro-Hungarian

had more than two years the exchange value of the total note circulation had decreased eight-ninths, from 145 million dollars to 16 millions. In the course of two weeks last June the crown lost half of its exchange value. At the end of May this year the dollar sold in Vienna for 11,000 crowns. On the twelfth of June it brought more than 22,000.

The second week in June one of Vienna's periodical purchasing panics set in. The workingman's wife, instead of buying as usual, one kilo of sugar, one kilo of flour, one kilo of lard, or one bar of soap, at one time demanded five kilos of fat, ten kilos of sugar and twenty bars of soap—in spite of the fact that deliveries are not as a rule made and each buyer has to carry her purchases home.

Those more well-to-do suddenly discovered that they needed sugar by the bag, flour by the hundredweight, and potatoes, milk, lard, salt, &c., in quantities sufficient for several months.

Foreigners who for some time had cast longing eyes at expensive overcoats, silk dresses, or Oriental rugs, beheld the coveted articles reduced in a few days to a cost in their money which made them an irresistible "buy." No one had suspected how many foreigners there were in Vienna until they came thronging out to make hay in the sunshine of depreciation.

But the art of defense is not without its stratagems against even the eager onslaughts of bargain hunters. The poor man's wife was sent away with half the amounts she had usually been able to obtain. Those who bought by the case were doled out one can of milk, one kilo

had followed in trying to induce numerous foreign powers with divergent and conflicting interests to waive their reparations claims so that the panting little republic could have a breathing spell. But in spite of the fact—he who runs can read—that reparations could not be collected from Austria, its reasonable requests had not been granted. Though no nation would lose by suspending its claims on Austrian assets for twenty years, the desperate plea was sent from one nation to another, was referred to the League of Nations, then turned over to the Reparations Commission and carried to each one of a series of conferences of the great powers—and nothing done really to put Austria on its feet.

Small credits such as those tardily obtained could not possibly cure the State's ailment and start the new note bank, which everybody agreed was the thing most needed. But now it was clear that they could not delay its founding until assets were freed from reparations' liens. The country must have a currency in which it could have confidence; a new note bank of issue must be founded and it must be done at once.

The result of this conference, announced the next day by the Chancellor, was a decision by Austrian bankers to found a new note bank themselves. Its capital was to be 100,000,000 Swiss francs; 60,000,000 to be underwritten by the banks, 40,000,000 to be subscribed by the public. Special inducements were offered to all who contributed Swiss francs or other sound money in return for shares in the new enterprise. Amnesty was to be held out to those who, by subscribing, revealed hoardings forbidden by law and hitherto punishable by severe penalties. For, it should be remembered, the emergency laws of last December required every citizen to announce to the Government, or place at its disposal, all his holdings in foreign values at home or abroad.

As announced in June and developed by subsequent legislation, the assets of the new bank are to be, besides the 100,000,000 Swiss francs, the Austrian share of the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, including coins, bullion, buildings in the Secession States, &c.; the metal reserves, commercial paper and physical properties now in possession of the Austrian Division of the Austro-Hungarian Bank; the exclusive

right for twenty-five years to issue bank notes as legal tender; part of the sums lent by France and Italy; treasury certificates which, unless redeemed within a definite time by the Government, are to bring the bank interest from the Government. The payment of this interest is to be secured by a first lien on receipts from State forests, salt mines, and other revenues, probably including customs. The Government is also to obtain foreign loans, if possible, to strengthen the assets of the new bank.

The liabilities of the new bank are to take over the money issued by the Austro-Hungarian Bank and at least prevent its depreciation. This ought to be easy, as the notes at present are supported by a gold reserve that a man could carry in his overcoat pocket and they would then be backed by gold worth almost 20,000,000 besides other resources

in the form of monopoly, divers privileges, &c. The rate at which old bank notes will be converted into notes of the new bank of issue is to be settled later.

The keystone of the whole structure was the asset contained in the Government's pledge not to exact loans from the new bank unless fully covered by gold or collateral equally sound in value. If the Austrian Government could live up to this self-denying ordinance then the task of the new Note Bank would be a possible one and the appeal to subscribe for its shares a potent one. Hope reigned for awhile. The quoted value of the crown rose nearly 40 per cent.

In a few weeks, however, under the burden of enormous issues establishing new weekly records, combined with other causes, the rate dropped again. A huge demonstration was announced for the 19th of July. On the eve of the 19th

the Government prohibited all sales of currencies except small sums needed by travelers leaving the country. Popular belief ran to the effect that the fall of the crown and the rise of prices were due to "valuta shiebers" who were "fixing" rates of exchange and frightening people into converting all their Austrian money into dollars, pounds, Czech crowns, Swiss francs, Italian lira, or other moneys.

This move of the authorities quieted the public. The demonstration passed off harmlessly (two English gunboats happened, quite by accident, to come up the river and arrive in Vienna on the evening of the 18th). But, after a short recovery, the crown fell again to 40,000 per dollar, then 50,000, 60,000, 70,000 and on downward.

Such a calamitous fall at a time when the Chancellor and the Finance Minister were moving heavenly and earthly

powers to get the new bank started, argued an appalling lack of public confidence in any redemption of the crown. In August it became known that the subscriptions made by the Anglo and Laender Banks—which had recently been converted into English and French institutions respectively—would not be approved by the head offices in London and Paris unless the charter of the new bank of emission were further modified so as to assure its greater independence from Government control.

Such an attitude challenges the greatest asset of the new Note Bank. If business men cannot be satisfied on this point there will be indefinite delay and perhaps catastrophe. If they can be assured that the Government will not have to use the new institution as a means of paying current expenses, then success is unquestionable. The whole country is bravely hoping against experience.

Money Standard
Economic Stabilization

Business

The Function of Gold in Foreign Trade

By William Trufant Foster

Director of Pollak Foundation for Economic Research

To understand the difference between internal trade and international trade, we must bear in mind the fact that there is no international money. Trade within a country is on a money basis; trade between countries is on a gold basis. This distinction is commonly overlooked. Some current fallacies are due to the assumption, expressed or implied, that whatever holds true of commercial transactions within a country holds true of transactions with other countries.

Although commerce among the nations is carried on without international money, it cannot be carried on extensively without an internationally recognized measure of value. No satisfactory measure of value has yet been used. Of all that have been tried, gold is by far the best. And as long as the currency units in various countries are weights of gold of given fineness, those countries use in foreign trade exactly the same measure of value that they would use if there were an international gold currency.

Thus, the gold basis of money promotes international trade by establishing fixed value-relationships among all the convertible currency units of the world. However the value of gold may fluctuate, the currencies of gold basis countries at least have a nearly fixed relationship to each other. Before the war, for example, the ruble contained 11.94 grains of gold and the dollar 25.8 grains. Consequently, an Atlanta merchant could sell his cotton for future delivery in Petrograd at a fixed price in rubles and know almost exactly how many dollars the rubles would bring several months later. Similarly, the pound was never far from 4.866 times as valuable as the dollar, because the pound contained 4.866 times as much gold as the dollar. This relationship was maintained as long as both the pound and the dollar were freely convertible into gold and were, therefore, freely interchangeable at the established ratio. For the same reason, it was easy to tell instantly how many dollars a thousand marks, or kronen, or guilder, or yen were worth. Thus the price quotations of all gold basis countries were linked together.

When the currencies of any two countries are related in this way, business between them is subject to no risk of exchange fluctuations beyond the cost of occasional shipments of gold. Whether it pays to ship gold is determined by market conditions. If the level of prices is higher in one country than in another, gold is necessarily cheaper in the country of higher prices and it is, therefore, shipped in preference to other commodi-

ties. In the United States, for example, when the volume of money increases faster than the volume of trade, the purchasing power of the dollar declines. If it sinks below parity with the yen by a sufficient amount to cover cost of shipment, and a profit on the transaction, gold is shipped to Japan, or to London for credit to a Japanese account. This is not because there is anything really "adverse" about the balance of trade, but simply because gold buys more in Japan. Gold seeks the market where its value is highest, measured as all value must be, by purchasing power. It is subject to the economic laws that govern all other commodities.

The movement of gold from one country to another tends to equalize the value of gold in the two, within the limits of the cost of shipment, by increasing the volume in the importing country and reducing it in the other. Gold serves, therefore, as an equalizer of money values between gold standard countries, but it has no power to stabilize the purchasing power of money in any country. Like a pipe between two tanks of water, it keeps the level of the water the same, but the level will rise in both if water is added to either.

Before the war, for example, if prices in Germany rose above those in England, it became more profitable to ship goods to Germany. Presently, therefore, German importers were obliged to ship gold to England to pay for the excess of imports over exports; with the result that prices in Germany tended to fall, prices in England tended to rise, and the flow of gold stopped or began to move in the other direction. Thus variations from the established exchange rate were never much more than the cost of shipping gold. For the same reason the exchange rate of the dollar and the pound usually varied only between 4.885 and 4.845—the gold export and import points. Before the war, therefore, fluctuations in exchange rates did not paralyze foreign trade.

After the war, however, when most currencies were no longer convertible, an Atlanta merchant who wished to trade with Petrograd, or Vienna, or Hamburg, or Paris, often had to meet, in addition to all the other risks of international trade, the risk of losing all his profits or more because of the falling values of nonconvertible currencies. It was not possible to reach a safe basis for foreign trade by converting paper prices into gold prices. As soon as the greater part of Europe abandoned the gold basis, the confusion was such that all price and wage comparisons became misleading. In February, 1921, for example, the wages of carpenters, in gold exchange value, were about as follows:

In the United States, \$9 per day; in Great Britain, \$3.26; in Belgium, \$1.91; in China, \$0.30; in Germany, \$0.24. That is to say, the daily wage of a carpenter in Germany was worth about 24 cents in gold. Many startling conclusions concerning foreign trade were drawn from the wide discrepancy between a daily wage of \$9 in gold in the United States and 24 cents in Germany; but the German carpenter was spending his 24 cents in a country where values were no longer measured in terms of gold. Consequently, it was misleading to use the old methods of comparing the wages and prices of Germany with those of any gold-basis country.

IT is not the lack of an international currency today that hinders world trade, but lack of a common measure of value—the lack of any currency units at all within many commercially important countries that are maintained in fixed relation to the value of the gold dollar. The gold dollar, or any other piece of gold of known weight and fineness, serves foreign trade—with the aid of a little arithmetic—just as well as it serves domestic trade. It is not the fact that paper money is nonconvertible that discourages foreign trade. It is the fact that, because it is nonconvertible, it fluctuates in value so rapidly and so widely that a merchant who sells goods at paper money prices has no means of knowing what his pay will be worth on the day he receives it. If the purchasing power of nonconvertible paper money could have been guaranteed during the World War, it would have been more eagerly sought than gold, because gold itself was unstable in value. Following the World War, the fluctuating values of nonconvertible currencies directly caused the breakdown of international trade relations; and the restoration of the gold basis in the chief commercial nations is now the dominant economic problem of the world.

When a nation is on an nonconvertible paper basis, there is no automatic curb upon the fluctuations of foreign exchange; on the contrary, an abridgment of the freedom of the market for gold at once increases the difficulty. The greater the doubt concerning the freedom of the market, the greater is the amount of gold required to maintain convertibility and take care of a given volume of internal trade.

Furthermore, the smaller the volume of other commodities available for export, the greater is the need of gold for export. But soon there is no gold to export. For, when economic conditions are unsound, as they were in most of those countries which continued, long after the war, to consume more goods

than they produced, the inward flow of gold is obstructed. Excess of consumption over production can continue only as long as a country exports gold, or pays the balance with services, or with the income or principal of foreign investments, or succeeds in getting the people of other countries to speculate in foreign exchange. For a time, following the war, Germany was successful in selling marks abroad. But this is only a temporary expedient. On account of the increasingly adverse exchange rates which result, the people of other countries presently stop speculating and the excess consumption has to stop.

Such emergencies cannot be met successfully by suspension or evasion of the principle of convertibility. For the value of money, once it has depreciated, tends to fall still further, because more paper money is issued under the stimulus of rising prices, the consequent need of the Government for larger funds, and the general complaint that there is "not enough money to do business with." When the income of an individual or a nation is less than the outlay, increased expenses can be met only by increased promises to pay. The easiest way, and at times apparently the only way, for a nation to make good these promises is by printing more paper money, or by obtaining bank credits in exchange for promises to pay in the form of certificates of indebtedness. The result is further fluctuations in foreign exchange; for gold does not flow in to restore the balance of prices.

BEFORE the war, the fact that in London all credits were immediately convertible into gold was enough to make London the money market of the world. For this reason, as Bagehot insisted in "Lombard Street," the Bank of England had to keep a far larger gold reserve in proportion to its liabilities than other banks, chiefly on account of the impossibility of predicting the extent of the demands of international trade at any particular time. Since that time, the history of the Bank of England has proved that Bagehot was right. As soon as London abandoned the gold basis, the rest of the world began to turn to the United States, and for the same reason that it had previously turned to London. In so far as the United States has succeeded England as the banking center of the world, Bagehot's argument applies to the United States. As long as every promise to pay, issued by any bank in any country in any form, means that the holder of this promise to pay can get gold from his bank, his bank must have the means of obtaining the gold on demand. But if the gold is more useful to his bank as a credit with the banks of the United States, then the banks of the United States, if they are to serve as the Bank of England did be-

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OCT

The Economic Position of Japan

By W. Mitham

THE wonderful faculty for economic self-deception which political Europe has displayed since the armistice finds its counterpart in Japan's present disquieting financial condition. While Europe is slowly setting itself to the task of repairing the wreck and ravages of the World War, Japan, which knew only profit in the great struggle, is now facing a period of reaction and liquidation, the severity of which threatens to be accentuated by the happy thought expedients unwisely adopted to check the continued inflation, profiteering and extravagance.

During the war Japan was in a most advantageous position economically. Foreign trade yearly showed an excess of exports, while increased freights and insurances were fruitful sources of invisible income. Specie holdings at home increased from a level of 400,000,000 yen in pre-war years to 2,200,000,000 yen at the end of 1920. Foreign credit balances accumulated to almost the same extent, while foreign debts increased from 1,900,000,000 yen to 1,600,000,000 yen. In the brief space of five or six years, the country gained enormous wealth. Postal savings deposits rose in the aggregate from 196,072,000 yen in 1914 to 827,550,000 yen in 1920. Domestic markets, under the stimulus of world demands, showed great activity. Earnings were unprecedentedly large; industries were promoted and extended and all together much capital was wasted in new enterprises that have added nothing to the real wealth of the country.

The great influx of gold, however, which the enormous export trade brought was, in itself, an inflationary development and automatically created a reserve upon which the banks could expand credit and put into the hands of the people a purchasing power which had grown much more rapidly than the amount of goods to be purchased. The inevitable result was an enormous rise in prices, an accompanying advance in wages and an excessive speculation in markets and commodities.

Following the armistice, the monetary depreciation in Europe moved rapidly. Japan continued to sell goods in enormous quantities on credit to all parts of the world and the fictitious prosperity of the years 1919-1920 which was world-wide, laid the foundation for subsequent reaction, culminating in the collapse which came first in the silk market early in 1920.

Confronted with the drastic break in commodities, the policy of the Government was directed to the maintenance of prices by the substitution of collective control for the free play of market forces.

Various methods have been employed to hold prices at artificial levels to save from loss those who were unable to dispose of their holdings when the crash came in 1920. Calls for the upward revision of the tariff have been sympathetically considered, pools have been formed and combinations of manufacturers, with the object of manipulating markets and maintaining prices.

The measures unwisely adopted by the banks and the Government since the armistice, in the way of readjustment and correction, not only have proved ineffectual in arresting the rapidly increasing volume of imports, but have resulted in an intensification of the difficulties. The liquidation process has been delayed only to make it more drastic when it finally breaks through. In Japan, as elsewhere, many individuals and corporations were reduced by the 1920 crisis to insolvency and the remarkably small number of commercial failures can represent only an accumulation of weakness. Unsound credits

Commodity Price Changes in Japan.

1921	Rice	Wheat	Sugar	Raw Silk	Cotton Yarn	Timber	Paper
March	219	226	357	197	201	342	459
April	220	260	329	197	222	342	441
May	224	243	303	197	244	342	405
June	224	249	304	189	255	326	375
July	234	220	325	192	280	309	375
August	263	220	329	184	285	318	351
September	294	239	303	192	327	318	339
October	335	267	317	208	347	318	339
November	337	245	334	224	285	344	334
December	324	249	315	252	283	344	316
1922							
January	310	243	308	260	281	344	316
February	308	252	390	236	252	337	292
March	301	237	288	217	243	337	285

have been artificially sustained; shrinking inventories withheld from the market in the illusory hope that prices will rise again; export losses in Russia and South America have not been written off; receivables have not been liquidated and general domestic readjustment has yet to be accomplished.

The artificial control of markets and restricted output, of course, fostered the continuance of surface prosperity and further encouraged the speculative spirit which invariably follows such circumstances. The accompanying rise in commodity prices led to, and was largely accentuated by, an appalling speculation in commodities financed frequently by reckless and dishonest banking.

Table I shows the general average wholesale price index for 1921 compiled by the Bank of Japan, having 100 as the base for the year 1900. The American figures are those of THE ANNALIST, while those of Great Britain are as furnished by the Economist.

Wholesale Price Movements

United States Wholesale	Great Britain Wholesale	Japan Wholesale
January ... 201	5,617	266
February ... 186	5,176	258
March ... 196	5,097	253
April ... 187	4,929	251
May ... 172	4,910	253
June ... 164	4,810	254
July ... 161	4,798	260
August ... 176	4,818	264
September ... 174	4,929	274
October ... 173	4,588	290
November ... 163	4,457	283
December ... 164	4,357	276

In March, 1922, the Bank of Japan's wholesale price index reached 265.50 as compared with 252.98 for the corresponding month of 1921, an indication of how inadequately prices are adjusting themselves to the world's level.

In consequence of the drastic change in the country's foreign trade since the war, the domestic policy of inflation has been aggravated by gigantic fiscal deficits:

Imports.	Exports.
1919 ... 2,173,459,000	2,098,872,000
1920 ... 2,236,174,000	1,948,394,000
1921 ... 1,614,154,000	1,252,837,000

The unfavorable balance for the first quarter of 1922 amounts to no less than 275,000,000 yen, which compares with 361,000,000 yen for the whole of last year and 388,000,000 yen for 1920. Taken together, Japan has piled up an adverse balance of more than one billion yen in the two years following the collapse of 1920, and owing to depression in shipping, insurance, lessened tourist expenditure and reduced banking transactions connected with exports, there has been less invisible contribution toward balancing her foreign trade. Foreign balances accumulated in the war years have been drawn upon to pay for the heavy

increase from 146 in 1913 to 420 at the end of last year. Life in the cities has become more comfortable than ever before, while the foundation industry of agriculture has deteriorated and the alarming increase in tenancy has become a problem that is largely sociological.

I should be the last to assume the mantle of prophet with regard to the economic future. The country is in a state of transition and in the midst of great changes in her social and industrial structure.

The country has ceased throughout its area to be self-sustained and self-sufficient and must become a member of an economic system world-wide in its organization and connections. With a population doubling every fifty years, already far in excess of domestic ability to produce sufficient food, Japan has open to it only two solutions of the problem of tomorrow's food supply. Japan must either find an outlet for a great mass of its surplus population, or so develop industries to find markets for its manufactured goods sufficiently large to purchase needed raw materials and goods.

FACING new economic barriers in a world whose purchasing power has been beaten lower by the war, Japan must meet in neutral and especially its chief Oriental markets the falsely stimulated advantages of German competition. The primary problem that confronts the country is that of trade recovery and the first essential condition of the power to export is undoubtedly that of prices. A satisfactory price adjustment is here dependent upon freedom from artificial control and the restoration of open competitive markets.

The tremendously unfavorable balance of trade and consequent depreciation of exchanges will eventually combine to check the rise of prices and bring them back to the world's level. In the meantime, conditions in the money market are growing steadily worse. Government expenditure shows no diminution and budgets are marked by large annual deficits. Under the pressure of Government and private borrowing, banks go on making new high loan records in spite of their efforts to liquidate and in face of reserve losses which are serious in amount and significance for the future. Inflation has already gone dangerously far unless a great and increasing control is maintained over the internal credit situation, and the direct financial consequences may easily degenerate into a crisis, the severity of which will not be softened by the long continual subservience of economic progress to political exigencies.

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Ship Subsidy Policies of Foreign Governments

III.—JAPAN

This is the third of several articles by Mr. Riggs on Government aid to shipping in foreign countries.

THE statement that shipping is a poor country's business applies forcibly to Japan. The islands contain few natural resources to demand the energy of the dense population.

An intensive system of agriculture does not suffice to feed the people without recourse to overseas sources of supply. The newly established textile, iron and steel and other industries do not yield a return to either capital or labor in excess of that which can be earned on the sea. Furthermore, the country is well situated geographically with reference to the Asian continent, somewhat as the United Kingdom is with reference to Europe. Consequently, the stage was set for a rapid development of Japanese shipping when the Kingdom decided to adopt the industrialism of its Western neighbors.

Japanese shipping was increasing rapidly when the Government saw fit to start first a system of ocean mail payments and then a comprehensive subsidy scheme involving in addition construction and navigation bounties. Unquestionably large increases in Japan's shipping occurred as a result of this State aid. Why should not increases occur? Economic and geographic factors favored such a development; it was occurring before the subsidy policy went into effect. It can be said, therefore, that the scheme of Government aid hastened a tendency that was already in evidence.

The case of Japan and that of France, previously discussed, show clearly that there is no profit in saying that subsidies succeeded in Japan and failed in France without analyzing the underlying causes. It also seems perfectly clear that in no case is a subsidy policy the single determining factor. The best that can be said for direct Government aid to shipping is that, in some instances, it has prevented the decay of shipping under some flags where economic considerations demanded it and that, in others, it has hastened the growth of merchant fleets where every factor favored such a development. The lesson to this country is to study the basic factors in the case rather than to argue from apparent analogies which, in nearly every case, are not analogous. The ship subsidy proponents descend to the logic of patent medicine quacks when they argue that what is good for one country is good for every country, without a diagnosis of the patient.

Jones has stated that "the development of the Japanese merchant marine coincides not only with grants or Government aid, but also with the awakening of the industrial and commercial activities of the Japanese nation, which followed the conclusion of its successful war with China. Prior to 1880 the merchant shipping of Japan consisted largely of junks. * * * The increase in the use of European ships was comparatively slow until 1893 and 1894, when the war with China compelled Japan to purchase a large number of steamers to use as transports. This event gave tremendous impetus to the development of the Japanese merchant marine on modern lines, and of Japanese industry and trade as well. This advantage was followed up by the passage of the subsidy law of Oct. 1, 1896, which brought a further increase in tonnage.

The war with Russia in 1903-04 compelled the Japanese Government to buy large fleets of steamers for use as transports, thereby adding greatly to the ton-

nage under the Japanese flag. In the period from Dec. 31, 1903, to Dec. 31, 1905, the gross tonnage of steamships increased 275,316 tons, or nearly 42 per cent." Today Japan stands third on the list of maritime countries.

Prior to the subsidy law of 1896 the only aids given to Japanese shipping were postal subventions which totaled 45,000 yen yearly in 1890 and 1891. The law of 1896 granted both construction and navigation bounties and provided for a greatly extended postal service, the vessels performing the postal service to receive therefor only the regular navigation bounties. The construction bounties equaled 12 yen (\$5.98) per gross ton for vessels between 700 tons and 1,000 tons. A further bounty of 5 yen (\$2.49) per horsepower was granted for engines constructed in Japan. It will be seen that this act was a virtual copying of the early French subsidy act.

The navigation bounties were granted only to Japanese tonnage exclusively owned by Japanese subjects and for voyages between Japan and foreign ports. The rate for ships making 10 knots was 25 sen (about 12½ cents) per gross ton per 1,000 miles. Ten per cent. was added to this rate for every additional 500 tons and 20 per cent. for every additional knot in speed until 6,000 tons and 17 knots were reached. Foreign-built ships less than five years old were admitted to full navigation bounties.

Fifteen specific postal routes were established by this law, which were to receive 4,964,404 yen (about \$2,482,202) when fully operative. As mentioned above, the payments for postal service were computed at the mileage rate given for general navigation. The designation of these specific routes is significant since, in later acts, these services came to receive practically all the Government aid, the navigation and construction bounties being abolished as anachronisms; they have also been abolished by France. Only in this country does there seem to be any unusual longing to return to old things such as discriminating duties and navigation bounties, to revert to discarded practices which the experience of other countries has proved to be futile.

THE effect of the law of Oct. 1, 1896, was at once noticeable. "The Nippon Yusen Kaisha increased its capital from 8,800,000 yen to 22,000,000 and ordered 18 large freight steamers aggregating 88,000 tons from England. The Osaka Shosen Kaisha ordered 13 steamers and other companies doubled or trebled their fleets. It was thought that one had only to build steamships in order to become wealthy. The overproduction of ships forced freights down and this, coupled with the economic crisis of 1898-99, brought severe losses upon the shipping companies, notwithstanding the large subsidies. At the same time the Government felt the necessity of contracting these expenditures for subsidies, which were rapidly growing beyond all reasonable limits. The sums expended for bounties on construction and subsidies to navigation, including the postal contract lines, were as follows: 1896, 1,027,275 yen (\$51,583); 1897, 2,127,086 yen (\$1,059,289); 1898, 4,132,123 yen (\$2,057,797); 1899, 5,846,956 yen (\$2,911,784); a total of 13,13,40 yen (\$6,540,453)."

In 1899 an act was passed which reduced by one-half the bounties granted to foreign-built ships less than five years old and limited the navigation bounties to fixed annual payments. Under this law the Nippon Yusen Kaisha was to

By S. G. Riggs

receive, for 10 years, 4,199,014 yen (\$2,091,109) yearly. The Osaka Shosen Kaisha was to receive 341,500 yen (\$170,067), the Toyo Kisen Kaisha 951,700 yen (\$473,947), and the Daito Kisen Kaisha 45,750 yen (\$22,783). For these sums each of the lines mentioned was required to maintain various steamship lines which were deemed essential for Japanese trade and prestige.

In 1910 the subsidies granted by the Government were restricted entirely to the special routes, subject to existing contracts some of which did not expire until 1914. In addition to changing the speed and age requirements of the ships which could claim the payments, the law of 1910 also provided for a reduction of 5 per cent. for every year of a ship's age above 5, and granted an increase up to 25 per cent. above the normal rates for vessels built according to plans approved by the Government. Many restrictions were placed by this act on the conduct of the subsidized lines.

At the outbreak of the World War, Japan's fleet of ocean merchant steamers, aggregating 1,700,000 gross tons, was about 250,000 gross tons less than the corresponding merchant fleets of France and Norway, and about 250,000 gross tons more than the corresponding fleets of The Netherlands and Italy. The advance of Japan within a generation, from a subordinate position in maritime affairs to a place among the nations of the second rank in merchant shipping and, since the Washington Conference, to a place with the British Empire and the United States as a naval power, was in the line of normal development of an insular empire, but its rapidity was greater even than the prewar growth of German shipping.

IN thirty years after 1880 German ocean-going tonnage increased twelve-fold, Japanese tonnage thirty-fold. The former increase was partly based on the military conquest of the mineral wealth of Lorraine. Although Japan, within the generation, had waged successful wars by land and sea against the Chinese and Russian Empires, the rapidity of the growth of her merchant shipping was due to the necessities of an insular people whose territory lacked iron ore and other resources necessary to an advanced industrial development and to the use of grants from the National Treasury which hastened the growth of maritime enterprises.

"In square miles and population, Japan exceeds the British Isles; its population is almost as dense and its needs for imports of food and raw materials from overseas sources would be as great were it not for the fact that its standards of living and industrial development are different. * * * Conditions thus compel Japan to be a ship-owning nation."

As the World War continued and the demand for merchant ships increased, the supply diminished and merchant shipbuilding in Europe almost ceased. Japanese shipyards were extended and new yards were built. In 1914 and again in 1915 Japanese yards built only 66,000 gross tons, on which the shipbuilding bounties amounted to about \$800,000 annually. In 1916 the output doubled; in 1917 Japan built 350,000 gross tons, of which a third was for foreigners, but even on the Japanese tonnage the shipbuilding bounty amounted to \$2,600,000. In 1918 Japanese yards built 490,000 tons, an annual output surpassing any previous German output and exceeded before the war only by the usual British total and on three occasions by American yards.

"In brief, within two years submarine

warfare developed Japanese shipbuilding and Japanese shipping at seven-fold the rate of its increase in twenty years under a carefully devised bounty project. The purpose of the Shipbuilding Bounty law of 1896 was being accomplished by other instrumentalities, and in 1918 the Japanese Government suspended its operation. So far as can be ascertained, Japan has no intention of putting it into effect again in the near future."

As Eugene T. Chamberlain, the ex-Commissioner of Navigation, and one of the foremost experts on shipping in this country, has summed up the situation: "The rapid development of shipbuilding plants during the war, rendering unnecessary the payment of bounties on shipbuilding after 1918, enabled Japan to push one step further back its policy of bounties. The country was embarrassed by the lack of steel plants and their machinery to supply materials for the shipyards, because arrangements for large steel imports from the United States had to be changed in 1917, when the United States entered the war, and imports of steel from Europe had been out of the question from early 1915.

"IN August, 1917, therefore, Japan enacted a law encouraging the steel industry, which exempted from income taxes and business taxes those engaged in such enterprises. It provided bounties for various domestic steel products, thus directing State aid to the forms of industry which could pay some claim to it and paved the way for the withdrawal in 1918 of direct State aid to shipbuilding. The amounts of these bounties and tax exemptions are not available, but by 1921 the domestic production of steel in Japan equaled the imports in volume. On a Government steel plant nearly 100,000,000 yen has been expended up to this year.

"The law to encourage the steel industry was amended in 1921, so that after July 20 bounties are provided only for steel products used in the construction or repair of naval vessels or merchant ships. A bounty is paid for steel ingots and slabs made in Japan equal to 12 per cent. of the value of imported steel ingots and slabs, and a bounty equal to 15 per cent. of the value of the imported article in the case of bars and rods, shapes, T-shapes, angles, ship plates, sheets, tubes, pipes and turbine blades made in Japan, the bounties being paid only when the articles are used in shipyards.

"The Japanese policy of navigation bounties has been so applied as to promote domestic shipbuilding as well as Japanese navigation, so that the abandonment in 1918 of the system of direct construction bounties has less current significance than would appear. Direct construction bounties have been adopted usually by nations which lack iron ore, as a method of providing plants and materials for the construction of warships without imposing upon the national treasury the entire cost of maintaining such plants and procuring materials. It is not unlikely, therefore, that Japan may provide at least temporary measures of promoting shipbuilding to offset the effects of the Washington conference in reducing the country's naval building program. Early in 1922 ambitious projects were talked about for applying perhaps 250,000,000 yen in the construction during the next five years of 500,000 gross tons of passenger ships, but with the uncertain prospects for ocean passenger traffic in the near future, and especially with the advent of the Kato ministry, committed to rigid economy, they seem at present to have been laid aside."

The special provisions in the navigation bounty law favor Japanese-built ships as before the war. In its main features, as to routes and speed of

vessels employed, the navigation bounty system has been maintained up to 1921 substantially as before the war.

The annual expenditures for the navigation bounty system for the eight years from April 1, 1914, to March 31, 1921, inclusive, were 63,921,269 yen, or an annual average of 8,000,000 yen (equivalent to about \$4,000,000). The essential feature of this scheme, as previously pointed out, is the support of lines deemed essential for Japan's trade or for imperial purposes. Certain lines which up to 1921 received payments according to the navigation bounty plan, in 1922 have been receiving mail payments on the novel basis of 33 sen (16 cents) per mile per 100 cubic feet. Mails usually are carried on the weight basis.

Mr. Chamberlain says: "The purpose of the Japanese change seems to be the relief of mail steamers from the Government's power to fix freight and passenger rates under the Navigation Bounty act; and it is not improbable, in view of the workings of the existing bounty system during the war, that the system of mail bounties may be further extended so as in time entirely to supersede navigation bounties.

The complaint was made by subsidized operators during the war that they were unable to take advantage of favorable opportunities because of the policy

of the Government to keep freight rates on subsidized vessels as low as possible. Whenever the demand for space on any particular line exceeded the supply of subsidized space, the tramp rate was always higher than the rates authorized by the Government on subsidized vessels—the former rate from Kobe to Liverpool during the great part of 1918, for example, being ten times higher than the latter. Instances frequently occurred of tramps paying for themselves, in spite of the high cost of vessels, by the profits of one trip to Europe. Probably with a view to promote the nation's commerce and its welfare as a whole, the Government consistently refused to permit more than normal increases in rates, so that during the period of high rates the profits realized from the operation of subsidized vessels were practically negligible.

The payment of subsidies for the carrying of mail appears to be an attempt to remove this source of dissatisfaction, as it is understood that the authorization of extra-budgetary mail pay in 1920-21, 1921-22, and 1922-23 was given to the Government independently of the Navigation Bounty law, so that the Government may not exercise the same control over passenger and freight rates that it did under that law. The extra-budgetary allowance, not to exceed 5,569,224 for the fiscal year 1921-22,

added to the 4,745,719 yen for the subsidized routes, would give upward of 10,000,000 yen for the navigation and mail subsidies for the year ended March 31, 1922; but the precise amount cannot be stated, because as yet there is no return on the amount of the extra-budgetary allowance which was expended."

THE lessons from the discussion seem exceedingly plain. Japan, ready for maritime development, witnessed a phenomenal increase of shipping under the emblem of the Rising Sun as a result of State aid. This Government help at first was a copying of the construction and navigation bounty system which proved so costly and futile in the case of France. Whereas in the case of the latter country the bounty rates had to be increased because the development of shipping, even when artificially stimulated, was so slow, in the case of Japan the rates had to be reduced because of an overproduction of native shipping. In other words, the success or failure of a subsidy scheme depends on fundamental economic conditions and is not a cure for all debilities.

Furthermore, the second lesson is found in the gradual abandonment of the construction bounties, although Japan for naval purposes needs shipbuilding, even though she lacks iron ore

deposits. Coupled with this goes the restriction of the navigation bounties. First, miscellaneous foreign-built ships were excluded, then Japanese-built vessels which engaged in tramp ship activities, and finally the aid was limited to ships meeting Government requirements and running on fixed routes deemed essential to the national welfare. The same tendency was seen in the change of the French subsidy policy. Construction bounties have been discarded and navigation bounties have been abandoned in favor of payments to certain lines necessary for trade and imperial purposes.

In the light of these facts, it is difficult to understand why this country should subsidize its shipping in the first place, and, in the second place, why it should adopt a system of general navigation bounties when the other two countries which have been most spendthrift in the matter of subsidies have abandoned this scheme for the more logical one of aid to necessary lines. A good case can be made for the support of the Munson Line of Government ships to South America, and of the Admiral and Pacific Mail Lines to the Orient, but the writer has yet to see a sound argument advanced for the little tubs built on the Great Lakes or for the cargo boats suited only for the general tramping trades.

The Function of Gold in Foreign Trade

Continued from Page 414

fore the war as the bankers' bank, must keep enough gold on hand to meet the demands of this banker and of all the other holders of credit.

This understanding of the part that gold plays in the commerce between nations should guard us against the fallacies that are frequently offered under the name of a "favorable balance of trade." That is a mouth-filling and prosperous-looking phrase. For centuries it has attracted many men of many nations. Indeed, it was the central interest of an early school of political economy, the Mercantilists, as they were called. Prominent among them was Colbert, Minister under Louis XIV. in the seventeenth century. Even in our day, some men are still talking about a favorable balance of trade as though it were a permanent source of national wealth. They seem to think that, since a merchant's prosperity is measured by the amount of money he receives in excess of the amount he spends, the prosperity of a nation can be measured by the same method. Consequently, they argue, the way for a nation to get rich is to sell more than it buys and take its pay for the balance in gold. The "Bank Catechism," issued (in 1920) by the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, makes this error when it says:

The more we can sell to foreign countries at a profit, the greater becomes the wealth of this country, because we are getting "the other man's money"; whereas, when products are sold for consumption in this country, it is as if we took money out of one pocket and put it in another.

As a matter of fact, it does not necessarily follow that "getting the other man's money" increases the wealth of this country. In the long run, it is only by getting the other man's goods that we can profit by foreign trade; whereas, under what is called a favorable balance of trade, we send abroad more tangible goods than we receive from abroad. In this case, to state the situation in terms of goods rather than in terms of gold, is to set up a defense against loose reasoning.

Apart from the requirements of the arts, all the gold that any nation needs at home is enough to insure convertibility. After a nation has accumulated sufficient gold for these purposes, the only way it can gain the maximum material benefit from sending goods abroad is by taking, ultimately, the full value of for-

ign goods in exchange. Following the World War, for example, the United States gained nothing by importing vast stores of gold. Most of the additional gold was not used as a basis for currency or credit expansion; and, if so used, it would merely have caused a more injurious inflation. It was of no immediate use in the United States; but it was immediately needed abroad to restore the gold basis of European currencies.

As long as we keep all this clearly in mind, we are not likely to think that a country can permanently prosper by preventing other countries from sending in their goods. In England a favorable balance of trade has long been a sign of trouble, because England, on account of her investments abroad and her services to the trade of the world, has regularly imported more goods than she has exported. The gist of the matter is that any nation, in so far as it exports goods in excess of its imports, usually increases its store of gold; but it cannot use the excess gold to increase the consumable goods at home except by making the balance of trade unfavorable. In short, a favorable balance of trade is advantageous, as a rule, merely because it makes possible a subsequent unfavorable balance of trade.

TO this statement, one exception may be noted, due to the important difference between the use of gold in internal trade and the use of gold in external trade. When gold flows from one country to another, it becomes an addition to the base of the inverted pyramid of money in the importing country, and may thus increase the currency and bank deposits of that country many times the value of the additional gold. Exchanges of gold within a country, however, do not change the monetary stocks of gold of that country. It follows that when the production of a country is below the maximum, importation of gold may increase the wealth of that country if it is so employed that it increases the purchasing power used in consumption of goods at home; for it may thus stimulate that country to produce more wealth for itself. This particular benefit can result from the importation of gold only when the business of the country is in special need of a revival. When production is at a maximum, an increase of current purchasing power cannot bring about the production

of more goods; so it lifts the price-level, which is far from beneficial.

THE paramount economic problem of European countries is stabilization of the purchasing power of monetary units in home markets. This is of far greater immediate importance than a return to prewar values. For purposes of international trade, there is no need of bringing back the depreciated monetary units of Europe to their former gold parities. This fact is not generally understood. From the widespread ridicule of the franc and the mark and the krone and the ruble, many people have gained the impression that these units can never again satisfy the purposes of exchange. On the contrary, if the purchasing power over commodities in the home markets of any one of these depreciated units could be maintained at its present level it would serve the purposes of foreign trade exactly as well as it would on any other level. This is due to the fact that the rate of exchange between two countries automatically establishes itself as soon as these countries succeed in stabilizing the purchasing power of their currencies in their home markets.

When prices reached their height in the United States following the war, it was frequently said that the high level of prices at home tended to curb trade with other countries. This is a mistake. For purposes of international trade, there is no such thing as a normal price-level. Whatever the purchasing power parity of the money of the country may be, it is entirely satisfactory for purposes of foreign trade as soon as the exchanges have become adjusted to that parity. It is not high or low price levels, but fluctuating price levels, that hinder foreign trade.

In most European countries, new rates of exchange will have to be far different from the old. This, however, need not hamper foreign trade. The one thing needful, as far as rates of exchange is concerned, is that they shall stay where they are long enough to warrant public confidence in their stability. To attain that *sine qua non* of foreign trade, no international agreement is necessary. A fairly constant and entirely satisfactory rate between any two countries becomes established as soon as each country stabilizes the purchasing power of its own money, whatever that may be, in its own markets.

Fortunately so; for there is not enough

wealth in the world to bring back the currencies of Europe to their prewar purchasing power. Nor is there any hope of producing enough. Production in the United States in the last generation seems to have increased at the rate of approximately 4 per cent. per annum. The rate for the whole world certainly has not been in excess of 4 per cent. For the United States to overcome, by means of increased production at that rate, a degree of inflation represented by an index number of 200, would take more than one generation. Germany would require several generations. Even if it were possible to prevent further inflation of the currency through such a long period, there would be a drop in the price level at the rate of about 4 per cent. per annum, and consequent prolonged business depression. But, under such conditions, it would not be possible to increase production at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum. Consequently, it would not be possible, even in a century, to restore the present volume of marks to prewar values by means of increased production.

NOR is there enough gold in the world to restore the present volume of marks to prewar parity with the dollar. Nothing but the discovery of a cheap method of making gold out of baser metals, or extracting it from the sea, or the discovery of far more productive mines than the world has yet known, would yield enough gold to bring back the mark to its old parity.

Furthermore, for most European countries, deflation would bring new disasters. To increase the value of the unit in which the debts of these countries have been contracted would render most of these insolvent, and would necessitate such sharp reduction of wages that the result would be social unrest and decreased production, if not revolution. At the very best, attempts to restore the currencies of Europe to their former parities would interfere with international trade, because such attempts would interfere with the stability of the exchanges.

The practical question for most European countries is not how soon it will be possible to restore the former values of their units, but how soon it will be possible to stabilize them at any value at all. The sooner the whole world accepts this fact and acts accordingly, the better it will be for the world.

The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

GENERAL business conditions continue to be of a highly satisfactory character. Developments of the last week have served merely to further emphasize that this business expansion is being built upon sound principles, and that it may be expected to continue at an increasing pace. It would be natural to expect that business at this period of the year would show improvement, no matter what might have been the record of preceding months. We are advancing now into the holiday period, and this in itself serves to stimulate activity in retail lines. Furthermore, at this time of the year the purchasing power in all parts of the country is at the peak, and this is particularly true of certain sections this year.

In the South, for instance, there has been heavy marketing of cotton, and the South has received a price for this staple which affords an excellent return on labor and capital involved. It is also true that in the West a goodly portion of the grain crop has been marketed, and the buying power has been correspondingly raised. Thus there is established the foundation for increased activity in all lines, and it is this which bears a direct influence on conditions this year. To a certain extent the demands for the holiday period are peculiarly seasonal, and it often happens that with the turn into a new year there is a reaction which leaves industry, so far as retail lines are concerned, in something of a prostrate condition. There is, however, no reason to expect that such a situation in its broadest interpretation will apply this year.

The record of the last nine months has been one of steady progression in business and finance, and the underlying situation has not been changed in the least. The money for business purposes is in plentiful supply, and will probably continue so, and under such circumstances there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the viewpoint of business men that operations can continue confidently in the full expectation that prosperity is more nearly of the present than it has been at any time since the process of deflation brought such drastic readjustments and such staggering financial losses.

It remains to be seen what the foreign situation will be in the final adjustments, and there is still justifiable reason for caution in our foreign dealings. However, from such reports as come to hand it seems that Europe is making forward strides which are somewhat overlooked here. There is still a disposition to consider Europe in general as being in a position somewhat analogous to Germany and Austria. On the contrary, these two countries cannot be taken as the index for all of Europe. The position of England is beyond question, no more tangible evidence of this being necessary than the recovery which is taking place in exchange on London. Likewise, there is no one who believes, or only a few who believe, that France will be in financial difficulties of a disruptive character. The same applies to Italy, and even some of the Central European countries, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia, are mending their ways in a manner which presupposes ultimate financial rehabilitation.

Likewise, it must be remembered that the countries of Europe which were free from actual war participation are in a strong position. It will be recalled that at one time the dollar was at a discount in Switzerland when it was at a premium in every other country of Europe. Sweden, Denmark, Holland and the like are all in a prosperous situation, possibly not so strongly entrenched as when there could be free trading with Russia, Germany and Austria, but nevertheless far from a state of financial debacle. It can, therefore, be realized that the export trade of this country with Europe can still be maintained and increased along fairly safe and reasonable lines, and thus provide an outlet for increased manufacturing activities here in the months to come.

Car-loading figures are still being scanned with close attention as measuring the progress of business recovery. For the week ended Oct. 7 loadings of revenue freight reached 998,169 cars. To be sure, this was a decrease of 30,212 cars from the preceding week and 43,497 cars from the corresponding week in 1920. But the movement of railroad traffic is nearly at the peak for all time, and it is not too much to expect that a new record figure may be established for car loadings in the next six weeks. Generally speaking, the peak of railroad traffic comes about this period of the year. It is interesting to note that loadings of miscellaneous freight have already established a peak of 599,008 cars. This was for the week ended Sept. 30, and was an increase of 36,735 cars over the corresponding week of 1921. For the week ended Oct. 7 loadings of miscellaneous and merchandise freight amounted to 573,782 cars. An index to the movement of this class of freight is to be found in the fact that for every week since July 15, with the exception of the weeks of Aug. 12 and Sept. 9, loadings have been in excess of 500,000 cars.

The transportation situation continues to be a cause for worry in some quarters, and alleviation will probably not come to the point of establishing normal conditions before the end of the year. However, the railroads are doing their best to work themselves out of the difficulty, and progress along this line is being made. Many of the roads are sending out announcements to shippers advising them as to conditions and as to the best manner of handling their requirements. One of these admonitions is to the effect of loading freight 10 per cent. in excess of the marked capacity of the car. If this plan has been followed to any large extent, then the total of merchandise moved is probably greater for a like number of cars than was the case a year ago.

No more striking evidence of the need of adequate transportation facilities is to be found than in the record of car loadings. The prosperity of the railroads is synonymous with business activity, and the rehabilitation of the finances of the railroads is therefore to a decided extent of just as much interest to the business men of the country as to the railroads themselves. A curb on railroad earnings that is too sharp therefore merely defeats the purpose of reasonable rates which is to move traffic without too large an increase in costs as a result of freight charges. In this connection it is perhaps not amiss to call attention to the record of the railroads of the country for the two years during which they have been under their own control, as opposed to Government control during the war emergency. In this period a decided betterment of conditions has been attained, and further improvement may be expected. For the twenty-

four months since the return of the railroads to private management, which ended Aug. 31, 1922, the new operating income of the carriers was at the annual rate of only 3.47 per cent. on physical valuation. This measures up about one-half of 1 per cent. in excess of half the return of 6 per cent. which was mentioned in the Transportation act. The net operating income for the two years, as compiled by the Association of Railway Executives, was \$1,035,271,549. During the first twelve months of private operation, or that which ended with Aug. 31 last year, the net operating income was \$523,598,172, or at the annual rate of 2.80 per cent. on tentative valuation. During the second year a sharp improvement in net operating income was shown, brought about by the exercise of drastic economy. During this period net operating income was \$781,673,377, or at the annual rate of 4.1 per cent. Naturally, if railroad income is held down to such a level, the carriers are not in a position to provide for replacements in rolling stock, and can hardly undertake new purchases to meet the needs of expansion in business.

Therefore the position of the railroads, both as to earnings and efficiency—which are linked together—is of prime importance to the business men of the country. Just at the moment the question of railroad consolidations is once again to the fore, and only last week mention was made of a possible combination between Great Northern, Northern Pacific and Chicago, Burlington & Quincy. These roads tap the great Northwest, have much in common and have been known more or less correctly as the Hill roads. Hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commission dealing with such consolidations will start in Washington on Nov. 17, and it is not improbable that the three roads will actually request that a merger be permitted. Certainly it would seem to be that such a merger would benefit shippers, and it will be interesting to note the views that are expressed.

One other instance, in which the public is displaying marked attention, is the case of Central Pacific as related to Southern Pacific and Union Pacific. The Central Pacific is now associated with the Southern Pacific, but dissolution of this bond has been ordered by the United States Supreme Court. So far as the Pacific Coast is concerned it appears that the public is by no means in favor of such a dissolution, and a question of great moment may, as a result, come before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The dissolution of Central Pacific from Southern Pacific is a decision made under the Sherman act. Since the Sherman act was passed, however, the Transportation act has come into being, and the Interstate Commerce Commission has thereby been empowered to act according to its judgment in the question of railway consolidations. Therefore the Central Pacific case will come before the Interstate Commerce Commission, and this body may rule that the road should stay in the Southern Pacific System. Should this be the case, it would be an important step in the carrying out of the views of the Interstate Commerce Commission as to railroad consolidations. Such consolidations undoubtedly would bring about, under wise direction, a great benefit to the shippers of the country.

The heavy oversubscription to the offering of Government 4½% for the purpose of refunding the Victory 4½% was quite in accord with expectations. It was, however, somewhat of a surprise that the oversubscription represented such a high percentage of cash demand for new bonds and a relatively small offering of Victory 4½% for refunding. It may have been that the slight premium on the 4½% was a deterrent to the refunding. At all events, an extra period for the refunding of the Victory notes may show that a goodly portion of these were turned in during the last week. The success of the loan as to cash subscription might raise the question as to whether a 4 per cent. bond could not have been floated. It would seem that this could have been done, but it would probably have defeated the purpose of the loan to a greater extent, since probably a smaller proportion of Victory notes would have been offered. It is probable that further Government financing of this character will develop before the end of the year or early next year, and it may be that a 4 per cent. coupon will prevail. Of course, any change in the money market would be an influencing factor, but it seems that ultimately, at any rate, Government financing will go to a 4 per cent. or even to a lower rate.

The payment of \$50,000,000 by England on account of interest due on the British debt to this country was one of the noteworthy happenings of last week, and is a step toward the ultimate liquidation of the entire wartime indebtedness. The total of the British debt was \$4,277,000,000, or more than one-third of the total obligations owing to this country by European Governments. Thus far this is the only payment that has been made on account of the debt. It was the opinion of bankers at their convention in New York some time ago that the United States should aid Europe by some rearrangement of the debt problem. It does not seem, however, that there will, for the time being at any rate, be any cancellation of European indebtedness. From the forces of the Administration at Washington the word comes that no such course is contemplated, and emphasis has been laid upon the fact that Europe is recovering at a faster pace than is generally realized in this country.

There has been precedent for debt cancellation in the attitude which Great Britain took with relation to her Allies during the Napoleonic wars. England at that time accepted from Austria a payment in satisfaction of all claims that was relatively small as compared to the total indebtedness. However, it is also shown by the records of history that the readjustments which were made were by no means quickly attained, and the amounts involved were a mere pittance as compared with the debts of the present day. Whatever may be the outcome as to the debt problem in its ultimate determination, it is certainly highly impossible that any cancellation or debt readjustment is to take place for a long time to come.

In the security markets the course of prices has been without any wide fluctuations except in the mid-week, when there was a decline in stocks. Both the stock and bond markets still give evidence of investment purchasing, but as a matter of fact this is becoming increasingly more discriminatory. The bond market has been easing off somewhat, and a number of the Liberty issues are now below par. Apparently there has been heavy institutional selling of Liberty bonds recently. In sharp contradistinc-

tion to the movement of the Liberties as a whole, the 3½ per cents last week went to a new high since date of issue at 103.02.

Cotton last week soared to a new high level for the year, the advance justifying predictions which were made in THE ANNALIST a number of weeks ago. While the new crop was being gathered there was of necessity a great deal of marketing of new-crop cotton, and this proved a heavy weight on prices. It was significant, however, that even with this pressure being exerted, quotations moved upward in trend, and mill buying was a support on all recessions. The position of cotton is in no wise changed over what it was a few weeks ago, except that the new-crop pressure is lessened and will continue to lessen probably from now on. It is to this, more than anything else, that the sharp upturn of last week can be attributed. There is this much to be said, that there is still a world shortage of cotton to be counted upon, and higher prices will probably be recorded. Up to the present time there has been a somewhat uneven operation of speculators in the cotton market, but last week speculative buying of the staple grew in volume, and if this should continue a further sharp upturn in prices may be witnessed within the next two or three weeks. The mills are not disposed to follow cotton up by bidding for the staple, but the buying on recessions for trade account is a stabilizing influence in the market, and actually tends to stiffen prices.

The World in Review

THE underlying economic sense of the Belgian people is clearly demonstrated, according to L'Opinion (Paris), in the recent action of the organized metal workers with regard to strikes. In this connection L'Opinion says:

At this time the Belgian proletariat is less than ever in favor of violent tactics, firstly, because the relief funds of the labor organizations are exhausted owing to severe unemployment prevailing which, in March, 1921, reached 32 per cent. of the workers and, last May, still affected 7.4 per cent. Secondly, the workmen believe that strikes lead to business stagnation. Last, and above all, the great strikes last year resulted disastrously for them.

The central committees are apparently anxious to all themselves of the opportunity to re-establish their discipline, which was largely undermined by the communist element. A general Congress of Metalworkers was, therefore, called last June and voted the following resolutions, as reported by the French journal:

1. In the event of a dispute between employers and employed, the regular (local) committees shall try all methods of conciliation, including arbitration. Should the employers refuse to negotiate, a referendum of at least 80 per cent. of the workers implicated shall be taken. Seventy-five per cent. of these must be in favor of the strike to be declared.

2. The direction of the strike is to be in the hands of the central committee if the number affected does not exceed 2,000. Should such number exceed 2,000 and not more than 5,000, the direction shall be undertaken by the national committee. In the event of its exceeding 5,000 an emergency Congress shall be called.

This procedure has the advantage of leaving very little opening for the communist leaders, the success of whose activities is said, by some French organs, to have been marked in the recent great strike at the Havre.

With this view of the Havre strike, however, the French correspondent of the London Economist (Sept. 16) does not altogether agree. He remarks that:

The continued high cost of living, or, as the French term it: "the artificial high cost of food," is again exciting a great deal of attention, particularly among the employers of labor. It is not generally recognized that the recent serious strike at Havre, where the workers proceeded to extremes in their resistance to a proposed cut of 10 per cent. in the metal workers' wages, was, at the bottom, a genuine protest by labor against living conditions.

The question was seriously discussed by the local Chamber of Commerce and from this discussion two facts emerged, namely, that certain of the Cheron decrees, permitting the export of certain foodstuffs and prohibiting the import of others, have proved absolutely prejudicial to consumers in general, however beneficial they may be to French agriculture. They have, in fact, contributed directly to the excessive cost of living. In addition to this, part of the abnormal price of foodstuffs is attributed to the huge profits made by the middleman.

Experts in the Havre district complain that farmers, who have profited largely since the beginning of the war, and who, in many cases, now own the land they formerly rented, systematically hold back their produce and refuse to sell except at the top of the market. In this regard the London Economist says:

Potatoes were selling at the end of May as high as 100 francs per 100 kilos. On the arrival of the June crop the old stocks fell to 10 francs per 100 kilos, and many holders preferred to lose the sale of their stocks rather than sell at reasonable prices. Potatoes were held at such a figure during the earlier part of the year that it was possible to import them from Estonia and, in spite of the high freight rates, make a substantial profit.

Growers of beans, and other vegetables, have followed the same policy, with the result that the crops of 1920 and 1921 are still being doled out for sale. These events have led to an urgent demand for the restoration of free competition in foodstuffs at any cost, by means of the abrogation of the decree prohibiting certain imports. This, it is felt, would curb speculation, especially on the part of the agricultural class.

Discussing the cost of living L'Opinion (Paris) gives some interesting figures covering the second quarter of 1922 in France. In the first quarter the index figure reached 3,239, falling, in the second quarter, to 3,163. The exceptions to this general average were to be found in Alsace, where living is cheaper, and in the Nord, where it is dearer, the index figure for the Nord being 3,378, as compared with that for the Est of 2,996.

As regards Paris, in April, 1922, living costs

were 204 per cent. higher than the corresponding months of 1914, dropping in July to 197 per cent. The Ministry of Labor gives the mean figure for the second quarter of 1922 as 202 per cent.

The new Budget is expected to cause much heated debate in the French Chamber, a great deal of which, the London Economist thinks, will centre round the proposal put forward by one of the Parliamentary committees that the Government match and tobacco monopolies should be transferred to concessionaries on a farming basis. With reference to this the Economist says:

Categorical reports have been in circulation from time to time, for several years, to the effect that important private groups, generally American, were anxious to enter into negotiations with the Government with a view to taking over the tobacco and match monopolies, and there is no doubt that most of these have been well founded. Ninety million francs relief to the taxpayer was yielded by the tobacco monopoly during the first seven months of the current year, to say nothing of 60,000,000 francs from the match monopoly. It is thought that these results might be improved upon if efficient methods of manufacturing, distributing, and so forth, were adopted.

As might be expected a vigorous cry of alarm has arisen from Government employees in the tobacco industry, as well as in the match factories, seconded by the protest of holders of Government selling permits (which form one of the most common minor political awards). A deputation has already been sent to the Ministry of Finance to voice this protest against the suppression of present monopolies. In reply, M. de Lasteyrie, the French Minister of Finance, stated that the Government did not contemplate handing these over to any foreign syndicate, but expected to carry out far-reaching modifications of the present methods of working the tobacco monopoly, with a view to improving its manufacture and reducing the sale price. At the same time he pointed out the marked inferiority of French matches as compared with those of other countries and informed the deputation that the Government proposed to conduct an official inquiry into the working of the match tax in other countries, with a view to possible modifications of the monopoly in France.

Bitter criticism of French financial methods is expressed by Dr. E. J. Dillon in the Fortnightly Review (England), who states that:

Over fifty per cent. of the wealth of France derives from agriculture, whereas only one-tenth of the national revenue is collected at this source. Nothing quite so incongruous is to be found in any country outside of Russia. It is, in a certain way, a Bolshevik arrangement adapted to the French people. The representatives of the agricultural interests in France virtually control the French Legislature and thwart all efforts to lay a fair portion of the taxes on the farmer. This streak of Bolshevism disqualifies France from contributing her due share to European finances and is one of the corrosive elements of the European situation. It explains, without justifying, the eagerness of French politicians to lay on the shoulders of British and American taxpayers the burden which the prosperous French husbandman angrily refuses to bear.

Dr. Dillon quotes the French daily, Le Temps, of June 2, 1922, to the effect that only one-third of the tax on business transactions, which was expected to yield five billion francs, is being paid, the deficit being due to evasion of the tax by two-thirds of the French merchant class. In support of his claim as to the insufficient taxation of the farmer he quotes L'Ouvrier, June 21, 1921.

A farmer whose income from the land amounts to thirty thousand francs pays 20 francs income tax annually, whereas business men with a similar income pay 2,000 francs and over. In other words 60 per cent. of the nation, with half of its wealth, pays ten per cent. of its taxes. Of the remaining forty per cent. two-thirds evade taxation.

At the same time, and on plea of financial necessity, France, it is pointed out, refuses to compromise on the question of German reparations and indemnities, and the economic state of Europe consequently approaches chaos. But for this state of things Dr. Dillon blames Lloyd George's lack of confidence, instancing, in support of this, a remark made by the late Walther Rathenau, on leaving Genoa:

If only Mr. Lloyd George would live up to his lights and subordinate minor and irrelevant considerations to the welfare of Europe, there would still be hope.

In this connection the paradox of the Armies of Occupation in Germany, which are a source of enormous expense to their respective countries, is exercising many minds in England. Dr. Dillon points out that England has received from Germany, since the signing of the Versailles Treaty, 50,351,000 sterling, all of which, plus some 4,000,000 sterling more, has been eaten up by the Army of Occupation. France has expended at least 50 per cent. more on this than she has received from Germany, and the total cost to the nations involved is estimated at not less than 300,000,000 sterling.

Writing in the same magazine, Miss Violet Markham, the first woman Justice of the Peace in England, stresses the point yet further, saying that military occupation at the end of war is inevitable and necessary for a certain period, but when it is extended for a prolonged and indefinite time it has every possible moral and political objection. According to the German report recently submitted to the Reichstag (Zweites Denkschriften über die Kosten der Rheinlandbesetzung), the occupation has cost Germany five and a half billion gold marks, or fourteen billion paper marks, taking what was then the average exchange figure as 200 marks to the pound sterling, or 345,000,000 sterling. This is 150,000,000 sterling more than France paid to Germany after 1870. The Rhineland High Commission and other missions are said to cost a scandalous amount. By the Treaty of Versailles four members were provided for the Rhineland High Commission which, it is recorded both by Dr. Dillon and Miss Markham, now include 1,300 delegates, and cost, from May to December, 1921, 178,522,000 marks. Going into details of this expenditure, the articles in the Fortnightly Review state that:

The establishment charges of the Chairman of the Rhineland High Commission amount to 1,500,000 marks. One delegate

The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

of the commission commandeered a house, which was furnished by the municipality of the town at a cost of 245,000 marks. A French Colonel in Ludwigshafen married but childless, furnished his house at a cost of 150,000 marks, the heating and glass coming to another 123,886 marks, and the total reaching 425,000 marks.

Reckless extravagance in requisitioning is charged to all the Armies of Occupation by the writers, one of whom states that the General commanding the French forces in Wiesbaden spent 435,000 marks on his house, which he then turned over to the French Consul General, going himself to the Nassauer Hotel where another 821,000 marks was expended on improvements. General Mangin is charged with having spent 1,200,000 marks on improvements to Mainz Castle, and another 1,500,000 marks on a Summer home in the Rhineland.

In a statement to the House of Commons, on Aug. 4, 1922, Sir Robert Horne detailed the payments made to the Allies by Germany as follows:

	Pounds sterling
Paid in cash, to reparations	77,000,000
Local payments in paper marks	30,000,000
Ships, coal, and payment in kind	160,000,000
Properties in ceded territory	125,000,000
Coal from Sarre mines (estimated)	23,000,000
Total	415,000,000

Of this, according to Sir Robert Horne, Great Britain has received 56,000,000 sterling—all of which has been spent on the Army of Occupation.

A vivid picture of the recent collapse of the mark in Germany, and its effect upon the people, is drawn by Sir Philip Gibbs in the *Review of Reviews* (London). On Aug. 17 the mark was exchanged at the rate of thirty-eight to the pound sterling. Six months previously the rate was seventy-eight to the pound. Three days after the first mentioned date it was 4,500; four days after 5,000; five days after 6,000, and so on, day by day, until it dropped to 10,000 to the pound. While this financial collapse was going on, says Sir Philip:

Life in Berlin appeared terribly similar to what I had seen in Austria two years previously, when Vienna was approaching its agony. The hotels were crowded with international vultures, called popularly "Valuta hounds," who feed upon the decay of nations, and speculate wildly on the exchange.

Up to the end of August the weekly wage of the German workingman was between 1,500 and 2,000 marks. An egg cost, at that time, 9 marks; a small roll of bread, 16 marks; a pint of milk, 24 marks; a pound of butter, 120 marks, etc.

One of the most interesting reflections made upon this situation has reference to its repercussion upon the intellectual life of Germany. With the mark at fantastically low figures, and little readjustment of wages or salaries to counterbalance it, the German student or professor cannot afford to buy the foreign books he needs. Consequentially Germany is, from the intellectual point of view, shut up in a cage, as effectually as its one-time enemy, Russia. Sir Philip Gibbs' conclusions are pessimistic to a degree:

I see no way out for Germany, except by way of a long moratorium, and an international loan. The first will certainly have to be granted, but the second, in my belief, is highly improbable owing to the fact that the French and British peoples will not be induced to lend money to Germany for the payment of her debts, on the security of her credit. But without such a loan Germany will continue to be a bankrupt State, and the whole of Europe will fall into decay and disorder. I see no way out from that severe deduction.

A curious situation exists in the Sarre region, as between the mark and the franc, which is discussed at length by M. Jean Priou in the *Revue d'Économie Politique* (France), what is known as the Waehrungsfrage, or Frankenfrage, dates back to the Armistice, when the arrival of Allied troops, and later of Allied mine supervisors, using the pound, dollar, and finally the franc, forced down the value of the mark. The foodstuffs furnished by the military command to the people cost more than those paid for by the German mark, while wages, etc., remained stationary. A great deal of food had to be distributed free. At the same time German taxes were evaded on all sides, and food-profitting was constantly carried on. The writer continues as follows:

Mark prices rose slowly to a level with francs. Each fall of the mark was followed, in a few weeks, by a rise of prices, until in May, 1919, when the question of special money for the Sarre district was considered, and abandoned. The Autumn of 1919 was marked by general disorder, riots, arrests, the rise of wages, and the fall of incomes.

A special clause to Articles 45-50 of the Treaty of Peace specifies that French money shall not be prevented in any way from free circulation in the Sarre territory, which makes the situation almost incapable of any arbitrary or artificial adjustment, and caused the abandonment of the special money project referred to above. But on January 10, 1920, the question entered what M. Priou calls the "second phase." The French military government of the mines gave way to civil government. The mark still fell, and the authorities found that mark payments hindered regular production. Their attitude is described by M. Priou as follows:

The French Government cannot use money which is liable to such sudden depreciation. The use of the franc frees them from this fear, and also from the necessity of leveling the wages of the Sarre and the Lorraine. From the first of July 1920, francs were used in Government payments. Salaries were shifted from 55 marks to 28 francs. This sum, by the end of July, equaled 100 marks. The change affected 70,000 miners and their families, say 300,000 souls. Some 150,000 wage earners in all are paid in francs. But the metallurgical workers, numbering 30,000, immediately demanded francs, or their equivalent, in wages.

Raw materials bought in francs were partly sold in marks. Marks were used in internal commerce, transport, and home industries, francs in mines, the metallurgical industries (for salaries), and partly in the customs. At the same time not all of the railroads

used marks, a certain proportion of French lines traversing Sarre territory adhered to the franc, with consequent ridiculous scenes at the booking offices of big stations during the rush hours.

Eventually Sarre prices became disorganized by the fluctuations of the mark. The Budget question is serious owing to the fact that revenues are collected in both francs and marks, the proportions of neither being quite certain. The railways buy their coal in francs, may have to pay their salaries in francs, and get their receipts in marks. Francs are used in the post and telegraph departments, but the tramways are financed in marks, and have a deficit amounting to 6,000,000 marks a month.

Nevertheless, the Sarrois gain something from the situation, for they are, on the whole, very much in the position of foreigners in their own country, benefiting from the exchange. Living in the Sarre is cheaper than in the adjoining Lorraine. But a new fall in the mark is considered bound to bring speculation, fresh rise of prices, strikes, and general restlessness.

In England, the general depression continues, and is the cause of steadily growing feeling against the French economic and political policy, which is considered responsible for the slump. The agricultural situation is usually a good index to the state of the country, and the London Statist (Sept. 30) has a long article upon the crisis through which it is now passing.

Joint meetings of the National Farmers' Union, the Agricultural Laborers' Union, and the Workers' Union, have been held to formulate an appeal to the Government to assist individuals, and to save farmers and laborers from impending ruin. The Statist notes:

Periods of depression are well known in the industry, particularly that which occurred in the eighties of last century, but the fall in prices which has taken place in the last year and a half is unparalleled. Between December, 1920, and 1921, the price of wheat fell from 86s. 9d. to 45s. per quarter—a drop of 41s. 6d. Barley fell from 72s. to 44s. 5d. per quarter. Oats fell from 42s. 9d. to 28s. 4d. Live stock values have also receded heavily. English beef per 8 pounds being 6s. 3d., as compared with 7s. 4d. last year. English wethers have risen in twelve months from 8s. to 8s. 6d., but English wool is below pre-war prices.

Prices have fallen so rapidly and so out of proportion to the fall of production costs that, in many cases, these must be met out of capital. The scarcity of money is one of the chief features of the crisis. When agriculture was booming, and the Agricultural Act held out promise of remunerative prices for some years to come, many farmers purchased their holdings, and to do this were obliged to raise loans on mortgage varying from 6 to 8 per cent, in not a few instances paying interest from 50 to 100 per cent, greater than the original rent charges.

This policy was based on a perfectly natural belief that the Agricultural Act would run its course, and that reparation is considered a gross breach of faith by the unions interested. These latter suggest a remedy by means of loans on a 4 per cent. basis to clear the farmer of his present indebtedness and enable a living to be made on the land.

At the same time, while a writer in the *Contemporary Review* (London) pleads for an amelioration of the burden of taxes upon the citizens, and suggests, as a beginning, the cutting down of the huge amounts spent on various forms of Government welfare work. Progress (London) points with pride to the items under this head in the English Budget as follows:

A few figures will show how important is the position of Social Service at the present time in Great Britain. The ordinary Budget of 1921-22 (excluding expenditure due to the war) amounts to 663,000,000 sterling. Of this 60,500,000 sterling is devoted to education: 15,000,000 to health, health insurance, unemployment insurance and old age pensions account for 21,073,000, and labor for 5,800,000. Total, 102,974,531 sterling, or one-sixth of the Budget.

In addition to this, local authorities, official departments, &c., spent as follows in 1921-22: Education, 91,900,000 pounds; health, 44,700,000; social insurance, 73,973,550; as well as smaller sums for other items, the total being 222,374,336 pounds sterling.

Stocks

HERE was an unsettled tone to last week's stock market which could not help but arouse a certain degree of caution on the part of traders. For the most part prices chattered about with only minor changes, as the net result of a week of trading. In the fore part of the week the market was highly irregular, the weakness on Monday being succeeded by a degree of buoyancy on Tuesday which was in sharp contrast with the previous demonstration. This advance in prices, however, was not long maintained, the market on Wednesday reacting and weakness prevailed thereafter until Friday when prices stiffened somewhat. The whole character of the market was such as to arouse doubts. Here and there new issues were taken up and moved into new high levels for the year, but the old-time speculative favorites, with a few exceptions, were inclined to be heavy.

Interest still centres around the question of stock dividends, but even this subject failed to bring the response that prevailed in the preceding week. This was only natural since with the lapse of a few days the outlook for stock dividends could be considered with a greater degree of calmness and good judgment. In the preceding week Wall Street, so far as the speculative element was concerned, jumped to the conclusion that every company with a surplus of large proportions was going to step into the stock-dividend class and announce distributions which, while they might not be of particular value at the moment, so far as increase in aggregate dividends was concerned, were expected to show something substantial with the passage of time. It was a theory that fitted well into the speculative scheme of things but which did not hold the degree of credibility which some were inclined to attribute to it. Even if a tax were to be placed on surplus, through the passage of some enactment by Congress—and this was at the root of the whole question—it was inconsistent to believe that Congress would tax surplus to the point of

jeopardizing the financial position of a company by creating a tax that would be almost of confiscatory character.

To be sure, there were several stock dividends last week, all of them by industrial companies, but the rumor mark received a sharp blow when Judge Gary, Chairman of the United States Steel Corporation, stated that the subject of stock dividends had not been mentioned with relation to this company, so far as he was aware. This set at rest the rumor with regard to United States Steel, and the President of the Corn Products Refining Company made a similar announcement with respect to his corporation. As a matter of fact, the stock dividend situation is one which has to do particularly with the Standard Oil companies, and it has been clearly demonstrated that so far as they are concerned, stock dividends are a thing of the immediate present.

The Vacuum Oil Company last week declared a stock dividend of 300 per cent and a subdivision of the shares from the present \$100 par value to \$25 par value. This means that for each share of old stock there will be issued sixteen shares of new stock, and in effect, this really amounts to a stock dividend of 1,500 per cent. The differentiation between a division of the shares and a stock dividend is so infinitesimal as to have no actual place in stock market discussion. If the shares of the Vacuum Oil Company had been shares of no par value, then a division of the old stock on the basis of sixteen for one would have been tantamount to a dividend of 1,500 per cent. So far as the stock market is concerned, it long ago ceased to consider seriously the par value of a stock. A stock sells for so many dollars a share and the par is usually lost sight of. This is especially true with relation to mining stocks, the price of the shares of some of the leading companies representing six, seven and ten times the par value. Not a few of the mining companies have a par value of \$5 a share, and others a par of \$1.

The main question with relation to stock dividends is bound up now with consideration as to whether there can be any taxing of surplus capitalized in this manner. Tax experts hold the view that no possible tax can be made and this seems a sane attitude.

The Supreme Court has ruled that stock dividends are not taxable, and it is fair to assume that the Court meant exactly what it said when it ruled that stock dividends were not subject to tax as income. There

may be means of subterfuge whereby a tax could be imposed, but this would hardly be of avail, it appears, in a final thrashing out of the question such as undoubtedly would be undertaken through the courts.

The action of the stock market on recent days has given further evidence of a lack of disposition on the part of speculators to follow prices upward. There is no doubt but that sentiment this week has undergone considerable change. Heretofore, opinion has been rampantly bullish, but it was noticeable that this was looked upon as another bit of evidence portending that the peak of prices had been or was being reached. As a matter of fact, speculation has run the price of many securities to a point that is out of line with the business development which has taken place. Speculation always swings the pendulum too far, and it is undoubtedly true that prices of many stocks at the present time not only discount the business improvement which may take place but represent as well a speculative emolument above this figure which has been carried beyond the bounds of reason.

That the market is vulnerable was evidenced in the case of certain stocks last week, an outstanding instance being that of Pacific Oil, which broke sharply during the trading of the midweek, the loss running to some eleven points in two days. This was a result of reports that the dividend might be passed, a report that was in sharp contradiction to the highly favorable report which was coming out with relation to this company only a relatively short time ago, when it was expected that the development of the company's vast oil properties in California would supply earnings on a basis that would send the price far above \$100 a share. At any rate the market action of the shares indicated that they were to some extent in hands where news of ill omen could bring about substantial liquidation and cause a sharp reaction in the quotation. This is taken merely as an instance to show that the market is in a position where unfavorable rumors can be made use of for stock market purposes.

As a matter of fact, the official statement of this company with relation to the dividend was to the effect that it did not come up for decision until November and that it had been the subject of no comment at the present time. As opposed to this rumor, the market had to deal with another with relation to Mexican Petroleum. Probably no stock on the Exchange has been the subject of more conflicting comment than Mexican Petroleum. Not so long ago the company was said to be in a decidedly unfavorable position because of the inflow of salt water in the Mexican oil fields. Last week the stock rose to 233, and there were rumors that a special distribution to stockholders by way of a stock dividend, was to be expected. Those who were predicting the decline of Mexican Petroleum to \$40 or \$50 a share were probably just as eager buyers of the stock last week when it rose above 200.

The railroad stocks showed a good tone throughout the week. There has been little or no speculation of wide proportions in the shares of the carriers probably for the reason that it was difficult to create a speculative atmosphere in the light of earnings that failed to measure up to the 6 per cent, on physical valuation which was mentioned in the Transportation act. There is this to be said, however, that the railroads are constantly improving their situation and there has been for a long time good investment buying of the rails. This purchasing has been of a finely discriminating character and particularly has centred in those issues which have long records of dividend payments.

Bonds

LAST week's bond market showed signs of still being under the influence of the Government's recent offering of \$500,000 of long term 4%. The effect of this loan, noted the week previous, was also

apparent last week when Liberties continued their irregular downward trend until Thursday when an almost insatiable demand was encountered for the tax-exempt Liberty 3½s. This issue now remains as the sole tax-exempt Government security and is growing as a popular investment for institutions and investors of large means. On Thursday trading in these bonds ran the price up to 103.02, the record so far attained. Trading on the New York Stock Exchange in the new 4½s was inaugurated on Tuesday and was more active than in other Government issues. Announcement of subscriptions to the 4½s was made on Sunday last when the Treasury Department circulated the statement that subscriptions aggregating \$1,550,000,000 were received up to noon Saturday, Oct. 14. Of particular interest was the fact that of the total subscriptions, \$1,400,000,000 were in cash and but \$150,000,000 in the form of 4% per cent. Victory Notes and Treasury certificates, maturing Dec. 15 next, tendered in payment. Allotments on the primary offerings were made on the following basis, but the lists for the tendering of Victory and Treasury Notes remained open until Saturday, Oct. 21: (a) subscriptions for \$10,000 or less, allotted in full; (b) subscriptions for over \$10,000, but not exceeding \$50,000, allotted 40 per cent, but not less than \$20,000 on any one subscription; (c) subscriptions for over \$50,000, but not exceeding \$100,000, allotted 30 per cent, but not less than \$20,000 on any one subscription; (d) subscriptions for over \$100,000, but not exceeding \$200,000, allotted 20 per cent, but not less than \$30,000 on any one subscription; (e) subscriptions for over \$200,000, but not exceeding \$1,000,000, allotted 15 per cent, but not less than \$100,000 on any one subscription; (f) subscriptions for over \$1,000,000, allotted 10 per cent, but not less than \$15,000 on any one subscription. Details brought out the important fact that of the cash subscriptions, over \$325,000,000 represented subscriptions in amounts not exceeding \$10,000 for any one subscriber, which have been allotted in full, thereby indicating the widespread commitments in the issue by the investor of moderate means. The closing price for the week on the new 4½s was 100.12. It has been brought to light that banking institutions are engaged in turning into cash a part at least of their Liberty bond holdings and directing such cash into industrial channels, and this is taken as a reflection of improving business conditions.

There were no developments of vital moment in other departments of the bond market of last week. Irregular prices were the rule but little significance was attached to this off current situation. That the new 4½ per cent. Government loan has disturbed the high-grade security market, especially the legal ranks, is an obvious fact. However, towards the close of the week there was a prevailing opinion that the depression in the market in the last two weeks is so really of an ephemeral character and, as a matter of fact, is of tangible value, for its probable effect will be the realignment of security values for a forward drive. This seems quite plausible for the reason that nothing has developed to account for this shape of the market and, though the new treasury loan has absorbed a good portion of idle investment funds, still the time has elapsed for the influence of the loan on the market. Friday was the exceptional day of the week when practically all domestic issues showed an appreciation over the closing of Thursday night. The rising quotations did not, however, extend to the foreign division, where the sensitive French Government 7½s reflected the resignation of Lloyd George as Premier of England and the election of Bonar Law as the new Premier with a new Conservative Cabinet succeeding the former Coalition Government. The perennial Gordian knot of allied debt cancellation and the attitude thereon elicited the statement by Secretary of Commerce Hoover that foreign payments were obligatory and this, together with the announcement the previous week of the dissatisfaction of the United States Government with military conditions obtaining in Europe, is taken as a good index of the position taken toward the subject of debt cancellation under existing conditions. The volume of daily trading on the New York Stock Exchange was substantially above that of the week previous. The New York Times bond averages showed a net loss for the week of less than one-fifth of a point. In the first half of the week call money rates were stiff and were ruling at 6 per cent. Toward the latter part of the week rates eased off to 4%, but on Friday ran up to 5 per cent. The renewal rate at the close was 5 per cent. and ninety-day accommodation on prime bills was 4½ per cent, which was the closing rate for the last two weeks.

An outstanding feature of the week's market was the large volume of new floatations.

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
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Financial Transactions

BAROMETRICS

The State of Credit

	Last Week.	Same Week	Year	Same Period
	Last Year.	to Date.	Last Year.	
Sales of stock, shares...	6,416,703	2,814,270	210,226,637	133,826,813
Sales of bonds, par value...	\$107,013,000	\$74,144,000	\$3,489,976,107	\$2,611,947,795
Average price of 50 stocks...	High 93.06	High 64.33	High 93.06	High 73.13
Low 90.00	Low 61.54	Low 66.21	Low 58.35	
High 81.01	High 70.90	High 82.54	High 71.87	
Low 70.00	Low 70.60	Low 75.01	Low 67.56	
Average net yield of ten high-priced bonds...	4.05%	5.21%	4.58%	5.31%
New security issues...	\$65,450,000	\$10,400,000	\$1,932,732,900	\$1,354,294,300

Potentials of Productivity and

THE METAL BAROMETER

Measure of Business Activity

WEEK'S PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES

Same Week
1921.
1920.

	Last Week.	Previous Week.	Year to Date.	Same Week
British Con. 2%	57%@57%	57%@57%	60 @4%	49 @48%
British 5%	101%@100%	100%@100%	102%@91%	90 @80%
British 4%	97 @96%	97 @96%	98 @83%	82%@82%
French rentes (in Paris)...	59.75@58.02	60 @58.40	62.85@54.20	55.70@55.15
French War Loan (in Paris)...	77.40@75.75	76.70@75.75	80.20@74.20	81.45

GROSS RAILROAD EARNINGS

AVERAGE OF WHOLESALE PRICES

WEEKLY PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES

	—End of September—	—End of August—		
	1922. 1921. 1922.	1922. 1921. 1921.		
United States Steel orders, tons...	6,681,607	4,360,670	5,950,105	4,531,026
Daily pig iron production, tons...	67,791	32,850	58,586	30,870
Pig iron production, tons...	*2,033,720	*1,865,529	†1,816,170	†1,954,193
*Month of September. †Month of August.				

ALIEN MIGRATION

WEEKLY PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES

	Second Week in October.	First Week in October.	Fourth Week in September.	Month of August.	From Jan. 1 to Aug. 31.
Inbound	24,776	24,169	18,967	14,803	10,792
Outbound	12,537	12,025	13,232	8,269	10,287
Gain or loss....	+12,339	+12,044	+5,735	+6,534	+3,729
					+12,713
					+8,000

SUMMARY OF IDLE CARS AND CAR LOADINGS

AMERICAN RAILWAY ASSOCIATION

WEEKLY PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES

	Sept. 15.	Sept. 8.	Aug. 30.	Aug. 23.	Aug. 15.	Aug. 8.
Idle cars	168,663	168,882	233,191	283,967	308,270	321,897
Oct. 7.	Sept. 30.	Sept. 23.	Sept. 16.	Sept. 9.	Sept. 2.	
Car loadings	998,169	998,381	973,291	945,919	832,744	931,598

COMPARISON OF WEEK'S COMMERCIAL FAILURES (DUN'S)

WEEKLY PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES

| Week Ended |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Oct. 10, 1922. | Oct. 20, 1921. | Oct. 21, 1920. | Oct. 22, 1919. | Oct. 23, 1918. | Oct. 23, 1917. | Oct. 23, 1916. |
| Total. Over \$5,000 |
East	148	101	85	79	45	37
South	117	53	114	51	38	19
West	121	64	109	75	40	22
Pacific	56	21	41	19	35	17
U. S.	442	289	407	236	212	101
Canada	69	23	68	39	16	6

FAILURES BY MONTHS

WEEKLY PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES

	September	October	November	December	January	February
	1922.	1921.	1922.	1921.	1922.	1921.
Number	1,560	1,400	18,417	13,507	5,383	
Liabilities	\$36,500,000	\$37,020,837	\$400,914,495	\$433,371,003	\$166,577,471	

BUILDING PERMITS (BRADSTREET'S)

WEEKLY PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES


	September	August	July	June	May	April	March
1922.	1921.	1922.	1921.	1922.	1921.	1922.	1921.
153 Cities.	153 Cities.	153 Cities.	153 Cities.	149 Cities.	149 Cities.	148 Cities.	148 Cities.
\$193,131,650	\$147,600,646	\$212,900,181	\$154,033,461	\$168,155,537	\$135,327,833		

The Week in the Money and Exchange Market

WEEKLY PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES

	Normal	Last Week.	Prev. Week.	Yr. 1922.	Same Wk., 1921.	Last Week.	Prev. Week.	Yr. 1922.	Same Wk., 1921.
Exch're.	High.	High.	High.	High.	High.	High.	High.	High.	High.
London	4.68	4.43%	4.43%	4.51%	4.17	3.95%	4.48%	4.43%	4.51%
Paris	7.52	7.38	7.51	7.37	7.35%	7.15	7.53	7.58%	7.51%
Belgium	7.00%	6.78%	7.06	6.93%	8.71	6.78%	7.17	7.07%	8.72
Switzerland	18.46	18.25	18.71	18.52	19.00	18.25	18.98	18.12	18.54
Italy	4.23	4.16	4.28	4.23	5.55%	4.16	5.97	4.23%	5.56%
Holland	38.91	38.80	39.18	36.22	34.78	33.90	39.23	38.97	38.85
Greece	2.58	2.10	2.80	2.68	4.63	4.55	2.61	2.13	2.83
Spain	15.42	15.28	15.17	15.18	14.83	15.12	15.10	15.29	14.85
Denmark	30.08	19.91	20.38	19.96	21.85	19.30	20.10	19.93	20.40
Sweden	26.75	26.70	26.67	26.45	24.65	23.00	26.77	26.70	26.47
Norway	18.90	17.65	18.33	17.64	19.05	14.55	12.90	18.98	17.67
Russia*	15	.05	.15	.10	.30	.20	.03	.024	.14
Bombay	29.13	28.88	28.75	28.75	28.75	28.125	29.25	29.00	28.875
Calcutta	28.88	28.75	28.75	28.75	28.75	28.125	29.125	28.25	28.75
Hongkong	56.00	53.13	57.06	56.38	59.00	52.75	57.00	55.25	57.18
Peking	79.25	77.12	80.00	78.62	89.50	72.50	88.75	77.25	89.00
Shanghai	74.13	73.25	76.38	75.38	82.50	67.75	80.75	74.25	73.375
Korea	48.13	48.06	48.00	48.50	47.18	47.50	47.375	48.25	48.125
Yokohama	48.13	48.06	48.00	48.00	48.00	48.30	47.375	48.25	48.125
Manila	50.00	50.00	50.00	47.75	50.00	50.00	50.25	50.25	48.00
Buenos Aires	36.30	35.95	35.95	35.95	37.43	33.375	32.50	36.35	36.00

Federal Reserve Gold Holdings and Total Stock of Gold



The space between the base line and the broken line represents the cash reserves required, that between the broken line and the light line represents the excess reserves, or free gold, and the whole space between the base line and the heavy line represents the total stock of gold. The supply is computed monthly, so that the record can never be brought to the date of publication. The chart records the last figures published.

Week Ended
Saturday, Oct. 21

Bank Clearings

By Telegraph to
The Annalist

Central Reserve Cities	Last Week		Year to Date	
	1922	1921	1922	1921
New York	\$5,282,875,932	\$3,833,546,944	\$176,043,992,166	\$156,658,066,188
Chicago	692,763,585	537,758,810	22,360,431,532	20,899,320,705
Total, 2 C. R. cities	\$5,975,639,517	\$4,371,305,754	\$198,404,423,698	\$177,557,386,893
Increase	36.0%		11.7%	
Other Federal Reserve Cities				
Atlanta	\$56,892,478	\$53,277,106	\$1,669,885,925	\$1,680,657,362
Boston	476,000,000	344,144,978	12,846,000,000	11,340,529,343
Cleveland	113,184,600	88,399,103	3,678,052,770	3,882,252,039
Kansas City, Mo.	172,510,393	163,153,440	5,429,188,769	6,268,950,189
Minneapolis	85,639,334	79,153,400	2,604,658,426	2,502,021,206
Philadelphia	591,000,000	442,000,000	17,637,000,000	15,743,356,739
Richmond	55,775,000	47,001,000	1,772,873,294	1,635,469,000
Total, 7 cities	\$1,551,001,805	\$1,217,238,074	\$45,637,659,184	\$43,053,216,891
Increase	27.4%		6%	
Total, 9 cities	\$7,526,641,322	\$5,588,543,828	\$244,042,082,882	\$220,610,603,754
Increase	34.6%		10.1%	

Other Cities	Last Week		Year to Date	
	1922	1921	1922	1921
Buffalo	\$48,111,683	\$37,893,660	\$1,580,122,191	\$1,464,039,022
Cincinnati	71,728,000	61,352,425	2,373,060,685	2,266,109,210
Columbus, Ohio	15,065,300	12,310,500	588,401,700	543,365,900
Denver	25,330,290	19,280,698	797,423,879	748,938,370
Los Angeles	121,034,000	89,709,000	4,030,138,000	3,426,899,000
Louisville	31,310,322	25,397,577	1,049,701,847	874,646,454
Milwaukee	35,884,778	29,396,342	1,246,043,632	1,146,718,768
Omaha	45,630,350	39,229,780	1,583,471,869	1,571,210,920
St. Paul	41,092,616	35,186,912	1,290,840,059	1,356,691,374
Seattle	36,872,811	32,598,596	1,320,097,189	1,206,427,354
Washington	20,405,965	18,252,566	777,221,630	696,436,758
Total, 11 cities	\$490,918,731	\$400,492,856	\$16,636,522,681	\$15,301,483,140
Increase	22.5%		8.7%	
Total, 20 cities	\$8,017,560,053	\$5,989,036,684	\$260,678,605,563	\$235,912,086,894
Increase	33.8%		10.4%	

Actual Condition

Statements of the Federal Reserve Banks

Oct. 18

Dist. 1.	Dist. 2.	Dist. 3.	Dist. 4.	Dist. 5.	Dist. 6.	Dist. 7.	Dist. 8.	Dist. 9.	Dist. 10.	Dist. 11.	Dist. 12.
Boston	New York	Philadelphia	Cleveland	Richmond	Atlanta	Chicago	St. Louis	Minneapolis	Kansas City	Dallas	San Fran'co.
Gold reserve	\$240,714,000	\$1,068,474,000	\$211,475,000	\$256,719,000	\$106,862,000	\$131,424,000	\$505,666,000	\$97,878,000	\$73,206,000	\$94,754,000	\$60,559,000
Rediscos.	9,899,000	57,515,000	28,926,000	24,240,000	15,727,000	3,916,000	28,204,000	7,268,000	1,786,000	5,435,000	2,038,000
Bills on hand	54,518,000	187,907,000	68,745,000	78,248,000	44,504,000	43,669,000	99,024,000	34,483,000	23,275,000	24,190,000	30,110,000
Due members	130,805,000	781,805,000	114,723,000	151,350,000	58,582,000	51,702,000	257,940,000	62,716,000	42,707,000	80,813,000	54,385,000
Notes in circul'n.	200,790,000	605,330,000	195,080,000	222,289,000	95,262,000	124,637,000	393,286,000	86,425,000	56,911,000	67,478,000	44,430,000
Ratio of reserve	76.0%	78.8%	73.6%	70.4%	74.3%	76.9%	80.5%	68.1%	73.8%	65.3%	66.5%
											67.2%

Federal Reserve Bank Statement

Statement of Member Banks

Oct. 18

Data for Federal Reserve Cities and in Federal Reserve Branch Cities		
Oct. 11	Oct. 4	
Number of reporting banks	64	
Loans sec. by U. S. Govt. oblig'n's	\$74,443,000	
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	144,648,000	
All other loans and discounts	1,973,706,000	
Total loans and discounts	5,097,797,000	
U. S. bonds owned (exclusive of bonds borrowed)	480,667,000	
U. S. Victory notes	13,704,000	
U. S. Treasury notes	386,132,000	
U. S. ctfs. of indebtedness	35,280,000	
Other bonds, stocks and sec's.	555,500,000	
Loans, discounts, invest., &c.	4,990,228,000	
Reserve bal. with F. R. Bank	635,436,000	
Cash in vault	61,173,000	
Net demand deposits	1,955,232,000	
Time deposits	542,231,000	
Government deposits	31,863,000	
Bills payable	93,535,000	
Bills rediscounted	28,667,000	
All Reserve Cities	Oct. 11	
Oct. 4	Oct. 11	
Number of reporting banks	266	265
Loans sec. by U. S. Govt. oblig'n's	\$172,733,000	\$173,894,000
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	266,689,000	268,357,000
All other loans and discounts	4,486,412,000	4,437,047,000
Total loans and discounts	7,321,854,000	7,294,298,000
U. S. bonds owned (exclusive of bonds borrowed)	775,768,000	787,140,000
U. S. Victory notes	26,142,000	19,879,000
U. S. Treasury notes	513,546,000	517,482,000
U. S. ctfs. of indebtedness	52,510,000	53,335,000
Other bonds, stocks and sec's.	1,211,104,000	1,208,823,000
Loans, discounts, invest., &c.	9,943,024,000	9,930,937,000
Reserve bal. with F. R. Bank	1,054,841,000	1,041,576,000
Cash in vault	161,454,000	149,261,000
Net demand deposits	7,802,222,000	7,761,598,000
Time deposits	1,730,588,000	1,762,711,000
Government deposits	73,296,000	46,534,000
Bills payable	116,610,000	52,472,000
Bills rediscounted	74,335,000	91,484,000
Reserve Branch Cities	Oct. 11	
Oct. 4	Oct. 11	
Number of reporting banks	208	208
Loans sec. by U. S. Govt. oblig'n's	\$41,895,000	\$41,895,000
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	412,940,000	402,029,000
All other loans and discounts	631,851,000	624,727,000
Total loans and discounts	1,081,277,000	1,088,654,000
U. S. bonds owned (exclusive of bonds borrowed)	480,667,000	480,667,000
U. S. Victory notes	10,041,000	5,288,000
U. S. Treasury notes	388,316,000	49,001,000
U. S. ctfs. of indebtedness	44,801,000	15,188,000
Other bonds, stocks and sec's.	555,430,000	552,955,000
Loans, discounts, invest., &c.	1,027,641,000	1,021,511,000
Reserve bal. with F. R. Bank	1,052,810,000	1,043,724,000
Cash in vault	61,173,000	29,973,000
Net demand deposits	1,912,180,000	998,605,000
Time deposits	325,383,000	328,717,000
Government deposits	31,834,000	9,306,000
Bills payable	4,509,000	5,970,000
Bills rediscounted	5,513,000	5,754,000

Other Selected Cities	
Oct. 11	Oct. 4
Number of reporting banks	313
Loans secured by United States Government obligations	\$41,569,000
Loans secured by stocks and bonds	445,545,000
All other loans and discounts	1,312,356,000
Total loans and discounts	1,303,861,000
United States bonds owned (exclusive of bonds borrowed)	1,801,401,000
United States Victory notes	277,405,000
United States Treasury notes	4,369,000
United States certificates of indebtedness	47,472,000
Other bonds, stocks and securities	17,081,000
Loans, discounts, investments, &c.	421,948,000
Reserve balance with Federal Reserve Bank	2,589,576,000
Cash in vault	78,401,000
Net demand deposits	1,631,989,000
Time deposits	768,441,000
Government deposits	8,883,000
Bills payable	16,053,000
Bills rediscounted	24,535,000

Total resources \$5,291,114,000 \$5,168,870,000 \$5,186,957,000

LIABILITIES

Capital paid in \$106,327,000 \$106,271,000 \$103,034,000

Surplus 215,398,000 215,398,000 213,824,000

Deposits: Government 12,545,000 12,457,000 29,120,000

Member banks—reserve account 1,921,277,000 1,890,841,000 1,660,936,000

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New York Stock Exchange Transactions


Week Ended October 21

Total Sales 6,416,793 Shares

1922										1922										1922										
Stock and High. Low. Sales. Dividend Rate.					Net High. Low. Last. Chge.					Stock and High. Low. Sales. Dividend Rate.					Net High. Low. Last. Chge.					Stock and High. Low. Sales. Dividend Rate.					Net High. Low. Last. Chge.					
83 48	4,550 ADAMS EXPRESS	82%	79%	80%	- 3%	95%	59	20,300 Chi & Northwest (5)	93	91%	92%	- 3%	123%	121	121	- 1	76%	1,100 Lake Erie & Western	35%	34%	34%	- 3%	75%	75%	75%	75%	75%			
23 10%	700 Advance Rumely	10	18	18	- 1%	125	100	460	Do pf (7)	84	84	- 3	87	84	84	- 3	55%	2,400 Lee Rubber & Tire (2)	27%	25%	25%	- 1%	75%	75%	75%	75%	75%			
60% 31%	300 Do pf (8)	54	50%	50%	- 3%	89%	59	2,900 Chi Pneumatic Tool (4)	87	84	- 3	45%	43%	45%	+ 1%	72%	5,500 Lehigh Valley (3)	71%	69%	71%	+ 2%	75%	75%	75%	75%	75%				
66 45%	1,700 Air Reduction (4)	63%	61%	63%	+ 3%	50	30%	29,300 Chi, Rock Isl & Pac.	45%	43%	45%	+ 1%	100%	99%	99%	- 1%	22%	2,200 Liggett & Myers (12)	22%	22%	22%	+ 1%	22%	22%	22%	22%	22%			
18% 9%	2,800 Ajax Rubber	13%	14%	14%	- 1%	105	83%	1,200 Do pf (7)	100%	99%	99%	- 1%	93%	90%	90%	- 3%	122	1,214 Lake Erie & Western	121%	121%	121%	- 1%	121%	121%	121%	121%	121%			
1% 3%	1,300 Alaska Gold Mines	3%	3%	3%	- 3%	93%	70%	2,000 Do pf (6)	92%	90%	90%	- 3%	125	100	100	- 3%	65%	5,200 Lima Locomotive (3)	61%	59%	60%	- 1%	52%	52%	52%	52%	52%			
2% 2%	1,500 Alaska Juneau	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	90	51	200 C. St. P. Minn & Om (5)	98%	90%	89%	- 3%	27	15%	29,300 Chi, Copper	26%	25%	25%	- 3%	23%	2,800 Loew's, Inc.	22%	22%	21%	+ 1%	22%	22%	22%	22%	22%
11% 10%	100 All Am Cables (7)	11%	11%	11%	- 1%	33%	25%	2,900 Chi, Copper	29%	28%	28%	- 3%	80%	54	600 C. C. & St. L (4)	80	78	80	+ 1%	144%	3,800 Loft, Inc (1)	12%	12%	12%	- 1%	12%	12%	12%	12%	12%
91% 55%	9,000 Allied Chem & Dye (4)	86%	83%	83%	- 2%	100%	72%	500 Do pf (5)	100%	100%	100%	+ 1%	114%	100%	100	- 1%	67%	3,000 Alcoa (1)	60	60	60	- 1%	60%	60%	60%	60%	60%			
11% 10%	1,300 Am Al�as-Chalmers Mfg (4)	52%	47%	49%	- 4%	60%	49	100 Do pf (4)	102	99	99	- 1%	68%	43	3,400 Cluett, Peabody	63%	63	63	+ 1%	140	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	
50% 37%	26,900 Alcoa Al�as-Chalmers Mfg (4)	52%	47%	49%	- 4%	103	87%	100 Do pf (7)	101	101	101	- 1%	21	5	3,200 Am Carb & El (6)	24%	23%	23%	+ 1%	144%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%		
42% 23%	2,400 Am Agricultural Chem. (3)	37%	35%	35%	- 2%	82%	41	50,800 Coca-Cola (4)	81%	79%	79%	- 1%	53%	38	3,200 Am Carb & El (6)	33%	31	31	- 1%	21%	3,200 McIntyre FOR M (1)	19%	17%	17%	- 1%	17%	17%	17%	17%	17%
80% 57%	1,000 Am Bank Note (4)	80%	79%	79%	- 2%	37	24	3,200 Chi, Copper & Iron	33%	31	31	- 1%	54%	38	500 Do Cl. C. E. (4)	46%	45%	45%	- 1%	84%	4,200 Mack Trucks	55%	54%	54%	- 1%	54%	54%	54%	54%	54%
54 51%	692 Do pf (3)	54	53%	53%	+ 1%	64	55	1,800 Chi, Southern (3)	49%	48%	48%	- 1%	102	99	600 Do pf (4)	62%	62%	62%	- 1%	87%	5,000 Lehigh Valley (3)	71%	69%	71%	+ 2%	72%	72%	72%	72%	72%
49 31%	1,000 Am Beet Sugar	45	42	42	- 3	60%	49	100 Do pf (4)	102	99	99	- 1%	59	59	100 Do pf (7)	102	101	101	- 1%	102	1,000 Manati Sugar	91%	90%	91%	+ 1%	91%	91%	91%	91%	91%
80% 61%	200 Do pf (6)	80%	80%	80%	- 1%	114%	64%	25,500 Chi, Gas & El (6)	110%	107%	109%	+ 1%	21	5	7,500 Columbia Graphophone	24%	23%	23%	+ 1%	35%	12,000 Magna Co. (4)	24%	23%	23%	+ 1%	23%	23%	23%	23%	23%
49 47%	2,400 Am Bosch Magneto	43%	40%	41	- 1%	59	15%	1,200 Do pf (7)	114	110	110	- 1%	97	94	1,200 Do pf (7)	114	110	110	- 1%	97	1,200 Lorillard (P) Co (12)	17%	17%	17%	- 1%	17%	17%	17%	17%	17%
113 98%	300 Am Brake Sh & Fdy (4)	80	79	79	- 3%	100	87%	100 Do pf (7)	101	101	101	- 1%	21	5	4,300 L & N (7)	101	101	101	- 1%	144%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%		
76% 53%	1,000 Am Do pf	66	60	60	- 4%	82%	41	50,800 Coca-Cola (4)	81%	79%	79%	- 1%	53%	38	3,200 Am Carb & El (6)	33%	31	31	- 1%	21%	3,200 McIntyre FOR M (1)	19%	17%	17%	- 1%	17%	17%	17%	17%	17%
80% 57%	500 Am Bank Note (4)	80%	79%	79%	- 2%	37	24	3,200 Chi, Copper & Iron	33%	31	31	- 1%	54%	38	500 Do Cl. C. E. (4)	46%	45%	45%	- 1%	84%	4,200 Mack Trucks	55%	54%	54%	- 1%	54%	54%	54%	54%	54%
54 51%	692 Do pf (3)	54	53%	53%	+ 1%	64	55	1,800 Chi, Southern (3)	49%	48%	48%	- 1%	102	99	600 Do pf (4)	62%	62%	62%	- 1%	87%	5,000 Lehigh Valley (3)	71%	69%	71%	+ 2%	72%	72%	72%	72%	72%
49 31%	1,000 Am Beet Sugar	45	42	42	- 3	60%	49	100 Do pf (4)	102	99	99	- 1%	59	59	100 Do pf (7)	102	101	101	- 1%	102	1,000 Manati Sugar	91%	90%	91%	+ 1%	91%	91%	91%	91%	91%
80% 61%	200 Do pf (6)	80%	80%	80%	- 1%	114%	64%	25,500 Chi, Gas & El (6)	110%	107%	109%	+ 1%	21	5	7,500 Columbia Graphophone	24%	23%	23%	+ 1%	35%	12,000 Magna Co. (4)	24%	23%	23%	+ 1%	23%	23%	23%	23%	23%
113 98%	300 Am Brake Sh & Fdy (4)	80	79	79	- 3%	100	87%	100 Do pf (7)	101	101	101	- 1%	21	5	4,300 L & N (7)	101	101	101	- 1%	144%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%		
76% 53%	1,000 Am Do pf	66	60	60	- 4%	82%	41	50,800 Coca-Cola (4)	81%	79%	79%	- 1%	53%	38	3,200 Am Carb & El (6)	33%	31	31	- 1%	21%	3,200 McIntyre FOR M (1)	19%	17%	17%	- 1%	17%	17%	17%	17%	17%
80% 57%	500 Am Bank Note (4)	80%	79%	79%	- 2%	37	24	3,200 Chi, Copper & Iron	33%	31	31	- 1%	54%	38	500 Do Cl. C. E. (4)	46%	45%	45%	- 1%	84%	4,200 Mack Trucks	55%	54%	54%	- 1%	54%	54%	54%	54%	54%
54 51%	692 Do pf (3)	54	53%	53%	+ 1%	64	55	1,800 Chi, Southern (3)	49%	48%	48%	- 1%	102	99	600 Do pf (4)	62%	62%	62%	- 1%	87%	5,000 Lehigh Valley (3)	71%	69%	71%	+ 2%	72%	72%	72%	72%	72%
49 31%	1,000 Am Beet Sugar	45	42	42	- 3	60%	49	100 Do pf (4)	102	99	99	- 1%	59	59	100 Do pf (7)	102	101	101	- 1%	102	1,000 Manati Sugar	91%	90%	91%	+ 1%	91%	91%	91%	91%	91%
80% 61%	200 Do pf (6)	80%	80%	80%	- 1%	114%	64%	25,500 Chi, Gas & El (6)	110%	107%	109%	+ 1%	21	5	7,500 Columbia Graphophone	24%	23%	23%	+ 1%	35%	12,000 Magna Co. (4)	24%	23%	23%	+ 1%	23%	23%	23%	23%	23%
113 98%	300 Am Brake Sh & Fdy (4)	80	79	79	- 3%	100	87%	100 Do pf (7)	101	101	101	- 1%	21	5	4,300 L & N (7)	101	101	101	- 1%	144%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%		
76% 53%	1,000 Am Do pf	66	60	60	- 4%	82%	41	50,800 Coca-Cola (4)	81%	79%	79%	- 1%	53%	38	3,200 Am Carb & El (6)	33%	31	31	- 1%	21%	3,200 McIntyre FOR M (1)	19%	17%	17%	- 1%	17%	17%	17%	17%	17%
80% 57%	500 Am Bank Note (4)	80%	79%	79%	- 2%	37	24	3,200 Chi, Copper & Iron	33%	31	31	- 1%	54%	38	500 Do Cl. C. E. (4)	46%	45%	45%	- 1%	84%	4,200 Mack Trucks	55%	54%	54%	- 1%	54%	54%	54%	54%	54%
54 51%	692 Do pf (3)	54	53%	53%	+ 1%	64	55	1,800 Chi, Southern (3)	49%	48%	48%	- 1%	102	99	600 Do pf (4)	62%	62%	62%	- 1%	87%	5,000 Lehigh Valley (3)	71%	69%	71%	+ 2%	72%	72%	72%	72%	72%
49 31%	1,000 Am Beet Sugar	45	42	42	- 3	60%	49	100 Do pf (4)	102	99	99	- 1%	59	59	100 Do pf (7)	102	101	101	- 1%	102	1,000 Manati Sugar	91%	90%	91%	+ 1%	91%	91%	91%	91%	91%
80% 61%	200 Do pf (6)	80%	80%	80%	- 1%	114%	64%	25,500 Chi, Gas & El (6)	110%	107%	109%	+ 1%	21	5	7,500 Columbia Graphophone	24%	23%	23%	+ 1%	35%	12,000 Magna Co. (4)	24%	23%	23%	+ 1%	23%	23%	23%	23%	23%
113 98%	300 Am Brake Sh & Fdy (4)	80	79	79	- 3%	100	87%	100 Do pf (7)	101	101	101	- 1%	21	5	4,300 L & N (7)	101	101	101	- 1%	144%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%	147%		
76% 53%	1,000 Am Do pf	66	60	60	- 4%	82%	41	50,800 Coca-Cola (4)	81%	79%	79%	- 1%	53%	38	3,200 Am Carb & El (6)	33%	31	31	- 1%	21%	3,200 McIntyre FOR M (1)	19%	17%	17%	- 1%	17%	17%	17%	17%	17%
80% 57%	500 Am Bank Note (4)	80%	79%	79%	- 2%	37	24	3,200 Chi, Copper & Iron	33%	31	31	- 1%	54%	38	500 Do Cl. C. E. (4)	46%	45%	45%	- 1%	84%	4,200 Mack Trucks	55%	54%	54%	- 1%	54%	54%	54%	54%	54%
54 51%	692 Do pf (3)	54	53%	53%	+ 1%	64	55	1,800 Chi, Southern (3)	49%	48%	48%	- 1%	102	99	600 Do pf (4)	62%	62%	62%	- 1%	87%	5,000 Lehigh Valley (3)	71%	69%	71%	+ 2%	72%	72%	72%	72%	72%
49 31%	1,000 Am Beet Sugar	45	42	42	- 3	60%	49	100 Do pf (4)	102	99	99	- 1%	59	59	100 Do pf (7)	102	101	101	- 1%	102	1,000 Manati Sugar	91%	90%	91%	+ 1%	91%	91%	91%	91%	91%
80% 61%	200 Do pf (6)	80%	80%	80%	- 1%	114%	64%	25,500 Chi, Gas & El (6)	110%	107%	109%	+ 1%	21	5	7,500 Columbia Graphophone	24%	23%	23%	+ 1%	35%	12,000 Magna Co. (4)	24%	23%	23%	+ 1%	23%	23%	23%	23%	23%
113 98%	300 Am Brake Sh & Fdy (4)	80	79	79	- 3%	100	87%	100 Do pf (7)	101	101	101	- 1%	21	5	4,300 L & N (7)	101	101	101	- 1%	144%	147%	147%	147%	147%</						

Continued on Page 42

The Trend of Bond Prices—Average of 40 Listed Issues



Stock Exchange Bond Trading

Week Ended October 21 Total Sales \$107,013,600 Par Value

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WAR LOANS

Range, 1922	High	Low	Sales	Range, 1922	High	Low	Sales	Range, 1922	High	Low	Sales	Range, 1922	High	Low	Sales	Range, 1922	High	Low	Sales	
High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Sales	Net		
103.02	94.84	4316 1/2 Lib 3 1/2%, 1932-47...103.02	100.60	100.32	+ .26	100% 8 1/2% 10	Am Ag Chem 7 1/2%, 1941...104%	103%	103%	%	Choc, Okla & G con 5 1/2%, 1941...98%	98%	98%	..	102.70	94.82	125% Lib 3 1/2%, 32-47...reg. 102.70	100.52	100.76	+ .40
101.68	95.70	1 1/2 Lib 4 1/2%, 1932-47...99.30	99.30	99.30	- .70	100% 8 1/2% 10	Am Ag Chem 5 1/2%, 1928...98	98%	88%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.68	95.70	1 1/2 Lib 4 1/2%, 1932-47...99.30	99.30	99.30	- .70
100.80	95.50	2 Lib 4 1/2%, 1932-47...98.50	98.50	98.50	- .50	100% 8 1/2% 10	Am Cotton Oil 5 1/2%, 1931...98	98%	88%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	100.80	95.50	2 Lib 4 1/2%, 1932-47...98.50	98.50	98.50	- .50
102.00	98.00	4 Lib 1 1/2-24 4 1/2%, 1932-47...100.10	100.10	100.10	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am Tel & Tel col 5 1/2%, 1926...98	98%	98%	- 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.78	96.00	117 1/2 Lib 1 1/2-24 4 1/2%, 1932-47...99.70	99.70	99.70	- .00
101.40	95.86	61 Lib 1st cv 4 1/2%, reg. 99.30	98.70	99.40	- .30	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.52	99.52	99.52	- .00
100.80	95.00	19 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am Sup R 6 1/2%, 1926...102%	102%	102%	- 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	102.00	98.00	19 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00
101.78	96.00	117 1/2 Lib 1st cv 4 1/2%, 1927-47...99.70	99.70	99.70	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.40	95.86	61 Lib 1st cv 4 1/2%, reg. 99.30	98.70	99.40	- .30
100.80	95.00	19 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00
101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	100.80	95.50	2 Lib 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.52	99.52	99.52	- .00
102.00	98.00	4 Lib 1 1/2-24 4 1/2%, 1932-47...100.10	100.10	100.10	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.78	96.00	117 1/2 Lib 1 1/2-24 4 1/2%, 1932-47...99.70	99.70	99.70	- .00
101.40	95.86	61 Lib 1st cv 4 1/2%, reg. 99.30	98.70	99.40	- .30	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00
100.80	95.00	19 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00
101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	100.80	95.50	2 Lib 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.52	99.52	99.52	- .00
102.00	98.00	4 Lib 1 1/2-24 4 1/2%, 1932-47...100.10	100.10	100.10	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.78	96.00	117 1/2 Lib 1 1/2-24 4 1/2%, 1932-47...99.70	99.70	99.70	- .00
101.40	95.86	61 Lib 1st cv 4 1/2%, reg. 99.30	98.70	99.40	- .30	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00
100.80	95.00	19 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00
101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	100.80	95.50	2 Lib 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.52	99.52	99.52	- .00
102.00	98.00	4 Lib 1 1/2-24 4 1/2%, 1932-47...100.10	100.10	100.10	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.78	96.00	117 1/2 Lib 1 1/2-24 4 1/2%, 1932-47...99.70	99.70	99.70	- .00
101.40	95.86	61 Lib 1st cv 4 1/2%, reg. 99.30	98.70	99.40	- .30	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00
100.80	95.00	19 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00
101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	100.80	95.50	2 Lib 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.52	99.52	99.52	- .00
102.00	98.00	4 Lib 1 1/2-24 4 1/2%, 1932-47...100.10	100.10	100.10	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.78	96.00	117 1/2 Lib 1 1/2-24 4 1/2%, 1932-47...99.70	99.70	99.70	- .00
101.40	95.86	61 Lib 1st cv 4 1/2%, reg. 99.30	98.70	99.40	- .30	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00
100.80	95.00	19 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00
101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	100.80	95.50	2 Lib 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.52	99.52	99.52	- .00
102.00	98.00	4 Lib 1 1/2-24 4 1/2%, 1932-47...100.10	100.10	100.10	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.78	96.00	117 1/2 Lib 1 1/2-24 4 1/2%, 1932-47...99.70	99.70	99.70	- .00
101.40	95.86	61 Lib 1st cv 4 1/2%, reg. 99.30	98.70	99.40	- .30	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2	..	101.00	94.68	387 3 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00
100.80	95.00	19 Lib 2d cv 4 1/2%, 1927-48...99.00	99.00	99.00	- .00	100% 9 1/2% 10	Am T & T cv 4 1/2%, 1929...92	92%	91%	+ 1	Cin Gas & El 5 1/2%, 1935...98%	97 1/2	97 1/2</td							

Stock Exchange Bond Trading—Continued

Stock Exchange Sales												Net													
Range 1922			High			Low			Last			High			Low			Last			Sales				
High			Low			Last			Chge			High			Low			Last			Chge				
90% 86 11	Int Paper co	25, '47.	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	+ 1%	+ 1%	85%	564	83	NY, NH & H cv deb'ts	45	52	80%	80%	80%	+ 1%	85%	76	18	St P & C Sh L 4%, '41 84%
90% 86 11	Invincible Oil & Gas	25, '48.	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	+ 1%	+ 1%	57	31	23	NY, NH & H Deb 4%	51	53	50	50%	+ 1%	+ 1%	94%	904	4	St P & M & Co 4%, '33 94
100% 90 238	Iowa Central ref	45, '51.	42%	41%	41%	41%	41%	41%	41%	+ 1%	+ 1%	53%	38%	5	NY, NH & H Conf'ys	56	53	53	53	+ 3	+ 3	114%	109%	10	St P & M & Co 4%, '33 94
50% 31% 29	Iowa Central 1st	54, '58.	80%	80%	80%	80%	80%	80%	80%	+ 1%	+ 1%	55	37%	3	NY, NH & H Inv'ble	54	51	50	50%	+ 1%	+ 1%	90%	93%	6	St P & M & Mont ext 4%, '31 91%
85 80 25	Iowa Central 1st	54, '58.	80%	80%	80%	80%	80%	80%	80%	+ 1%	+ 1%	55%	38%	11	NY, NH & H noncv'db'ts	56	56	56	56%	+ 1%	+ 1%	92%	88	17	St P & Nor Pac 4%, '23 100
80 80 25	JAMESTON F & CLEAR- FIELD 4s, '59.	87	87	87	87	87	87	87	- 1	- 1	60	41	8	NY, NH & H noncv'db'ts	47	59%	50%	50%	+ 1%	+ 1%	101	100	10	Saks Co 4%, '23 100	
80 80 25	JAMESTON F & CLEAR- FIELD 4s, '59.	87	87	87	87	87	87	87	- 1	- 1	63%	45	7	NY, NH & H noncv'db'ts	47	59%	50%	50%	+ 1%	+ 1%	814	78	47	Saks Co 4%, '23 100	
84% 72% 141	K. C. FT & S & M 4s,	'35.	89%	70%	70%	70%	70%	70%	70%	- 1	- 1	99	60	1	NY, NH & H deb'ts	55	52	68	68	+ 1%	+ 1%	91%	83	4	Say, Fla & W 1st 4%, '28 100%
94% 84% 53	Kan City 5s	50, '35.	92%	90%	91%	91%	91%	91%	91%	+ 1%	+ 1%	70%	65%	5	NY, NH & H deb'ts	62	62	71%	70%	+ 1%	+ 1%	91%	83	6	Scioto V & N 4%, '28 89%
84% 72% 53	Kan City 5s	50, '35.	69%	68%	68%	68%	68%	68%	68%	+ 1%	+ 1%	85	77%	8	NY, NH & H Putnam	65	85	85	85	+ 1%	+ 1%	63	48	28	Seab Air L 4%, '29 50%
80% 70% 54	Kan City Term 4s	40, '30.	83%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	+ 1%	+ 1%	44%	25%	41	NY, NH & H Rya	49	1942	38%	38%	+ 1%	+ 1%	63	31	132	Seab Air L 4%, '29 44%
100% 101 16	Kayser (J) 4s	7s, '42.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	- 1	- 1	44	24	115	NY, NH & H Rya	47	30%	37	34	+ 1%	+ 1%	73%	41	212	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
94% 72% 16	Kelly-Spring Tire 5s	7s, '42.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	- 1	- 1	15	56%	60	NY, NH & H Rya	54	52	64	64	+ 1%	+ 1%	101%	94	16	Sharon Steel Hoop 8s, '41 100%
94% 72% 16	Kekulik & D. M. 5s,	'22.	93%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	13%	46	28	NY, NH & H Rya	48	7	65	65	+ 1%	+ 1%	102%	98	24	Shinclair Oil 7s, '22 75%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	73	63%	68	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	66	66	+ 1%	+ 1%	110%	95	32	Shinclair Oil 7s, '22 100%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	72	54	10	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	74%	74%	+ 1%	+ 1%	98%	84	17	Seab Air L 4%, '29 50%
80% 70% 54	Kan City Term 4s	40, '30.	83%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	+ 1%	+ 1%	60	38%	16	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	38%	38%	+ 1%	+ 1%	33%	13	157	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
100% 101 16	Kayser (J) 4s	7s, '42.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	- 1	- 1	44	24	115	NY, NH & H Rya	47	30%	37	34	+ 1%	+ 1%	73%	41	212	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
94% 72% 16	Kekulik & D. M. 5s,	'22.	93%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	13%	46	28	NY, NH & H Rya	48	7	65	65	+ 1%	+ 1%	101%	94	16	Sharon Steel Hoop 8s, '41 100%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	73	63%	68	NY, NH & H Rya	48	7	65	65	+ 1%	+ 1%	102%	98	24	Shinclair Oil 7s, '22 75%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	72	54	10	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	74%	74%	+ 1%	+ 1%	98%	84	17	Seab Air L 4%, '29 50%
80% 70% 54	Kan City Term 4s	40, '30.	83%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	+ 1%	+ 1%	60	38%	16	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	38%	38%	+ 1%	+ 1%	33%	13	157	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
100% 101 16	Kayser (J) 4s	7s, '42.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	- 1	- 1	44	24	115	NY, NH & H Rya	47	30%	37	34	+ 1%	+ 1%	73%	41	212	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	73	63%	68	NY, NH & H Rya	48	7	65	65	+ 1%	+ 1%	101%	94	16	Sharon Steel Hoop 8s, '41 100%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	72	54	10	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	74%	74%	+ 1%	+ 1%	98%	84	17	Seab Air L 4%, '29 50%
80% 70% 54	Kan City Term 4s	40, '30.	83%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	+ 1%	+ 1%	60	38%	16	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	38%	38%	+ 1%	+ 1%	33%	13	157	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
100% 101 16	Kayser (J) 4s	7s, '42.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	- 1	- 1	44	24	115	NY, NH & H Rya	47	30%	37	34	+ 1%	+ 1%	73%	41	212	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	73	63%	68	NY, NH & H Rya	48	7	65	65	+ 1%	+ 1%	101%	94	16	Sharon Steel Hoop 8s, '41 100%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	72	54	10	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	74%	74%	+ 1%	+ 1%	98%	84	17	Seab Air L 4%, '29 50%
80% 70% 54	Kan City Term 4s	40, '30.	83%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	+ 1%	+ 1%	60	38%	16	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	38%	38%	+ 1%	+ 1%	33%	13	157	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
100% 101 16	Kayser (J) 4s	7s, '42.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	- 1	- 1	44	24	115	NY, NH & H Rya	47	30%	37	34	+ 1%	+ 1%	73%	41	212	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	73	63%	68	NY, NH & H Rya	48	7	65	65	+ 1%	+ 1%	101%	94	16	Sharon Steel Hoop 8s, '41 100%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	72	54	10	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	74%	74%	+ 1%	+ 1%	98%	84	17	Seab Air L 4%, '29 50%
80% 70% 54	Kan City Term 4s	40, '30.	83%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	+ 1%	+ 1%	60	38%	16	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	38%	38%	+ 1%	+ 1%	33%	13	157	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
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94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	73	63%	68	NY, NH & H Rya	48	7	65	65	+ 1%	+ 1%	101%	94	16	Sharon Steel Hoop 8s, '41 100%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	72	54	10	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	74%	74%	+ 1%	+ 1%	98%	84	17	Seab Air L 4%, '29 50%
80% 70% 54	Kan City Term 4s	40, '30.	83%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	+ 1%	+ 1%	60	38%	16	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	38%	38%	+ 1%	+ 1%	33%	13	157	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
100% 101 16	Kayser (J) 4s	7s, '42.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	- 1	- 1	44	24	115	NY, NH & H Rya	47	30%	37	34	+ 1%	+ 1%	73%	41	212	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	73	63%	68	NY, NH & H Rya	48	7	65	65	+ 1%	+ 1%	101%	94	16	Sharon Steel Hoop 8s, '41 100%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	72	54	10	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	74%	74%	+ 1%	+ 1%	98%	84	17	Seab Air L 4%, '29 50%
80% 70% 54	Kan City Term 4s	40, '30.	83%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	+ 1%	+ 1%	60	38%	16	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	38%	38%	+ 1%	+ 1%	33%	13	157	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
100% 101 16	Kayser (J) 4s	7s, '42.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	- 1	- 1	44	24	115	NY, NH & H Rya	47	30%	37	34	+ 1%	+ 1%	73%	41	212	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	73	63%	68	NY, NH & H Rya	48	7	65	65	+ 1%	+ 1%	101%	94	16	Sharon Steel Hoop 8s, '41 100%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	72	54	10	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	74%	74%	+ 1%	+ 1%	98%	84	17	Seab Air L 4%, '29 50%
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100% 101 16	Kayser (J) 4s	7s, '42.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	- 1	- 1	44	24	115	NY, NH & H Rya	47	30%	37	34	+ 1%	+ 1%	73%	41	212	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	73	63%	68	NY, NH & H Rya	48	7	65	65	+ 1%	+ 1%	101%	94	16	Sharon Steel Hoop 8s, '41 100%
94% 84% 43	Kelch Steel 5s,	'35.	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	+ 1%	+ 1%	72	54	10	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	74%	74%	+ 1%	+ 1%	98%	84	17	Seab Air L 4%, '29 50%
80% 70% 54	Kan City Term 4s	40, '30.	83%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	82%	+ 1%	+ 1%	60	38%	16	NY, NH & H W 1st	56	57	38%	38%	+ 1%	+ 1%	33%	13	157	Seab Air L 4%, '29 27%
100% 101 16	Kayser (J) 4s	7s, '42																							

New York Stock Exchange Transactions—Continued

Transactions on the New York Curb

WEEK ENDING OCT. 21, 1922.

Trading by Days.

	Indust.	Oil.	Mining.	Bonds.	Foreign	Range, 1922	Net	Range, 1922	Net											
						High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last	Chge	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last	Chge	
Monday	166,524	245,690	474,600	\$1,187,000	\$283,000	.08 .21	2,000 Allen Oil	.39 .37 .39 ..	21 .06	11,200 Tonopah Ext.	.84 .3	.34 ..	3 .75	1 .75	1 .75	1 .75	1 .75	1 .75	1 ..	
Tuesday	134,655	236,521	503,400	802,000	438,000	.08 .02	1,000 Amal Royal	.02 .02 .02 ..	21 .06	1,600 Tonopah Min.	.24 .24	.24 + .4	2 .14	2 .14	2 .14	2 .14	2 .14	2 .14	..	
Wednesday	136,783	341,515	535,345	1,010,000	314,000	.17 .75	300 Ark Nat Gas.	.94 .94 .94 ..	21 .06	39,000 Tri-Bullion Smelt	.15 .08	.13 + .05	1 .45	39,800 Tuolumne Copper	.55 .49	.49	.49	.49	.49	..
Thursday	128,605	282,440	348,685	672,000	177,000	.16 .58	12,000 Boone Oil	.12 .10 .12 ..	21 .06	10,000 Trinity Copper	.2	.15 ..	1 .14	1 .14	1 .14	1 .14	1 .14	1 .14	..	
Friday	87,510	239,290	339,620	845,000	311,000	.26 .15	8,400 Boston & Wyoming Oil	.16 .95 .16 ..	21 .06	17,400 United Eastern	.11 .12	.11 + .1	1 .14	1 .14	1 .14	1 .14	1 .14	1 .14	..	
Saturday	49,810	149,660	189,520	424,000	80,000	.09 .34	1,000 Brit Controlled Oil Flds	.2 .2 ..	21 .06	200 United Verde Ext.	.29	.28 + .29	1 .14	1 .14	1 .14	1 .14	1 .14	1 .14	..	
Total	703,887	1,514,416	2,381,170	\$4,940,000	\$1,614,000	242 .18	780 Cities Service	.203 .197 .198 ..	21 .06	7,500 Unity Gold Min.	.5	.4 + .5	1 .1	1 .1	1 .1	1 .1	1 .1	1 ..		
						72 .51	1,300 Cities Service pf.	.69 .69 .69 ..	21 .06	900 United Zinc Smelt	.1	.1 ..	1 .11	1 .11	1 .11	1 .11	1 .11	1 ..		
						.06 .4%	300 Cities Service pf. B.	.64 .64 .64 ..	21 .06	3,000 U S Coml M.	.11	.11 ..								
						.24% .17	3,100 Cities Service bkrs shs.	.21 .20 .20 ..	21 .06	2,000 Victory Divide	.02	.02 ..								
						.67 .06%	500 Cities Service B pf.	.66 .66 .66 ..	21 .06											
						.35 .14	1,500 Columbian Synd.	.2 .2 ..	21 .06											
						.1% .1%	2,500 Cons. Royal	.14 .14 .14 ..	21 .06											
						.4 .1	1,700 Cont Ref.	.34 .25 .3 ..	21 .06											
						.12 .03	3,000 Cushing Pet.	.03 .03 ..	21 .06											
						.8 .44	100 Cosden pf. 4d.	.44 .44 .44 ..	21 .06											
						.8 .1	100 Dom Oil of Texas.	.9 .9 ..	21 .06											
						.8 .4	100 Dom Oil pf.	.44 .44 .44 ..	21 .06											
						.1 .8	100 Dom Oil pf.	.9 .9 ..	21 .06											
						.1 .5	1,900 Cretone Syndicate	.6 .6 ..	21 .06											
						.1 .5	11,500 Carib Syndicate	.6 .6 ..	21 .06											
						.242 .158	780 Cities Service	.203 .197 .198 ..	21 .06											
						.72 .51	1,300 Cities Service pf.	.69 .69 .69 ..	21 .06											
						.06 .4%	300 Cities Service pf. B.	.64 .64 .64 ..	21 .06											
						.24% .17	3,100 Cities Service bkrs shs.	.21 .20 .20 ..	21 .06											
						.67 .06%	500 Cities Service B pf.	.66 .66 .66 ..	21 .06											
						.35 .14	1,500 Columbian Synd.	.2 .2 ..	21 .06											
						.1% .1%	2,500 Cons. Royal	.14 .14 .14 ..	21 .06											
						.4 .1	1,700 Cont Ref.	.34 .25 .3 ..	21 .06											
						.12 .03	3,000 Cushing Pet.	.03 .03 ..	21 .06											
						.8 .44	100 Cosden pf. 4d.	.44 .44 .44 ..	21 .06											
						.8 .1	100 Dom Oil pf.	.9 .9 ..	21 .06											
						.8 .4	100 Dom Oil pf.	.9 .9 ..	21 .06											
						.1 .8	100 Dom Oil pf.	.9 .9 ..	21 .06											
						.1 .5	1,900 Cretone Syndicate	.6 .6 ..	21 .06											
						.1 .5	11,500 Carib Syndicate	.6 .6 ..	21 .06											
						.242 .158	780 Cities Service	.203 .197 .198 ..	21 .06											
						.72 .51	1,300 Cities Service pf.	.69 .69 .69 ..	21 .06											
						.06 .4%	300 Cities Service pf. B.	.64 .64 .64 ..	21 .06											
						.24% .17	3,100 Cities Service bkrs shs.	.21 .20 .20 ..	21 .06											
						.67 .06%	500 Cities Service B pf.	.66 .66 .66 ..	21 .06											
						.35 .14	1,500 Columbian Synd.	.2 .2 ..	21 .06											
						.1% .1%	2,500 Cons. Royal	.14 .14 .14 ..	21 .06											
						.4 .1	1,700 Cont Ref.	.34 .25 .3 ..	21 .06											
						.12 .03	3,000 Cushing Pet.	.03 .03 ..	21 .06											
						.8 .44	100 Cosden pf. 4d.	.44 .44 .44 ..	21 .06											
						.8 .1	100 Dom Oil pf.	.9 .9 ..	21 .06											
						.8 .4	100 Dom Oil pf.	.9 .9 ..	21 .06											
						.1 .8	100 Dom Oil pf.	.9 .9 ..	21 .06											
						.1 .5	1,900 Cretone Syndicate	.6 .6 ..	21 .06											
						.1 .5	11,500 Carib Syndicate	.6 .6 ..	21 .06											
						.242 .158	780 Cities Service	.203 .197 .198 ..	21 .06											
						.72 .51	1,300 Cities Service pf.	.69 .69 .69 ..	21 .06											
						.06 .4%	300 Cities Service pf. B.	.64 .64 .64 ..	21 .06											
						.24% .17	3,100 Cities Service bkrs shs.	.21 .20 .20 ..	21 .06											
						.67 .06%	500 Cities Service B pf.	.66 .66 .66 ..	21 .06											
						.35 .14	1,500 Columbian Synd.	.2 .2 ..	21 .06											
						.1% .1%	2,500 Cons. Royal	.14 .14 .14 ..	21 .06											
						.4 .1	1,700 Cont Ref.	.34 .25 .3 ..	21 .06											
						.12 .03	3,000 Cushing Pet.	.03 .03 ..	21 .06											
						.8 .44	100 Cosden pf. 4d.	.44 .44 .44 ..	21 .06											
						.8 .1	100 Dom Oil pf.	.9 .9 ..	21 .06											
						.8 .4	100 Dom Oil pf.	.9 .9 ..	21 .06											
						.1 .8	100 Dom Oil pf.	.9 .9 ..	21 .06											
						.1 .5	1,900 Cretone Syndicate	.6 .6 ..	21 .06											
						.1 .5	11,500 Carib Syndicate	.6 .6 ..	21 .06											
						.242 .158	780 Cities Service	.203 .197 .198 ..	21 .06											
						.72 .51</														

The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

Continued from Page 419

The total was in the vicinity of \$96,800,000 (against \$41,156,000 the week previous) and distributed as to character of issuing body as follows: (a) municipals and foreign \$37,900,000, (b) industrials \$22,400,000, (c) public utilities \$26,500,000, (d) railroads \$10,000,000. The noteworthy issues were: \$3,822,000 City of Norfolk (Va.) direct obligation non-callable bonds, \$1,172,000 4½%, due 1947, offered at 101½, to yield about 4.40 per cent.; \$650,000 4½%, due 1972, at 102, yielding about 4.40 per cent.; \$2,000,000 5%, due 1952, at 108½, yielding about 4.50 per cent.; \$500,000 South Vancouver (British Columbia) 5%, due 1930 to 1945, at prices yielding 5.60 per cent.; \$10,000,000 Southern California Edison general and refunding 5%, due 1941, at 95, yielding 5.40 per cent.; \$250,000 Cumberland County (N. C.) road and bridge 5%, due 1951, at prices yielding 4.65 per cent.; \$3,794,000 City of Philadelphia non-callable 4%, due 1952, at 101½, yielding 3.935 per cent.; \$450,000 City of Wilmington (N. C.) 4½%, due 1923 to 1942, at prices yielding 4.50 per cent.; \$2,000,000 Seville-Biltmore Hotel Corporation first mortgage sinking fund 7½%, due 1937, at par; \$1,500,000 A. E. Little Company first mortgage sinking fund 7%, due 1942, at par; \$18,000,000 Kingdom of Norway sinking fund external 6%, due 1952, at par; \$2,300,000 State of North Carolina 4½ per cent. school bonds, \$15,000 due annually 1927 to 1936, inclusive, at prices yielding 4.30 per cent., and \$15,000 due annually 1937 to 1946, inclusive, at prices yielding 4.25 per cent.; \$4,500,000 Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Railway consolidated mortgage 4½%, non-callable, due 1957, at 96½, yielding 4.72 per cent.; \$15,000,000 Hershey Chocolate first mortgage sinking fund 6%, due 1942, at 93½, yielding 6½ per cent.; \$400,000 Fifty-five Park Avenue Apartment (N. Y. C.) first (closed) mortgage serial 6%, due 1923 to 1935 at par; \$1,000,000 The Mount Royal Hotel Company, Ltd., convertible debenture 8%, at par; \$300,000 Delaware County (N. Y.) 4.20 per cent. bonds, due 1923 to 1952, inclusive, at prices yielding 4 per cent. for the 1923 maturity, 4.10 per cent. for the 1924 to 1929 maturities, 4.05 per cent. for the 1930 to 1935 maturities, and 4 per cent. for the 1937 to 1952 maturities; \$1,000,000 State of Mississippi 4%, due May 1, 1924, at 100.72, yielding 4.25 per cent.; \$14,000,000 Consumers Power first lien and uniting mortgage 5%, series C, due 1952, at 92½, yielding over 5.50 per cent.; \$2,500,000 Southwestern Gas and Electric general mortgage 6%, due 1957, at 90, yielding 6.75 per cent.; \$2,500,000 Pierce, Butler & Pierce Manufacturing first mortgage sinking fund 6%, at par; \$5,000,000 Island of Montreal Metropolitan Commission sinking fund 5%, due 1942, at 96.33, yielding 5.30 per cent.; \$400,000 Gastonia (N. C.) street improvement 5%, due 1923 to 1941, at prices yielding 4.70 per cent.; \$5,000,000 Missouri Pacific Railroad first and refunding mortgage 6%, series D, due 1949, at par.

In spite of the attractiveness of the new Government loan the municipal market was strong and quickly absorbed new offerings. Overcounter trading in the Liberties was large, especially on Thursday, in the tax-exempt 3½%. New York State issues were a little depressed. There is still a good demand for new offerings which are taken up with alacrity. Attention is being concentrated on the Federal Farm Loan bonds and the Joint Stock Land Bank bonds which return a handsome yield compared with the character of the obligation, and also offer limited tax-exemption. It is expected that the Treasury Department will undertake another national piece of financing through a bond issue some time this December.

The volume of trading in rail bonds last week was large and floating supply somewhat excessive. The triple A issues continued their downward course, but stalled around the week-end. The semi-speculative and the speculative groups were prominent in the trading. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe general 4% went off 1%, to 88%; the adjustment 4%, at 81½, were off 1%, and at 82½ the convertible 4% of 1935 showed a net loss of 1%; Atlantic Coast Line first 4% declined 1%, to 88%; as usual Baltimore & Ohio issues received good attention but went off, the prior lien 3½%, at 95, were off 1%; the 6% of 1929 fell 1%, to 100%; the convertible 4½% declined 1%, to 83; the first 4%, at 82½, defied the trend and were up a net 1%; the refunding 5% dropped 1%, to 87; very active trading was done in Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh consolidated 4% during the first part of the week—at the time of the recent offering of \$4,500,000 of the consolidated 4% it was thought that the price was a little too high and the decline in the bond to 94½, off 1%, was somewhat expected; Canadian-Pacific consolidated debenture 4% dropped 1%, to 80½; Central of Georgia 6% of 1929, at par, were off 1%; Central Pacific, over which the Southern Pacific is having segregation

trouble with the Government, incurred losses in its bonds, the 6% of 1949 fell off 1%, to 87½; Chesapeake & Ohio obligations were active as is usually the case, the consolidated 5% ran up 1%, to 100%; the general 4% dropped 1%, to 80; the convertible 4½% dropped off 1%, to 96%; and the convertible 4½% dropped off 1%, to 87½; Chicago & Alton refunding 3% showed a loss of 1%, at 93%; and the first lien 3½% declined 1%, to 82%; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy general went off 1%, to 88%; the first and refunding 5% dropped 1%, to 100%; Chicago & Eastern Illinois general 5% were also active, at 82%, they were off a point; Chicago, Milwaukee & Puget Sound first 4% were particularly depressed and dropped off 2%, to 78%; St. Paul general 4% also declined, they went off 2%, to 74%; Chicago Union Station first mortgage series dropped, the 6% lost 1%, to 112; Chicago & Northwestern general 4% went off a point, to 88%; Chicago, Rock Island general 4% declined 1%, to 83, and the refunding 4% lost 1%, to 83; Cuba Railroad first 5% at 85 showed a loss of 1%; Delaware & Hudson convertible 5% dropped a point, to 90%; Erie issues were weak, the consolidated extension 7% fell 1%, to 104%; the consolidated 4% dropped 1%, to 64%; while the general 4% and the convertible issues went off fractionally; at 111% Great Northern general 7% showed a recovery and lost a net of but 1%; Hocking Valley consolidated 4½% developed a weakness and fell off 2 points to 85%; Illinois Central collateral trust 4% fell a point to 84%; Long Island consolidated 5% also fell a point, and closed at 98; Louisville & Nashville unified 4% slumped a point, to 90%; Missouri, Kansas & Texas adjustments fell 1%, to 61%; Missouri Pacific general 4%, at 64%, were off 1%; New Orleans, Texas & Mexico income 5% rose 1%, to 76%; New York Central issues were in good demand and showed but fractional losses; Northern Pacific refunding and improvement 6% fell 1%, to 108%; and the 5 per cent. series dropped 1%, to 98%; Pennsylvania general 4½% declined 1%, to 91%; St. Louis-San Francisco prior lien 4% fell 1%, to 73%, while the adjustment and income 6% fell fractionally; Seaboard Air Line bonds were sold in large volume and the issues declined fractionally; Southern Railway issues were soft, the development 6%, at 102%, were off 1%; the first consolidated 5%, at 96%, were off a point, and the general 4%, at 96%, were off 2%; Wabash first 5% dropped down 1%, to 62%; Western Maryland 6% went off 1%, to 62%; Western Pacific first 5% dropped a point, to 83; West Shore first 4% declined 1%, to 88.

The public utility bond market was off fractionally and was characterized by its withstanding powers. American Telephone and Telegraph collateral trust 5% dropped 1%, to 98%; Commonwealth Power 6% fell 1%, to 98%; Duquesne Light first and collateral 6% declined 1%, to 103½, and the 7½% fell 1%, to 106%; Detroit Edison first and refunding 5%, at 97, were off 1%; Montana Power first 5%, at 98½, were off 1%; Laclede Gas Light refunding and extension 5% dropped 1%, to 92%; New England Telephone and Telegraph first 5%, at 90%, were off 1%; New York Telephone 6% of 1949, at 103½, were off 1%; North American Edison secured 6% fell a point, to 95%; Northwestern Bell Telephone first 7% and the Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania hovered around their redemption price of 107½%; Pacific Gas and Electric general 5% went off 1%, to 92%; Pacific Telephone and Telegraph refunding 5% dropped a point, to 97%; Toledo Edison first 7% went off 1%, to 106%; Havana Electric Railway, Light and Power general 5% dropped a point, to 94%; Philadelphia Company first and refunding 6% showed a net loss of 1%, at 100%.

The industrial department was not so prominent and fluctuations were more or less small. The resistance power of the bonds in this division was strong during the week. American Smelting and Refining first 5% covered a good deal of ground and at 94½ they were up 1%; American Sugar 6% closed unchanged from last week; Bush Terminal Buildings 5%, at 92%, were off a point; Cerro de Pasco Copper convertible 6% went off 1%, to 123%; Chile Copper 6% lost 1%, to 95%; while the 7% remained unchanged; Consolidation Coal first and refunding 5%, at 91, closed 1% off; Empire Gas and Fuel 7½% were in great activity, they closed at 94, off 1%; General Electric 6% closed at 105%; the company has announced its intention of calling in these bonds for payment on Feb. 1 next, at 105; Goodyear 6% declined 1%, to 101%; Goodyear Tire first 5% declined 1%, to 116, and the debenture 6% went off 1%, to 90%; Sinclair 7½% dropped 1%, to 103, the conversion privilege of these bonds having expired last Monday; Sinclair Pipe Line 5% went off a point, to 94%; Standard Oil of California 7% dropped 1%, to 105½—it is expected that these bonds will be called in a short while at 105; United States Rubber first and refunding 6% were weak during the week.

ing the first part of the week but developed strength and closed a point up, at 89½; Virginia Carolina first 7% fell 1%, to 96½; Wilson first 7% dropped 1%, to 105%; and the convertible 6% declined a point, to 98.

The foreign bond market was strained. Belgian 8% dropped 1%, to 102; Bolivia 8% declined 1%, to 96½, on no developments so far known except that it is not believed that the bonds were well placed; "French cities" 6% were off a point, at around 80%; Brazil Central Railway 7½% fell 1%, to 87%; other Brazilian issues closed with minor changes; Canadian obligations were in good demand; the 5% of 1952 closed at 99, off 1%; Chile 8% of 1926, 1941, and 1946 closed practically unchanged; Czechoslovak 8% dropped 1%, to 93%; Dominican Republic 5½% fell 1%, to 80; Dutch East Indies issues displayed activity, the 1947 and 1962 maturities, at 95 and 94½, respectively, were off 1%; French 8%, at 99½, to a point; French 8%, at 96, showed a decline of 1%; the 7½% are considered as a good indicator of political conditions in Europe; Paris, Lyons and Mediterranean 6%, which are in effect obligations of the French Government, fell 1%, to 74; State of Queensland 6%, at 101½, were off 1%; and the 7%, at 108½, were off a point; State of Rio Grande do Sul 8% at 100, were off 1%; British issues dropped on the report that Lloyd George had resigned, but later recovered part of their loss; the convertible 5½% of 1929, at 100, declined 1%, and the 5½% of 1937, at 102%, were off a point.

The week's Curb bond market was as a whole quiet. Practically the entire list remained unchanged or showed very small fluctuations. The exceptions were: Columbia Graphophone 8%, which rose 2%, to 32½; the Standard Oil of New York 7% of 1925, which gained a point, at 106, and the 7% of 1927, which lost 1%, to 105; Jugoslav 8% fell 1%, to 83%.

Foreign Exchange

THERE were two outstanding developments in the foreign exchange market last week, one the upturn in sterling to a new high for the present movement at \$4.48, the other a decline in German mark to a new low record of 29.16 hundredths of a cent, this comparing with a high for the week of 3% hundredths of a cent. In the case of 3% hundredths of a cent, this was natural to expect that there should have been a further downturn until the market encountered such disturbing news as the resignation of Lloyd George. Word of this caused a reaction to \$4.44% and subsequently there was a moderate recovery as supporting orders came into the market. So far as the upturn in sterling was concerned, it was the logical sequence to the lifting of pressure from exchange on London. The payment of interest on the British war debt was accomplished in part by the shipment of gold to this country and in part by the sale of sterling to establish dollar credits. With this operation completed, it was to be expected, then, that there would be a further rebound in the price of sterling.

The question of German marks has to do entirely with the unlimited output of paper currency in Germany. The checks that were put upon speculation could not correct the position of the mark in the international exchanges. Such a course might have had some influence if there had been evident any desire on the part of Germany to curtail the output of new currency. The record of last week in the official statement of the Reichsbank, however, indicated clearly that no new policy was to be inaugurated. New note circulation to the extent of 31,000,000,000 marks was announced, the highest record for any week thus far, and record which could not help but spell further disaster for the dollar value of the mark. As has frequently been said the mark at this rate is fast drifting into the position of Austrian kronen and Russian rubles. How much of it is artificial may be open to debate, but it can be said that Germany appears to hold no desire to correct the situation, but rather is embued with the idea of printing marks as fast as the printing presses can work and converting them into the exchanges of other nations through sales to speculative purchasers.

It would seem that people by this time might have been able to differentiate between the bankruptcy of the German people and the bankruptcy of the German State. The latter is so complete as to cause wonderment as to what the eventual outcome will be. A multiplication of value can be accomplished to a certain extent by increasing the size of denomination of the issue of currency, just as did Russia, and after that perhaps it will be possible, as was the case with the Soviet Government, to scale down the total currency by issuing new currency which shall represent an aggregate of mark values, as, for instance, 100 or 200 old marks

for one new mark. But any means of this character is simply subterfuge and that which may prove dangerous is that the German people themselves are holding much the same opinion of the mark as do other nations. It is conceivable that ultimately the currency medium of another country may find circulation in Germany as a basis of settling debts between Germans themselves. In some sections the dollar has already played such a part.

French francs receded to 7.38 cents last week from 7.52½ cents, and the Belgian rate was also reactionary. Exchange on Sweden declined to 18.30 from 18.46. There was, however, some strengthening in the rate on Amsterdam, which sold at the year's high of 39.18. The Central European rates fluctuated irregularly, with the Polish rate somewhat heavy. So far as the Chinese rates were concerned, they showed a reactionary tone, due to a lower price for silver.

Money

THERE was some easing in the call money market last week. While the range of rates for demand loans was 4½ to 6 per cent., the same as that prevailing in the preceding week, the high rate was made in the early part of the week and there was successive easing up to Friday. On Thursday the rate in the outside market touched 4 per cent. and 4½ per cent. ruled on the Exchange. On the other hand, there was no evidence of easing in the time money market, the rate remaining firm at 5 per cent. for all maturities. There was little activity in this quarter of the money market. Acceptances were firm, buyers' and sellers' rates advancing ½ to 4 per cent. and 3% per cent., respectively, for thirty to ninety days, with the same degree of firmness on more distant bills. The commercial paper rate was unchanged at 4½ per cent.

The easing in the call rate was hardly of particular significance. It is no wise to changes the opinion expressed last week that a stiffening in rates in the money market may be expected as the year draws to a close. It is increasingly evident that business is making greater demands and this tends to limit the supply of funds available. In the case of demand loans there is nothing to foreshadow any abrupt curtailment of the supply. Rather there will be a progressive cutting down and ultimately, if the stock market expands, there may be temporary shortages which will cause an advance in the rate to above 6 per cent. While brokerages are not large as compared with other periods, still they are far from being small, and with business increasing its demand for accommodation, there will naturally be a shortening of funds that flow into the call money market.

Iron and Steel

A S compared with recent weeks, there was a period of lessened activity in the iron and steel industry. During the last several days this was attributable to several causes. In the first place there was not such an urgent demand for immediate delivery of iron and steel products, this apparently having been brought about by the quickening of demand during and just after the coal and the railroad strikes. However, there was still the overhand of the transportation situation to be considered in any estimate of future business. It cannot be denied that there is still a congestion at many of the steel centers, and it is coming to be the belief of steel men that there is little likelihood of operations being raised above 70 per cent. during the balance of this year.

This does not mean that the industry is slowing down. As a matter of fact, operations at the present time, taking the industry as a whole, are in the neighborhood of 70 per cent., and this means a huge output of steel products, since the manufacturing capacity of the country is so far in excess of what it was only a few years ago. There is no indication of any real slackening in demand, but rather it is a case where the urgency of demand has somewhat abated. It may be that this is correlated to the price movement in raw materials. It has been noted during the last several days that prices of coke and pig iron were working toward a lower level, and it may be that consumers feel that this readjustment of prices will find reflection in the quotations on finished steel products. There has been some slight recession in certain products, but on the whole it may be said that the price as to finished products is practically unchanged.

It is a debatable point as to whether a moderate decline in the price of raw materials would have any pronounced effect on

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State of Maine (\$863,000) 4%.....	3.90	July, 1, 1921	July, 1943-48	Clark, Williams & Co., 160 B'way, N.Y.C. Cert. 3094
City of Troy, \$42,000, 4%.....	4.05	June, 1923-42	Clark, Williams & Co., 160 B'way, N.Y.C. Cert. 3094
City of Rome, N. Y., U. F. S. D., 4%.....	4.10	Sept., 1923-38	Clark, Williams & Co., 160 B'way, N.Y.C. Cert. 3094
Town of Union, N. Y., U. F. S. D., No. 5, 4%.....	4.20	July, 1923-36	Clark, Williams & Co., 160 B'way, N.Y.C. Cert. 3094
Township of Overpeck, N. J. (\$236,000).....	4.35	July, 1929-44	Clark, Williams & Co., 160 B'way, N.Y.C. Cert. 3094
County of Washington, Va. (\$251,000).....	4.60	July, 1941-42	Clark, Williams & Co., 160 B'way, N.Y.C. Cert. 3094
Township of Overpeck, N. J. (\$62,000).....	4.25	July, 1944-48	Clark, Williams & Co., 160 B'way, N.Y.C. Cert. 3094
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Brunswick County, N. C. \$75,000, Road, 3½%.....	4.00	1940-1953	Federal	Spitzer, Rorick & Co., 120 B'way, N.Y.C. Rector 0095
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Morton Co., No. Dakota, \$150,000, Funding, 6%.....	5.00	1932	Federal	Spitzer, Rorick & Co., 120 B'way, N.Y.C. Rector 0095
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The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

the market for steel. It must be remembered that costs in all lines have been rising, and that the price of finished steel has hardly kept pace; therefore a slight reduction in raw materials might not be carried through to finished steel product. So far as raw materials are related to iron and steel, it is worth while considering that it takes between three and four tons of raw materials to make a ton of steel. Also, as has been pointed out on previous occasions, labor is one of the chief items entering into the cost of iron and steel, and the trend in wages is upward rather than downward.

In connection with traffic conditions, it is worth while noting that in some instances motor trucks have been called into use as a means of transport for manufactured products, and that runs as far as Detroit have been made, with the additional cost of \$10 to \$18 a ton as a result. This, of course, represents steel that is in urgent demand, and, more particularly, special types of steel. On the whole, however, the industry cannot extricate itself from a major traffic difficulty by means of the motor truck. It will be necessary to await a smoothing out of the difficulties in the transportation line, and there is no reason to doubt that present obstacles will be overcome as the Winter progresses, and that probably by the turn of the year the movement of finished products will be unhampered.

The industry still is looking to the railroads for a big volume of business during the coming months. There is every indication that the carriers are in need of large tonnages for various wants, and there is no reason why this buying should not make itself felt in the market for a long time to come. Undoubtedly the railroads will place further orders for cars and locomotives, and the present transportation situation has emphasized the fact that they are needed quickly if there is to be an expansion in business such as has been predicted. Thus far business as a whole, while showing improvement, is by no means on a normal plane. It is indicated, however, that expansion is taking place through the fact that business is making heavier demands on the money market.

Building operations have fallen off recently, but there is still a big amount of construction to be undertaken, and the steel industry can look forward to good business from this quarter for many months. Likewise, there is a heavier demand from automobile companies than is general at this season of the year. This has been largely due to the fact that the automobile manufacturers have been able to create a demand for closed cars, which is far in excess of that which the industry has heretofore known.

Pig iron prices at Chicago have receded about \$1 a ton, and at Pittsburgh the base price has declined a like amount. The Iron Age, in its composite figure on pig iron, showed last week a current price of \$30.27 per gross ton, as compared with \$30.94 in the preceding week. The Iron Trade Review's composite price on fourteen iron and steel products showed \$43.56 last week, as compared with \$43.88 in the preceding week.

Textiles

By far the greater number of the interesting happenings in the textile industries last week were confined to the cotton goods trade. There, more than in any of the other trades, were there advances in prices, activity in buying and withdrawals of goods previously priced.

Actual withdrawals of fabrics in the cotton goods trade took place in denims and in percales, the largest producer in the country in each case showing the way. The denims, which had previously been withdrawn so far as shipments this year were concerned, were reinstated for deliveries during the first two months of 1923. In one full business day, however, the total production of the mills for that period was disposed of and the merchandise withdrawn a second time. The percales were withdrawn on Friday, this action being attributed to the rapid rise in cotton and the advancing cost of the goods in the gray, rather than to a sold-up condition of the mills. In the case of bleached cottons, one of the country's leading lines was placed "at value," the price at which they had been selling being withdrawn instead of the goods. Unbranded bleached printcloths also moved up during the week, the general advance being a quarter of a cent a yard. Printcloths in the gray also advanced as a result of the higher cost of cotton, with spot 28x2-inch 64-65s held at 9½ cents or more, depending on the price views of the holder of the goods.

The feature of the week in the woolen and worsted goods field was the opening of Spring lines of worsteds by the largest independent maker of those goods in the country. The new figures showed an average advance of 10 per cent. over those for the Fall season. Several independent lines that had been opened previous to the ones in question were repriced at advances ranging up to 15½ cents a yard. In the jobbing end of the market for dress goods there was little done of importance, an expected opening of one of the prominent corporation lines having failed to materialize. No marked change in the buying and sell-

ing of manufactured silks was seen during the week, nor was there much new in the ribbon situation. Even the raw silk situation eased up to some extent, the week's rise in No. 1 Sinshu amounting to only 5 cents. This brought it to \$8.25 a pound, the highest price in more than two years.

Business in linens continued to improve, orders having come in from the road during the week in good volume. There was also buying in this market on the part of retailers, and it kept up well despite the fact that the higher prices growing out of the new tariff are beginning to make their appearance. The ready acceptance of the advances by buyers is said to be due in part to the psychological effect of the rising markets for woolen and cotton goods.

Burlaps were inactive and weak, with both light and heavy goods quoted lower at the close. The large shipments from Calcutta in the last two months, and prospects of others to come, have "beared" the local market to no small degree.

Shipping

THE most elaborate scheme yet proposed for the taking over and operation of the Government-owned merchant fleet has been rejected by the United States Shipping Board with such definiteness that there is little possibility of its modification or amendment for reconsideration.

Shipping circles were considerably agog over the announcement on Oct. 16 that a vast concern had been organized, at the instance of W. F. Gibbs, formerly naval architect for the International Mercantile Marine Company, and with the backing of the Huntington estate, Homer Ferguson, the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company and others, to take over and operate the Leviathan and the following vessels now composing the fleet of the United States Lines: George Washington, America, President Van Buren, President Roosevelt, President Harding, President Polk, President Arthur, President Adams, President Garfield, President Monroe, President Fillmore and Susquehanna.

Among things of interest reported about the new company were that its projected passenger operations were comparable to nothing hitherto set on paper except possibly the gigantic Pacific Coast combine once talked of as the agency for taking over all Government ships on the Pacific; that it was to start off with a capital of \$5,000,000 and liberal aid from the Shipping Board; that it was the same company which Homer Ferguson of the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company recently announced

intends to build two 1,000-foot passenger liners; and that its formal offer, accompanied by plans and specifications, had been placed in the hands of the United States Shipping Board.

Within twenty-four hours after the publication of the story, however, the great project tumbled to pieces like a house of cards, information coming, in no uncertain terms, from those in position to know, that, whereas the plan had been submitted to the Shipping Board, it had been flatly and unconditionally rejected. W. F. Gibbs, reported to be the head of the new organization, laid the proposal in detail before Chairman Lasker of the Shipping Board, but was unable to convince him of its merits and feasibility. Officials of the Shipping Board, it is said, are disposed to continue the Government's vessels under their present management, without change, although frankly at sea as to what to do with the great monster Leviathan when its reconditioning at an expense of \$8,000,000 is completed.

The statement given out Monday, Oct. 16, by the Shipping Board, advising of the formation of the Admiralty-Oriental Line to take care of the Government-owned ships out of Seattle to the Orient, is taken to mean the beginning of the development of a Pacific Coast company of considerable proportions. The officers of the new company are: R. Stanley Dollar, President; J. Harold Dollar, H. M. Lorber and A. F. Haines, Vice Presidents, and Merrill Robinson, Secretary. Chairman Lasker, in announcing the formation of the new company, explained that it was to effect "a separation of the Government's ships into a company that will devote its entire time to the operation of the allocated ships" and "leave the Pacific Steamship Company free to devote all its attention to the operation of its own ships in the very important trade in which they are engaged." The company, generally known as the old Admiralty Line, operated five passenger ships—the President McKinley, the President Jackson, the President Grant, the President Jefferson and the President Madison—between Seattle and the Far East on the North Pacific run for the Government, in addition to operating four of the Government's cargo ships in the same trade.

The decision of The Hague Tribunal awarding to Norway approximately \$12,000,000 on claims growing out of the requisitioning by the United States during the war of Norwegian vessels is, in spite of the immediate dissent filed by the American arbitrator, Chandler P. Anderson, likely to stand without contest by the United States Government and Shipping Board. It is not believed that the American arbitrator in communicating

to the Secretary General of the tribunal and the agents of Norway and the United States his opinion that the tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction, and the American Government's agent, William C. Dennis, in announcing that he reserved for the United States "all the rights arising out of the plain and manifest departure of the award from the terms of submission" represent what will be the final and official viewpoint of the American Government. To the contrary, counsel for the United States Shipping Board have made it rather plain that in all probability the award would be accepted without further ado.

The counter-claim of the United States for \$22,800 in behalf of Page Brothers, San Francisco ship brokers, was not allowed by the tribunal, but the deduction of this amount from one of the Norwegian claims allowed was permitted on condition that the United States pay the sum to Page Brothers.

The tribunal was composed of James Valleton of Switzerland, who acted as President; Chandler P. Anderson, for America, and Benjamin M. Vogt, for Norway.

The battle over Attorney General Daugherty's crusade to extend the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead act not only to all American ships but to all foreign ships in American waters rages, without any signs of abatement or compromise. Great Britain, in a note to Secretary Hughes, has quite definitely declined the American proposal for a treaty to extend the right of search to all waters within twelve miles of American territory, and the American State Department has quite acquiesced, making no move to indicate that any further step to extend the right of search beyond the three-mile limit was in prospect. In the meantime the British Government has made the seizure by prohibition enforcement officials of the Canadian schooner Emerald, off the New Jersey coast, the ground for formal protest, contending that the vessel was outside the three-mile limit and American jurisdiction. The report of the prohibition enforcement officials to Washington was that the Emerald had been seized for liquor smuggling while in communication with shore from a point beyond the three-mile limit, and that the seizure was according to the recent Government ruling as to operations beyond American territorial waters. The controversy apparently turns upon whether or not the Emerald was in touch with shore through her own boats.

The Government, in the matter of applying the Daugherty ruling to foreign vessels, is becoming more and more timid and uncertain. Application of the decision to foreign vessels leaving their home ports and American vessels leaving foreign ports, which was to have become effective on Oct. 14, was postponed, following a visit of the Prohibition Commissioner to the White House, until Oct. 21. The question of a permanent injunction to restrain the Government from enforcing the Daugherty decision is at this time still hanging in the balance, five foreign and two American companies having presented their arguments for such an injunction before Federal Judge Learned Hand, Tuesday, Oct. 17. Judge Hand reserved his decision. The foreign companies emphasized the point that liquor stocks on board ship are ship's stores rather than merchandise for import or export, and as such do not fall under the intent of the Volstead act. The American lines stressed the contention that the word "territory" does not refer to American ships on the high seas and cannot mean so until Congress specifically acts on that point. It would seem at this juncture of affairs highly probable that the enforcement of the dry decision will be delayed by permanent injunction until the Supreme Court shall have acted. It is possible for this reason that it was announced by the Prohibition Bureau on Oct. 18 that it would take the initiative in bringing the question of the legality of the decision before the Supreme Court, attempting to effect a final settlement of the controversy within a month's time.

A special session of Congress, on or about Nov. 20, for the consideration of the Administration's Ship Subsidy bill meanwhile looms up as more and more of a possibility. In high official circles the conviction is expressed that the controversy over liquor on ships has reacted strongly in favor of the Administration measure. The visit of Representative Philip Campbell of Kansas, Chairman of the House Rules Committee, to the White House to urge a special session is thought to be significant of the trend of things.

The announcement that the Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company of Glasgow is to build for the Union Steamship Company of New Zealand a liner 600 feet in length and of eighteen knots speed for propulsion by internal combustion engines has interested shipbuilders and marine engineers throughout the country. Although the shipbuilding company has evidently considered the latter from all angles, the plan of putting such high speed on a vessel of this tonnage with a propulsion by internal combustion engines is a feat which will be watched with keen interest.

Protests over the Shipping Board's delay in acting on the American Steamship Owners' Association's complaints against Government competition in the intercoastal trade and the complaints of the Williams Line against the

American-Hawaiian Steamship Company withdrawing from the conference have resulted in Commissioner Chamberlain asking the various lines to submit answers to a long list of questions relative to the intercoastal business. These answers have been furnished, it was stated, and the lines declare that a decision of the board would go a long way toward restoring harmony in rates.

Settlement of claims of the Argentine Government against the Shipping Board on account of the collision of the Shipping Board vessel, the American Legion, with several gunboats and other craft of the Argentine Government in the Harbor of Buenos Aires on Aug. 21 has been made. The board turned over to the South American republic one lake type vessel and one seagoing tug, and injuries to the seamen of the Argentine vessels will be settled to an amount not exceeding \$50,000. The provisions of the Disarmament Conference prohibited the United States from complying with the demands for a battleship in settlement.

Stocks—Transactions—Bonds

STOCKS, SHARES

	Week Ended Oct. 21, 1922	1921	1920
Monday	1,230,502	604,895	473,661
Tuesday	1,091,290	414,151	366,980
Wednesday	1,240,630	472,113	451,550
Thursday	1,274,607	437,203	537,256
Friday	1,084,832	484,858	383,184
Saturday	484,842	389,960	203,823

Total, week 6,416,793 2,814,270 2,413,088
Year to date 210,226,637 133,836,813 175,041,257

BONDS (PAR VALUE)

	Monday	\$15,722,700	\$15,763,000	\$12,558,400
Tuesday	19,645,800	11,486,250	13,652,000	
Wednesday	19,183,500	12,564,950	14,108,450	
Thursday	18,318,250	12,237,000	14,801,650	
Friday	20,862,750	15,375,450	15,578,900	
Saturday	13,280,600	6,697,350	6,189,000	

Total, week \$107,013,600 \$71,144,000 \$76,888,400
Year to date 3,488,976,107 2,611,947,795 3,005,879,150

In detail the bond dealings compare as follows with the corresponding week last year:

	Oct. 21, '22	Oct. 22, '21	Changes
Corporations	\$39,490,500	\$20,237,500	+\$19,253,000
Liberty	32,006,000	45,277,500	-12,970,000
Foreign	9,894,500	8,545,000	+ 1,349,500
U.S. Govt. new	24,875,000	+ 24,875,000
4½s	147,000	34,000	+ 113,000
City
Total, all	\$107,013,600	\$71,144,000	+\$32,889,600

Stocks—Averages—Bonds

TWENTY-FIVE RAILROADS

	High	Low	Last	Chg.	Net	Same Day
Oct. 16	69.99	69.07	69.46	+.23	51.23	
Oct. 17	69.84	69.25	69.50	+.04	51.78	
Oct. 18	69.89	68.84	68.90	-.60	52.24	
Oct. 19	69.59	68.47	68.61	-.29	52.49	
Oct. 20	69.38	68.53	69.01	+.40	52.43	
Oct. 21	69.43	68.98	69.13	+.12	52.46	

TWENTY-FIVE INDUSTRIALS

	High	Low	Last	Chg.	Net	Day
Oct. 16	113.93	111.85	112.47	-.24	72.69	
Oct. 17	114.44	112.35	113.64	+1.37	73.10	
Oct. 18	116.24	112.96	113.68	-.18	73.25	
Oct. 19	114.48	111.71	112.37	-1.29	74.01	
Oct. 20	114.31	112.18	113.30	+.93	74.72	
Oct. 21	114.08	113.02	113.52	+.22	74.07	

COMBINED AVERAGE—50 STOCKS

	Oct. 16	91.96	90.46	90.96	-.01	61.96
Oct. 17	92.14	90.79	91.67	+.71	62.44	
Oct. 18	93.06	90.90	91.28	-.39	62.73	
Oct. 19	92.03	90.00	90.49	-.79	63.40	
Oct. 20	91.84	90.35	91.15	+.66	63.57	
Oct. 21	91.76	90.98	91.32	+.17	63.71	

BONDS—FORTY ISSUES

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New England Securities
Bought—Sold—Quoted
WITHINGTON & CO.
27 State St., Boston.Atlantic City Gas Co. 5's, 1960
Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Lt. 5's, 1951
St. Clair County Gas & Elect. 5's, 1959
Chester County Public Service 5's, 1947**McCown & Co.**
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61 Broadway, N. Y. Bowl. Green 6860**Guaranteed Railroad Stocks**
MINTON & WOLFF
Broad 4377

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ADVERTISEMENTS.

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Open Security Market—Bonds

UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES

	Bid	Offered	
Consol. 2s, April, 1930	102%	103%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731
Conversion 2s, 30 days from date of issue	92	95	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731
Old 4s, 1925	103%	104%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731
Liberty 1st 3½s, 1932-47	101.90	102.00	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731
Liberty 1st 4½s, 1932-47	99.06	99.10	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731
Liberty 1st-2d 4½s, 1932-47	100.60	100.90	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731
Liberty 2d 4½s, 1921-42	98.96	99.00	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731
Liberty 3d 4½s, 1928	98.12	99.18	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731
Victory 4½s, 1923	99.10	99.16	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731
Victory 4½s, 1922	100.32	100.36	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731
Panama 3s, 1961	99.16	100.20	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731
Philippine 4s	91	93%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731
Philippine 5½s, 1941	107%	108%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731
Porto Rico 5½s	Quo. on Req.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
			C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 6731

FOREIGN SECURITIES, INCLUDING NOTES

GOVERNMENT ISSUES

	1½	2½	
Austrian 6s, Treasury	1½	2½	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500

Austrian 6s, Treasury

Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300

ARGENTINA:

Argentine Recession 4s	66	60%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Argentine Recession 4s	66	66%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Argentine 4s, 1896-1900	66	65%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Argentine 4s, 1896-1900	60%	61%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Argentine 4s, 1897	66	66%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Argentine 4s, 1897	66	66%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Argentine 4s, 1897	66	66%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Argentine 4s, 1895 (large)	79	75%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Argentine 4s, 1895 (large)	75	75%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Argentine 4s, 1895 (520 pieces)	75	75%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Argentine 4s, 1895 (large)	78	75%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Argentine 4s, 1900 (large)	78	75%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Argentine 4s, 1900 (small)	75	75%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Argentine 4s, 1900 (small)	75	75%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Argentine 4s, 1945 (listed)	80%	82%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Argentine 4s, 1945 (listed)	81	82%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613

BELGIUM:

Belgian Restoration 5s, 1919	60	62	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Belgian Restoration 5s, 1919	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Belgian Restoration 5s, 1919	60%	62%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920	66	69	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920	65	68	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920	65	68	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920	67	70	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920	69	99%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Belgian 7½s, 1945	103	103%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Belgian 8s, 1941	102%	103%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Belgian 8s, 1941	101%	102%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330

BOLIVIA:

Bolivian 6s, 1920	8%	8½%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Bolivian 6s, 1940	77	80	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330

BRAZIL:

Brazil 4s, 1889	36%	39%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Brazil 4s, 1889	38%	39%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Brazil 4s, 1889	38%	39%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Brazil 4s, 1889	38%	39%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Brazil 4s, 1910	39	40	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Brazil 4s, 1910	38%	39%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Brazil 4s, 1910	38%	39%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Brazil 4s, 1911	20	24	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Brazil Recession 4s	39%	40%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Brazil Recession 4s	39%	40%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Brazil Recession 4s	39%	40%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Brazil Recession 4s	39%	40%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Brazil 4½s, 1883	43	44	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Brazil 4½s, 1883	44	46	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Brazil 4½s, 1888	43	44	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Brazil 4½s, 1888	42½	44%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Brazil 4½s, 1888	43½	44%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Brazil 5s, 1895	48%	49%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Brazil 5s, 1895	48	49	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Brazil 5s, 1895	48	49	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Brazil 5s, 1903	53	57	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Brazil 5s, 1903	55	60	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Brazil 5s, 1903	55	60	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Brazil 5s, 1903	53	57	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Brazil 5s, 1913	43	27	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Brazil 5s, 1913	46	47	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Brazil 5s, 1913	46	47	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Brazil 5s, 1914	40%	47%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Brazil 5s, 1914	55	60	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Brazil 8s, 1941	101%	102%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613

CANADA:

Canada 5s, 1925	96%	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Canada 5s, 1926	99%	99%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Canada 5s, 1931 (external)	99%	99%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Canada 5s, 1931 (internal)	99%	99%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 613
Canada 5s, 1931	99%	100%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Canada 5s, 1931	99%	100%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Canada 5s, 1932	99%	100%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Canada 5s, 1933			

ADVERTISEMENTS.

ADVERTISEMENTS.

Open Security Market—Bonds

FOREIGN SECURITIES, INCLUDING NOTES—Continued

GOVERNMENT ISSUES—Continued

DENMARK:

	Bld	Offered	
Denmark 3½%	14	16	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Denmark 3½%	14%	19%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Denmark 8%, 1945	110	110½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Denmark 8%, 1945	109½	110%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Danish Con. Municipal 8%	107%	108%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813

FINLAND:

	17	20	C. B. Richard & Co., 20 B'way, N.Y.C. Whitehall 500
Finnish 5½%			Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
French 4%, 1917	46%	47	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
French 4%, 1917	46	47	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C. Broad 7130
French 4%, 1917	46%	46%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
French 4%, 1917	46	47	C. B. Richard & Co., 20 B'way, N.Y.C. Whitehall 500
French 4%, 1918	46	48	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
French 4%, 1918	43%	47%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
French Victory 5%	56	57	C. B. Richard & Co., 20 B'way, N.Y.C. Whitehall 500
French Victory 5%	56	56%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
French Victory 5%	56	57	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
French Victory 5%	56	57	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
French Premium 5%	64%	66%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
French Premium 5%	65%	66%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
French Premium 5%	65	67	C. B. Richard & Co., 20 B'way, N.Y.C. Whitehall 500
French Premium 5%	64%	66%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
French Premium 5%	64%	66	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C. Broad 7130
French Premium 5%	64%	66	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
French 6%, 1921	66%	68%	C. B. Richard & Co., 20 B'way, N.Y.C. Whitehall 500
French 6%, 1920	67%	68%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C. Broad 7130
French 6%, 1920	67%	68%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
French 6%, 1920	67%	68%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
French 6%, 1920	67%	68%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
French 7½%, 1941	95%	97%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
French 8%, 1945	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
French 8%, 1945	99%	100	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330

GERMANY:

	20	30	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C. Broad 7130
German Govt. 5%	14	14	C. B. Richard & Co., 20 B'way, N.Y.C. Whitehall 500
German Govt. 5%	14	14	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300

GREECE:

	50	55	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Greek 5%, 1914	50	55	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C. Broad 7130

GREAT BRITAIN:

	250	260	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
British Consol. 2½%	376	386	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
British Funding 4%	75%	77%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
British Funding 4%	75%	77%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
British Victory 4%	78	80	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
British Victory 4%	78	80	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
British 5s., 1922	80%	81%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
British 5s., 1922	80%	81%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
British 5s., 1922	80%	81%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
British 5s., 1927	93%	95%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
British 5s., 1929	93%	95%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
British 5s., 1929	89	91	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Rector 813
British 5s., 1929-47	41%	45%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
British 5s., 1929-47	80%	91%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
British Govt. Exchequer 5%	91%	93%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
British Govt. Exchequer 5%	463	473	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Great Britain and Ireland 5½%	102	103	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330

ITALY:

	34	34½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Italy 5s., 1920	34	34½	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Italy 5s., 1920	34	34½	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Italy 5s., 1920	34	34½	C. B. Richard & Co., 20 B'way, N.Y.C. Whitehall 500
Italy 5s., 1920	34	34½	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C. Broad 7130
Italy 5s., 1925	41%	42%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Italy 5s., 1925	41%	42%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Italy Treasury 5s., 1925	42	43	C. B. Richard & Co., 20 B'way, N.Y.C. Whitehall 500
Italy 5s., 1925	41%	42%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C. Broad 7130
Italy 5s., 1925	41%	42%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Italy 5s., 1925	96%	97%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Italy 5s., 1925	95%	96%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Italy 5s., 1925 (small)	94	96	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330

JAPAN:

	59	62	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Japan 4%, 1910 (sterling)	63	64	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Japan 4%, 1910	79%	80%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Japan 4%, 1931	79%	80%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Japan 4%, 1931	79%	80%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Japan 4%, 1931 (small)	76%	77½	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Japan 4%, 1931 (small)	76%	77½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Japan 1st series 4½%, 1925	92%	93%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Japan 1st series 4½%, 1925	92%	93%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Japan 2nd series 4½%, 1925	92%	93%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Japan 2nd series 4½%, 1925 (small)	90	92	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Japan 2nd series 4½%, 1925 (small)	90	92	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Japan 5s., 1907	72	73	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Japan 5s., 1907	71	73	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330

MEXICO:

	10%	11½	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Broad 7130
Mexican 3s	10%	11½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Mexican 3s	10%	11½	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Mexican 4s, 1845	37%	38%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	C. B. Richard & Co., 20 B'way, N.Y.C. Whitehall 500
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C. Broad 7130
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Mexican 4s, 1845	38%	39%	Dunham & Co.,

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Open Security Market—Bonds

PUBLIC UTILITIES—Continued

	Bid Offered	
Salmon River Pow. Co. 1st 5s, '52	94% 100%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
San Antonio Pub. Serv. 6s, '52	98% 99%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 610
Scioto Val. Trac. 1st 5s, 1923—	97 00	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6336
Santiago Elec. & Trac. 6s, '50	64 ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Schenectady Ry. 5s, 1946—	73 75	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Seattle Elec. 1st 5s, 1930—	90 90%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Seattle Electric 5s, 1923—	92 92%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Seattle-Everett 1st 5s, 1930—	86 86	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Seattle Lighting 5s, 1923—	85 87	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Shawinigan W. & P. 1st 5s, '52	101 103	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Shawinigan W. & P. 1st 5s, '54—	98 100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Shawinigan W. & P. 1st 5s, '56—	103 105	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Southern Canada Pow. 6s, 1948—	92 95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Southern Public Utility 5s, 1943—	92 94	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Southern Util. 6s, 1933—	89% 91	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Southern Wla. Pow. 1st 5s, 1938—	76 78	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Syracuse Gas 5s, 1946—	94% ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Syracuse Ltg. 5s, 1951—	95 ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Terre Haute Elec. 5s, 1929—	85 ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Terre Haute Trac. & Lt. 5s, 1944—	85 ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Texas Pow. & Lt. 1st 5s, 1937—	93 94% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Toledo Edison 1st 5s, 1947—	94 ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Toronto Pow. Co. Ltd. 5s, '24	96% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Toronto Pow. Co. Ltd. 5s, '24	97% ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Tri-Tel Ry. & Lt. 1st 5s, 1930—	90 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Tri-Tel Ry. & Lt. 1st 5s, 1942—	90% ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Twin City Lt. & Trac. 6s, 1935—	77 83	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
United Lt. & Ry. Co. 1st 5s, 1922—	88 89	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
United Lt. & Ry. Co. 6s, 1932—	93% 97%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
United States Tel. 7s, 1941—	103 105	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Union Elec. Lt. & Pow. ref. & ext. 5s, M. & N., 1933—	93 95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Utah Lt. & Trac. 5s, 1944—	89% 90%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Virginia Power 6s, 1942—	81 82	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Wash. Balt. & Annapolis 5s, '41	80 81	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
West Pr. Trac. 1st 5s, 1960—	83% 85%	Otto Billi, 37 Wall St., N.Y.C. Hanover 629
West Virginia Utilities 6s, 1935—	74 80	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Wisconsin Edison Co. 6s, 1924—	101 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Wis. Elec. Pow. 7s, 1945—	106% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Wis. River Pow. 1st 5s, 1941—	88% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Yadkin River Pow. 1st 5s, '41—	91 ..	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 6340
Yarmouth Lt. & Pow. 5s, 1937—	92 ..	Vitas & Hickey, 49 Wall St., N.Y.C. Hanover 4245

RAILROADS

	W.O.	
Atlanta Terminal 6s, 1939—	102% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Atlanta Coast Line 4s, 1939—	82% 84%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Augusta Terminal 6s, 1947—	102% 103	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Austin & N. W. 1st 5s, 1941—	96% 96%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
B. & O., P.L.E. & W. Va. 1st 5s, '41	79% 80%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Buffalo & Rutland 4s, '27—	75 ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
B. & O. Tol. & Cln. 4s, '59—	69 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Buff. & N.Y. 1st 5s, 1944—	77% 80%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Burlington & R. & I. 5s, 1934—	99% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Can. Atlantic 4s, 1953—	72 73	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Can. Northern Ry. 4s, 1930—	88% 89%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Can. Northern Ry. 5s, 1924—	100% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Can. Northwestern 4s, 1943—	87 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Carolina Central 1st 4s, 1949—	71% ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Cent. Argentine 6s, 1927—	95% ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Cent. of Ga. Chat. Div. 4s, '51	82 ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Cent. of Ga. Mobile 5s, 1946—	96 ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Cent. of E. Ist 1st 5s, J. & J., '40—	81% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
C. P. European 4s, M. & S., '46—	67% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
C. & N. North. Ry. 7s, A.D.O., '45—	96 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Central Pacific 4s, 1946—	68 ..	Dunham & Co., 4 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Central Vermont Ry. ref. 4s, '30—	88% 89%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Central Pacific 4s—	68 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Central Vermont 5s, 1938—	88% 89%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Chi. & Erie 1st 5s, J. & N., '82—	97% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Chi. Ind. & Pac. 1st 5s, 1947—	81 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Chi. Ind. & Pac. 1st 5s, 1948—	81 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Chi. M. & P. S. 1st 4s, '49—	61% 71	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
C. M. & S.P. European 4s, J.D., '25—	66 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Chi. M. & St. P. 4s, '46—	85% 86	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
C. T. H. & S. C. Inc. 5s, Dec., '60—	71 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Choctaw-Memphis 5s, J. & J., '49—	89% 90%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Cin. Leb. & N. Ist 4s, M. & N., '32—	82 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Cin. San. & Cleve. 1st 5s, 1928—	97 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Cleve. & Mahon. Val. 5s, J. & J., '38—	95 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
C. C. & St. L. Springfield	95 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
C. C. & St. L. St. L. Cairo 4s, J. & J., '33—	96 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
C. C. & St. L. Cin. Wab. & Mich. 4s, J. & J., '91—	80 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Cleve. Term. & Val. M. & N., '95—	81 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Col. & St. Louis 1st 4s, 1942—	70% W.O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Col. Hock. Val. 4s, A. & O., '48—	84 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Cuba Northern Ry. 1s, 1936—	80 ..	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Col. & Toledo F. & A., '55—	70 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Detroit, Tol. & Ironton 1st 5s—	89 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Delaware River R. & Bridge 1st 5s, 1940—	70 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Detroit & Mackinac gen. 4s, '95—	70 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Detroit & Mackinac 1st 4s, '95—	75 W.O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Detroit & Mackinac 1st 4s, '95—	70 ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Dul. S. S. & A. 5s, J. & J., '37—	80 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Edmonton, D. & B. C. (gtd. Alberta) 1st 4s, A. & O., '44—	80% 87%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Fla. Cent. & Penin. con. 5s, '45—	91% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Florida West Shore 5s, 1934—	61% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Gal. Harris. & San. An. 1st 5s—	97 100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Gal. H. Ist 5s, A.O., '33—	80 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Georgia & At. 5s, 1945—	84 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Georgia & At. con. 3s, 1945—	81 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Grand Trunk Pacific 1st 4s, '41—	70% 72	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
G.R. & W. 2d 4s, A. & O., '36—	80% 82	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Grand Trunk Pacific 3s, 1962—	63 ..	Alfred F. Ingold & Co., 74 B'way, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 1454
Grand Trunk Pac. 4s, '39 (Alberta) 5s, 1962—	82% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Grand Trunk Pacific 3s, 1962—	62 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Grand Trunk Pac. 4s, all issues, Will trade.	82% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Grand Trunk Pac. Min. & Pral. Div. 4s, 1955—	70% 71%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
G. T. Pac. (Alberta) 4s, 1942—	80% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
G. T. Pac. (gtd. Dom. of Can.) gen. 4s, 1962—	80% 81%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
G. T. Pac. (gtd. Dom. of Can.) 3s, 1962—	62 ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
G. T. Pac. Prairie 4s, 1937—	70% 71%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
G. T. Pac. L. Sup. 4s, '35—	71% 72%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Grand Trunk Western 4s, 1950—	76% 77%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Grand Trunk Western 4s, '50 (E) 6s	620 650	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Gt. N. Ry. of Can. 4s, A.O., '34—	81% 82%	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Gulf & Ship Island 5s, 1932—	83 W.O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Gulf Terminal Co. (Mobile) 1st 4s, J. & J., '57—	79 82	Alfred F. Ingold & Co., 74 B'way, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 1454
Gulf Term. of Mobile 4s, 1937—	80 83	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Hannibal & St. Louis 1st 4s, 1937—	94 96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Hudson & West. Cen. 1st 5s, '37—	97% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Hudson & West. Cen. 1st 5s, '37—	44 55	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Hudson & West. Cen. 1st 5s, '37—	85 89	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Ind. & Louisville 1st 4s, 1936—	76 78	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Jacksonville Term. 4s, 1967—	107 109	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Jefferson R. R. 5s, 1929—	99% ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Kanawha & W. Va. 5s, 1955—	91 93	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Kanawha & W. Va. 5s, 1955—	91 93	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
K. C. & M. & A. 4s, A.O., '36—	70% 81	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. R

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Open Security Market—Stocks

STANDARD OIL SECURITIES

Bid Offered

Anglo-Am. Oil Co., Ltd.	21	21%	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Atlantic Refining Co.	175	142%	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Atlantic Refining Co. pf.	116	118	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Borne-Seymer Co.	425	440	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Huckeye Pipe Line Co.	94	95	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
*Chesbrough Mfg. Co. Con.	215	230	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
*Continental Oil Co.	148	151	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Crescent Pipe Line	35	37	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Cumberland Pipe Line	150	155	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Eureka Pipe Line	95	95	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Galena Signal Oil Co. com.	50	54	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Galena Signal Oil Co. pf. new.	105	110	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Galena Signal Oil Co. pf. old.	111	114	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Illinois Pipe Line	71	77	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Indiana Pipe Line	93	97	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
International Pet. Co., Ltd.	22%	23%	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
National Transit Co.	25	26	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
New Haven Trans. Co.	175	178	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Northern Pipe Line	108	110	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Ohio O. Co. com.	223	237	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Penn.-Mex. Fuel Co.	26	29	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Prairie Oil & Gas	665	675	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Prairie Pipe Line	294	297	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
*Solar Refining	385	395	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Southern Pipe Line	96	98	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
South Penn. Oil Co.	190	195	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Southwest Penn. P. L.	60	62	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Standard Oil of Cal., \$25 par.	125	126	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Standard Oil of Ind., \$25 par.	125%	125%	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
*Standard Oil of Kansas	380	395	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
*Standard Oil of Kentucky	110	111	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Standard Oil of Nebraska	190	200	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
*Standard Oil of New York	565	570	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
*Standard Oil of Ohio	540	550	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Standard Oil of Ohio pf.	118	120	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Swan & Finch Co.	30	35	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
*Union Tank Car Co.	115	120	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
*Union Tank Car Co. pf.	109	112	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Vacuum Oil Co.	653	665	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500
Washington Oil	24	28	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C. John 4500

*Ex dividend.

RAILROADS

Alt. & S. Southern ordinary	50%	53	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Alt. & S. Southern pf.	53	58	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Albany & Susquehanna	194	200	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Beech Creek R. R.	39%	41%	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Canada Southern	53	56	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Cleveland & Pittsburgh 7%	71%	..	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Cleveland & Pittsburgh 4%	40%	..	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Fort Wayne & Jackson pf.	103	108	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Illinois Central leased line	77	79	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Kalamazoo, Allegan & G. R.	105	118	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Kan. City, Ft. Scott & Mem. pf.	540	550	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Mobile & Birmingham pf.	656	68%	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Minn. St. P. & S.M. leased line	66%	..	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Morris Canal	79	82	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
New York & Hudson	125	140	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
New York, Lack. & West	101	103	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Northern Central	78	80	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & C. pf.	141	142	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Rensselaer & Saratoga	123	127	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Schuylkill Valley & R. R.	47	..	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
St. Louis Bridge 1st pf.	110	115	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
St. Louis Bridge 2d pf.	53	56	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Tunnel R. R. of St. Louis	110	115	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
United N. J. R. R. & Canal	109	204	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379
Valley Railroad	98	..	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4379

PUBLIC UTILITIES

Adirondack P. & L. Co. com.	23	25	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. G. & E. 10% com.	93	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. G. & E. Co. com.	175	178	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. G. & E. pf.	47	48	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. Pow. & Lt. pf.	93	98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. Gas & Elec. 9% pf.	47	48	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. Lt. & Trac. 8% com.	148	150	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. Lt. & Trac. 6% pf.	93%	97	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. Pow. & Lt. Co. 4% com.	148	142	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. Lt. & Trac. pf.	148	150	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. Lt. & Trac. 6%	111	112	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. Lt. & Trac. 6% ex war	100%	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. Lt. & Trac. warrants	105	110	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. Public Utilities 6% pf.	88	91	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Am. Public Utilities 6% com.	148	149	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Appalachian Pow. Co. com.	27	28	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Appalachian Pow. Co. com.	27	28	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6360
Appalachian Pow. Co. com.	24	27	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C. Bow. Gr. 6340
Ark. Lt. & Pow. Co. com.	23	26	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Ark. Lt. & Pow. Co. 7% pf.	73	75	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Bayuk Bros. com.	58	63	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C. Bow. Gr. 6340
Bayuk Bros. 2d pf.	104	110	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C. Bow. Gr. 6340
Bayuk Bros. 1st pf.	116	125	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C. Bow. Gr. 6340
Carolina Pow. & Lt. Co. com.	56	60	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Carolina Pow. & Lt. Co. 7% pf.	96	98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Carolina Power & Light	57	59	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6360
Central Maine Pow. Co. com.	37	40	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Central Maine Pow. Co. 6% pf.	85	86	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Central Maine Pow. Co. 7% pf.	96	98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Central States Elec. Corp. com.	9	10	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Central States Elec. Corp. 7% pf.	69	72	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Central States Elec. Co.	9	11	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6360
Cities Service, bankers' shares	20%	21%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Cities Service, bankers' shares	20%	21%	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C. Hanover 10000
Cities Service Co. com.	190	201	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C. Hanover 10000
Cities Service Co. pf.	60%	70	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C. Hanover 10000
Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. 6% pf.	97	102	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. com.	118	125	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. 5% pf.	91	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Colorado Pow. Co. 7% pf.	21%	23	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Colorado Pow. Co. com.	21	23	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6360
Commonwealth Edison Co. com.	187	189	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Commonwealth P. Ry. & Lt. com.	30	32	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Commonwealth P. Ry. & Lt. 6% pf.	66	68	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Consumers Pow. 6% pf.	98	99	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Cont. Gas & Elec. com.	35	40	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Cont. Gas & Elec. 6% pf.	68	71	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Cumberland Co. P. & L. com.	27	30	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Cumberland Co. P. & L. 6% com. pf.	76	80	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Dayton Pow. & Lt. com.	60	60	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Detroit Edison 8% capital	112	115	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Duluth Edison Elec. Co. 6% pf.	83	85	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Duluth Edison Elec. Co. 6% pf.	75	76	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Duquesne Light Co. 7% pf.	107	107	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
East Texas Elec. Co. com.	91	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
East Texas Elec. Co. 6% pf.	82	85	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Elec. Bond & Share Co. 6% pf.	97%	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Empire Gas & Fuel Co. pf.	88	93	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Federal Lt. & Trac. Co. com.	99	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Federal Lt. & Trac. Co. pf.	73%	75	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Ft. Worth P. & L. 7% pf. (ex div.)	93	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
General Gas & Elec. 6% pf.	77	82	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Gen. Gas & Elec. 7% com.	88	89	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Gen. Gas & Elec. 7% com.	92	95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Havasu Elec. Ry. & Lt. & P. pf.	92	94	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6360
International Shoe Co.	114	118	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C. Bow. Gr. 6340
Illinoi's Trac. Co. com.			

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